Amir Bakhtiari, an operational officer, said that from the second year of the war, the unified command between the army and the Revolutionary Guards was lost.
Amir Bakhtiari, an operational officer at the Karbala headquarters and one of the planners of the Khorramshahr liberation operation, said that from the second year of the war, the unified command between the army and the Revolutionary Guards was lost.
It is unfair to downplay the army’s actions in the first year of the war. There was not much opposition within the army to continuing the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr.
From the second year of the war, the unified command between the army and the Revolutionary Guards was lost.
Leftist groups were accusing army personnel of dishonorable acts; under such psychological pressure, no military force could endure.
Within 20 months, 15,000 army personnel were purged.
They assumed anyone serving in the intelligence unit was a SAVAK agent, and with this reasoning, they dismantled the army’s intelligence organization.
Despite all the problems, the Iraqi army was bogged down in the deserts of Khuzestan. Saddam, who had come with the intention of capturing Tehran, requested a ceasefire on the sixth day of the attack.
In the first seventeen days of the war, thirty army pilots were martyred.
