Battle After Defeat

25 Min Read

Battle After Defeat

The battle after the defeat in the fourteenth presidential election case was finally closed with the introduction of Masoud Pezeshkian as the new president of Iran, and the elected president is currently designing his cabinet.

In these days, however, the situation among the conservatives is not calm. The defeat in the election and losing the executive branch, only three years after the end of Hassan Rouhani’s government, has kept the internal conflicts among them heated, and they are now going through another phase of internal family conflict. These conflicts began last winter between the neo-conservatives supporting Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and the radical conservatives and fundamentalists, having four phases, three of which have been passed, reaching today where they are trying to blame each other for the failure to reach the presidency.

Phase One

The first phase of the internal conflict among the conservatives was displayed in the winter of 2023 and before the twelfth parliamentary elections, where they, unlike the eleventh parliamentary elections, did not agree on presenting a unified list, making the division among them public.

The Coalition Council of the Revolutionary Forces, considered a relatively older organization, led by Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel and headed by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and with the support of the Stability Front, stood on one side. On the other side was the Unity Council of Conservatives led by Manouchehr Mottaki, and a significant and controversial part of this division was created with the name of the Trustees and centered around the newly established Sharian Party, which presented a list including controversial conservatives like Hamid Rasaee and Amirhossein Sabati.

This created tripartite in the parliamentary elections initially only manifested in different lists with minimal similarity, but on the eve of the parliamentary elections, a statement by Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel changed the situation, where Haddad-Adel referred to himself and the Coalition Council members as the main tree and the other created lists as its offshoots.

After this statement, the conflict between them peaked and extended to the virtual space, and in the end, with the lowest participation in the history of parliamentary elections in Iran, the offshoots managed to defeat the main trees and gather more votes than prominent figures like Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

However, the interesting point here is that the offshoots could not succeed in bringing their desired candidate to the presidency of the parliament, and once again Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf took the seat of the head of the legislative branch, marking a victory for someone whom the radical conservative faction was trying to prove their superior position over him and his supporters.

Phase Two

After the parliamentary issue was resolved and both conservative groups in a way felt victorious, a new phase of internal conflict among conservatives began with the early presidential elections, which was actually a continuation of the same trend present in the parliament.

Initially, with the assumption that Ghalibaf would not enter the presidential race, the focus of attacks was limited to reformists Ali Larijani and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, after Ghalibaf registered, their dual contest officially began, centered around Saeed Jalili and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, continuing until election day.

Supporters of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf based their attacks on the fact that Saeed Jalili had no work record, trying to highlight why Saeed Jalili had not taken any major executive position in the structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran so far.

On the other hand, supporters of Saeed Jalili mostly tried to follow the same parliamentary election narrative, bringing up the issue of the Speaker’s entourage and presenting Saeed Jalili as the only suitable candidate to continue the path of Ebrahim Raisi.

This process and virtual conflicts between the two conservative groups were pursued with great power and intensity, and ultimately, despite the efforts made, neither Ghalibaf nor Jalili withdrew, leading both to enter the elections like in 2013, with Saeed Jalili advancing to the second round along with Masoud Pezeshkian.

Phase Three

With Saeed Jalili and Masoud Pezeshkian advancing to the second round of the presidential elections, although Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf officially supported Saeed Jalili by issuing a statement, this view and support did not exist among some of Ghalibaf’s supporters. Even some prominent figures who supported Ghalibaf in the first round not only did not join Saeed Jalili’s team in the second round but went further and officially supported Masoud Pezeshkian, a situation that led to verbal conflicts among conservatives on social media in the one week between the first and second rounds of the elections.

Phase Four

After the fourteenth presidential election case was closed with the announcement of Masoud Pezeshkian’s name, a new phase of these conflicts has begun among Saeed Jalili and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s supporters, which is visible these days in the virtual space.

To investigate this issue, we turned to the social networks used by conservative activists, including Virasty and Eitaa. Examining Virasty can be interesting as it serves as a platform for dialogue, where they respond to each other in a space similar to Twitter.

What Jalili’s Supporters Say

The atmosphere among Saeed Jalili’s supporters is such that they emphasize if Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf had withdrawn, Saeed Jalili would have won this competition in the first round. For example, Amirhossein Sabati, a member of the twelfth parliament and a supporter of Saeed Jalili, wrote in a note after the elections that after the votes were counted, some of Ghalibaf’s supporters claimed that if Jalili had withdrawn in favor of Ghalibaf in the first round, he could have defeated Pezeshkian in the second round.

