Utter confusion in the foreign policy of the Pezeshkian government
Utter confusion in the foreign policy of the Pezeshkian government
In the few months since the establishment of the fourteenth government, the field of diplomacy has witnessed the efforts of statesmen in various and diverse diplomatic areas, from official negotiations to public diplomacy, from Geneva to Cairo and Istanbul to Riyadh.
This movement, with the change of government and techniques, and also in response to extensive and rapid regional developments, is natural. However, the question of which strategy, approach, and tactics diplomats should use to leverage all possible capacities to advance national interests and what achievements they will accomplish is open to consideration and reflection.
1. During the election season, Masoud Pezeshkian outlined a dual-axis strategy for the fourteenth government: internal cohesion and, as a consequence, interaction with the world. Throughout the elapsed period, in the area of internal cohesion in advancing foreign policy, there has been considerable alignment with the political power structure, facing no negative reactions except from the perpetual critics of interaction and negotiation.
Unlike the confrontational approach of the twelfth government, in the style of the thirteenth government, neither the president’s speeches nor the foreign minister’s actions received negative feedback from the power structure, and there were no verbal ping-pong disputes. Part of this is due to the specific and unique regional conditions, another part to the perpetual red carpet for the new government, and another part to Pezeshkian’s focus on interaction and consensus-building in various matters.
However, despite the suitable atmosphere in the internal cohesion axis, we do not observe its overflow into the second axis or a significant and tangible advancement in laying the groundwork for constructive interaction in foreign policy, which would lead to a clear and noticeable change in national interests and improve conditions in interactions with the surrounding world. Consequently, no change in the country’s general situation, which has a close and organic connection with the foreign policy domain after decades of sanctions and tensions, is observed, and there are not many encouraging signs in the forward-looking horizon.
We will continue to address this issue specifically and review examples of the fanciful and slogan-driven approach in the country’s diplomatic perspective during the elapsed period.
2. The second visit of Iranian presidents to the land of the pyramids is inherently significant and holds special and unique potential in bilateral relations. It could have resolved the decades-long issue of relations between these two important countries in the geostrategic Middle East, especially considering the events in Syria and the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood spectrum in recent Egyptian developments as a symbol of Arab nationalism alongside the UAE and Saudi Arabia, competing heavily in the geopolitical arena with Turkey and Qatar, the winners in Syria. This presented a very important opportunity for the two countries to come closer and create a new and strategic alliance in the region.
However, from this historic trip, apart from a few souvenir photos, a routine speech, and a restaurant visit, what feedback have we had in this strategic and special position? Of course, not that such approaches are bad, wrong, or unnecessary, but they certainly are not sufficient and comprehensive enough to create tangible changes and establish constructive interaction.
3. On the other hand, we know that one end of the thread to resolve complex foreign policy issues ends in Washington, and the upcoming Trump administration, given its background and key figures, has the potential to escalate tensions and conflicts in all areas. A specific and pragmatic strategy must be outlined and defined to deal with it, a point that was hinted at in some statesmen’s statements reacting to Trump’s election and also in the rumor of a meeting with Elon Musk, but quickly faded with the foreign minister’s emphasis on observation, patience, and a reactive approach to the U.S. government’s actions.
In the latest activity in this regard, Seyed Abbas Araghchi stated in an interview with an Egyptian publication that we are still waiting for the decision of the parties we have entered negotiations with, which includes the three European countries, China, Russia, and the American side that withdrew from the JCPOA.
We are ready to enter into honorable negotiations based on mutual respect and interests.
Some domestic media and government supporters highlighted the part about readiness for honorable negotiations, welcoming it with headlines like ‘Araghchi’s Important Remarks on Direct Negotiations with the U.S.’, whereas Araghchi’s remarks were addressed to the P5+1 members within the framework and context of JCPOA negotiations, and not only did they not refer to direct bilateral negotiations with the U.S., but fundamentally, since Donald Trump and his team showed no interest or inclination towards the JCPOA negotiation framework and withdrew from it, this statement by the foreign minister neither indicates a change in strategy nor provides a foundation for it.
4. In any case, with these symbolic and attractive headlines or slogan-based reliance on public diplomacy approaches, rather than promotional imagery from foreign trips, one cannot expect the necessary and essential changes in the current sensitive and strategic position in the foreign policy arena.
We have now reached a stage where we must accompany a specific pragmatic diplomacy strategy with courage, boldness, and initiative in promotional and slogan-based approaches; otherwise, expecting change and results will be a mere dream.
