The Baku-Tel Aviv Military Axis
Amid the escalation of conflicts in Lebanon and the ongoing Israeli military attacks in West Asia, events related to the Baku-Tel Aviv military axis in the South Caucasus are generally overlooked.
Meanwhile, on September 27, AzerSalah, a state-owned company from Azerbaijan, signed a strategic memorandum of understanding with the Israeli holding company AAS and its subsidiary AriArms, known for producing small and light weapons according to NATO standards. Therefore, bilateral cooperation in this field will be expanded.
Over the past year, following the start of the ‘Al-Aqsa Storm’ operation, while many Muslim countries condemned Israel in response to the violence against the people of Gaza and it affected their relations with this regime, Baku has continued its relations with Tel Aviv more than before.
Such agreements are not new for the parties; military cooperation between Baku and Tel Aviv has significantly increased since the previous decade.
Israel is an important arms exporter to Baku. According to research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, from 2011 to 2020, Israel accounted for 27% of Azerbaijan’s total arms imports.
In 2012, Israel and Azerbaijan signed a contract under which Israel’s state aerospace industries would sell $16 billion worth of drones and air defense and missile systems to Baku. Baku also decided to locally produce some weapons, like drones, through a joint investment between its Ministry of War Industries and the Israeli company Aviation Defense Systems.
This trend has been upward during the mentioned ten-year period, such that from 2016 to 2020, Baku imported 69% of its major arms from Israel.
Also, according to the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, between 2015 and 2019, Israel supplied 60% of Azerbaijan’s average annual arms purchases. Additionally, the Israeli company Elta Systems helped Baku by providing a comprehensive digital map of Nagorno-Karabakh, giving Azerbaijani forces a significant advantage during operations.
Therefore, on the eve of the Second Karabakh War and before the 2023 operations of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, Israeli leadership actively provided necessary weapons and ammunition for the Azerbaijanis, without which Baku could not have achieved victory in the war.
It has even been stated that Israeli special services played an important role in planning the operations.
After the success of the Azerbaijani military forces in capturing Karabakh, reports emerged from the region that Israel had begun constructing its secret military-security facilities in Karabakh.
In 2023, the parties signed a contract for Israel to supply two satellites to Azerbaijan worth $120 million, as well as the purchase of the Barak MX missile interception system worth $12 billion.
Naturally, the cooperation between Baku and Tel Aviv on a larger scale includes the construction of electronic espionage stations on the southern borders of Azerbaijan to monitor Iran’s activities.
Additionally, Baku allows Mossad to establish an advanced operational base on its soil to conduct operations inside Iran, while also making its airports available to Tel Aviv if needed to advance attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites.
For this reason, reports that consider Azerbaijan as the origin of many acts of sabotage inside Iran are justified in light of these matters.
On the other hand, in addition to the mentioned security benefits for Israel, Azerbaijan is a major oil supplier for this regime.
According to available data, over 60% of Israel’s crude oil is supplied by Baku through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
Despite Israel’s violence in Gaza and global public opinion pressures, Azerbaijan has maintained its effective role in supplying energy to Israel.
In conclusion, considering the stated matters, it can be said that Baku-Tel Aviv relations rely on three pillars: oil, weapons, and intelligence. Israel buys oil from Azerbaijan and sells advanced military equipment to it, in return, Baku allows Tel Aviv access to its land and sea borders with Iran. Therefore, the notion that Israel might use its capacities in Azerbaijan to respond to the ‘Promise of Sadiq 2’ operations at a security and even lower military level is not far-fetched.