But this analysis is wrong from several aspects. Firstly, based on the popularity index, Jalili had more votes and naturally should have stayed in the scene, and after the first round, it was clear that his votes were about three times that of Ghalibaf, and in this regard, perhaps if it were the other way around and he had withdrawn in favor of Jalili, Jalili could have finished the job in the first round.

Ghalibaf’s high negative votes due to various issues, which had also manifested in the recent parliamentary elections in Tehran, indicated that he was also an easier opponent for Pezeshkian in the second round.

Or the Khat-e-Velayat channel on Eitaa wrote that the volume of destruction against Jalili was unprecedented. Jalili was attacked by insiders and outsiders. Do you wonder why some people who were in Mr. Ghalibaf’s campaign turned to Pezeshkian’s campaign? Have you ever thought about why they are so afraid of Jalili? Why don’t they want Jalili to be in the game? Why don’t they like someone like Jalili to be prominent? The reason is clear: he was the only candidate who pointed to corruption in the system, repeatedly citing the example of the wheat warehouse and the mice.

This atmosphere was also seen among other political activists supporting Saeed Jalili. For example, these texts were observed in the Virasty space. Hadi Zare wrote, ‘In the explanation jihad, we fell short; the elders only gave orders.’

Zarif sweated, but our elders sat in Tehran and gave orders, and their maximum effort was to reach Mashhad al-Reza the night of the election to persuade the younger ones who sweated for each of Jalili’s votes that 3 is greater than 9.

Esra Parsia: The Coalition Council and the elders of the Revolutionary Front should stop their stubbornness. The 14 million reception of Saeed Jalili is not a threat but a political and social potential that should be seen as an opportunity. The offshoots with empty hands received 14 million votes. This is not a threat; it is an opportunity.

Peyman Hassani: Unfortunately, we have reached a point in the country where someone who speaks of real Islam and the Muhammadan Sharia is called backward by our clerics and scholars.

Seyyed Reza Karimi: By standing against the totalitarian neo-conservative movement, Saeed Jalili showed that he has the capacity to become a charismatic figure for leading the revolutionary movement after dear Ahmadinejad and Raisi. The necessity of leading the revolutionary movement is no less than being a revolutionary president.

Mohammad Taqi Radman: To those who condemn the bipolarity of Jalili and Ghalibaf supporters, we, relying on the people’s votes, broke some fake and false taboos and stood silent with pride. It is those preachers, media people, and virtual players who are trying to clear the remaining dues thrown into the well on election night.

Danial Pourabbas: The code name of the operation was to destroy Dr. Jalili so that 14 million people would regret it and create division among them. The pseudo-revolutionaries and two-column analysts, employer Hadi Jahanmehr, I am just saying so that some do not make foolish analyses. Those idiots who think that if Jalili withdrew, 100% of his supporters would vote for Ghalibaf should know that we would have cast void votes. People like me would never and ever vote for Ghalibaf.

Reza Gomar: The joint project with the keyword of eliminating Jalili and Raeisi is because they have raised young people who are thinkers, who are not deceived by money, position, and rank, and work for the country for free, and do not recognize the guardianship of the main trees.

This is dangerous for the future of both parties. Do not become a pawn because we have weakened their table. Mohammad Raouf Alipour: The joint mission of Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian was to prevent Jalili from entering the Pasteur. Whenever the nation understands this, they will no longer be fooled.

Meysam Mahmoudi: Ghalibaf caused the defeat of martyr Raisi. This noble Jalili was the best choice who created 16 million votes for martyr Raisi in 2017 and made him win in 2021 with his withdrawal. Never did they vote for the martyr of the republic and voted for Hassan Fereydoun. This year, they voted for Pezeshkian so that the best choice would not get votes. Habib Bagheri: May God never forgive Ghalibaf and his team who secretly colluded with Pezeshkian and the reformists to prevent the revolutionary option from getting votes, and may they be guided to the depths of hell along with all the oppressors and tyrants of different eras on the Day of Judgment.

Alireza Golkari-Fard: Revolutionary friends, the enemy is afraid of Jalili’s high votes. You might say we lost, but from the enemy’s perspective, Jalili’s supporters are the same young faithful revolutionaries that the leader of the revolution has repeatedly been proud of.

These approximately fourteen million people are the same population willing to stand by the system until the last drop of blood, and the enemy’s fear is from this.

Hanan Hekmati: If Ghalibaf really cared about the revolutionary front, he should not have run for candidacy because both his vote in the parliamentary elections had recently decreased, and he already had one branch in his hand, and it would have been better to conquer another branch as well. Must you be president?

Ali Shojaei: None of them have a history of rent-seeking and corruption; their pockets are closed, and their mouths are open, shouting against corruption. Corrupt people fear these individuals, and since they have nothing to say, they are forced to label them as backward, extremist, and delusional, repeating it to tarnish their reputation in the eyes of the people.

Mohsen Azadfallah: I, who voted for Mr. Jalili and brought my family too, have one request: after all the mess that some of these insiders made, did you really expect 50% of the people to come and vote for Jalili? Even with simple calculations, it was impossible.

Yousef Feshki: I see no difference between Ghalibaf and the reformists. What did his silence mean when the reputation of the system was at stake in the baby equipment scandal? Now, at the last moments of the election, his daughter comes and speaks, yet he remains silent about his son. I see Ghalibaf as power-hungry. He had promised the representatives he would not run in the election but broke his promise.

Taha Doostmohammadi: Some friends still do not understand what 14 million votes without dealing with godfathers, partisanship, factionalism, money distribution, participation in political gatherings, and spreading lies mean. Well, do you want this process to be strengthened or should we sit and mourn?

Mohammad Esmaeili: In this cycle, we lost due to the lack of adherence of insiders and outsiders to political ethics. Whether it was friends who did not agree to the stated consensus or opponents who slaughtered ethics with tribalism and Taliban phobia. God was supposed to be the witness, and he is. Bravo to Dr. Jalili, who was the true and real winner.

What Ghalibaf’s Supporters Say

Regarding Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and his supporters, efforts to respond to Saeed Jalili’s supporters continue.

For example, Farhikhtegan newspaper in a report questioned the reasons presented by Saeed Jalili’s supporters, writing in part that the claims about the voting organization even on election day by some members of the losing campaign in social networks are so far from reality and humorous that it leaves one astonished, and perhaps the best expression about it is number illiteracy.

Or in another example, the neo-conservative channel on the Eitaa platform wrote about Saeed Jalili’s defeat, stating that the reason for the defeat lies in some of his characteristics, which are frightening for the urban middle class.

He makes ambiguous statements about some important national issues, like strategic depth, which opens the way for different interpretations and shows him as frightening. His entourage is also composed of individuals who are frightening for the middle class.

Sabati, Rasaee, Shahbazi are among these individuals. In the Virasty space, these types of analyses and statements from Ghalibaf’s supporters are also seen, and for example, some of them will be mentioned.

Hossein Ghodratzadeh: The same people who attacked Ghalibaf until yesterday, asking why he became the Speaker of Parliament when he wanted to be president, now have pinned their hopes on Ghalibaf to keep an eye on the government with the parliament.

They didn’t have enough strategic understanding to realize that if the revolutionary front didn’t win, like now, at least they wouldn’t lose another branch.

Hossein Roudsari: As it appears from the evidence, Jalili wants to participate in the elections again in four years. Be assured that with this policy, defeat in the next election is certain, especially if Pezeshkian’s cabinet is not dependent on Rouhani’s government and can manage the economy to some extent in these four years. The revolutionary movement needs a new person.

Reza Mohammadi: I voted for Mr. Jalili in the second round because of Mr. Ghalibaf’s support and the fact that Mr. Pezeshkian’s entourage is the same team as Rouhani’s. But in recent days, I have come to the conclusion that the extremist accusers are more dangerous for the country than Pezeshkian’s entourage. I’m not regretful of my vote, but in the future, I will not vote for supporters of extremist ideologies.

Saeed Ebrahimi: When will the Stability Front realize that Jalili cannot attract high votes? When will you consider the gray votes in your calculations? Until when will you impose Western-oriented governments with unrealistic idealism? In 2013, when Jalili didn’t win, was it about ethnicity or social networks?

Sajjad Kazemi: They say people voted for the best, but they don’t say that for six months we portrayed Ghalibaf as corrupt and non-revolutionary. For four weeks, we brought all the facilities of Martyr Raisi’s government to our work and falsely described only Jalili as the continuation of the martyr.

In the last two days, we took votes from Ghalibaf and gave them to Jalili with the promise of first-round victory. People chose the best. Fatemeh Karimi-Dashti: When they don’t hear and ignore the Supreme Leader’s praise of Dr. Mokhber as criteria for the best presidency, naturally, the destruction project switches from Dr. Ghalibaf to Dr. Mokhber to attribute their weakness to ethnic votes and the ignorance of the people. God bless Dr. Mokhber.

Mehdi Najafi: Where was the ethnic vote? You cannot cover up the disgrace of the revolutionary front’s defeat due to Saeed Jalili’s stubbornness with these statistics.

In 2017, West Azerbaijan voted 64% for Hassan Rouhani, and now only 56% for Pezeshkian. If it were ethnic, these statistics should have increased, not decreased. Mohammad Mansouri: The destruction of Mr. Mokhber in case of candidacy was on the agenda of Sabati, Rasaee, Raeisi, and Adalatkhorha. They start destroying him today to reap the benefits four years later.

Hamed Fard: The insightful soldiers of the sacred defense saw obedience to commanders as obedience to the Supreme Leader and the infallible leader. Wasn’t it like this? Of course, when Jalili is not obedient, we should not expect his supporters to be.

The soldiers who grew up in the lessons of Madani and Motahhari, where are they compared to those raised by Raeisi? Mohammad Javad Negari: Why don’t you still realize that in the polls, attention should have been paid to the dual aspect with Pezeshkian, where Ghalibaf had more chances? But why did Ghalibaf’s visit to Russia and meeting with Putin not please the shadow-sitters, and they expected him to come and answer them instead of going to Russia? That’s the question. Abuzar Sharifi: By the way, why couldn’t your faction get any significant votes in the presidium of the same parliament you talk about, and Ghalibaf was re-elected as the Speaker with a significant difference from people like you and your friends?

Tayebeh Sadat Mousavi: Those who could easily ignore 30 years of senior management experience and extensive praise from the leader of the revolution for Ghalibaf and easily accepted and spread all the insults and accusations made against Ghalibaf, taking the ethics cup with this action, unfortunately lost both ethics and the election.

Masoumeh Ajli: Ghalibaf and martyr Raisi both strived in the path of serving the people, from one responsibility to another. Mr. Jalili, how come you couldn’t serve during Rouhani’s era, but you had a good opportunity to serve during martyr Raisi’s time?

With all due respect, he is among his papers rather than in the field of action and service. Mohammad Hossein Dadkhah-Tehrani: Well, friends, it seems that after destroying and accusing Ghalibaf, it’s now Mokhber’s turn.

Jalili’s entourage is a mindset that will destroy everyone, especially those who are not in their circle.

Just as they glossed over the clear statements of the leader of the revolution about Ghalibaf, they will also gloss over those about Mr. Mokhber.

Alireza Panahi: Because we are religious and revolutionary, we can do anything. These issues cause us to be blind to our weaknesses, not recognize our society, and blame all faults on the ignorance of the people, while a significant part of the faults was ours.

We do not understand society and do not know how to speak to others in an appropriate manner, and when society does not accept our words, we immediately label the majority of people as ignorant. Reza Doosti: Let’s no longer hear anyone say Jalili has no record. Jalili has a lot of records.

He has delivered two presidents to the country, each better than the other. Long live the shadow government, the president-maker. They have recognized the country’s problems and created presidents for us who cannot solve those problems.

Emad Mansouri: The reality is not Pezeshkian’s vote-getting; the reality is Jalili’s lack of votes. If you don’t believe me, ask your non-political and less religious friends how many of them voted just to make sure Jalili doesn’t get elected. Many voted for Pezeshkian out of spite against people like Rasaee, Raeisi, and Sabati.

Yousef Rezayimehr: Let me say that only the elections are over, but the insults towards Ghalibaf continue, and the festering wound of destruction and bipolarity is incurable. Perhaps the solution is to cut off the limb. I hope the next parliament’s participation in Tehran reaches over 20% so that anyone with deceit will be disgraced.

There is no peace in sight

The truth is that a part of the conservatives has moved beyond big names, and it is not the case that with a statement from a prominent conservative figure, they would back down from their position and take another path.

As seen in the recent election, even Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s words and statements could not create unity among them, and after the election, they are attacking each other with harsh language, accusing each other of being the main cause of the defeat in this election.

Overall, with the process that began last winter and continued in the summer of 2024, and is clearly visible among virtual conservative activists these days, it can be said that the rift created among the conservatives is broader than imagined, making it unlikely they will achieve political unity and peace. Even a common opponent has lost its effectiveness for them, and they are engaged in a family feud for more power.

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