Dollars That Didn’t Return: Unveiling the Bitumen Mafia in Oil and Social Security Investment Company
Saeed Aganji, editor of Irangate and investigative journalist focusing on corruption, mentioned a case in a tweet which he claims is one of the main roots of today’s economic and currency crises in the country. In this tweet, he names the corruptions related to the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Labor, and the Social Security Investment Company (Shasta), pointing to a network active in bitumen exports that has not returned over one billion dollars in foreign currency from exports to the country. According to him, the guarantees of this network remain uncollected, and the main perpetrators are either fugitives or still engaged in rent-seeking activities.
Based on the data and information presented in this same exposé, this operation functioned as an organized network rather than an isolated violation. The activity platform of this network is said to include parts of the Ministry of Oil under Paknejad’s management and companies affiliated with the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare, particularly Shasta. This is where oversight weaknesses, structural rent-seeking, and managerial immunity have enabled the outflow of vast foreign currency resources from the country.
Among the names mentioned, Ali Samani is identified as one of the central figures of this alleged network. According to the information presented by Aganji, Samani was involved in a bitumen export trust and a significant portion of the currency from exports managed by this network has not returned to the country. It is said that he is currently a fugitive residing in the United Arab Emirates, and despite not fulfilling currency commitments, the guarantees related to these exports have yet to be collected. The arrest of his nephew, according to this information, has been the only limited judicial action taken against this network so far.
Another name mentioned in this exposé is an individual named Shahidi, a former employee of the export department of Pasargad Oil Company. It is claimed that he acquired ownership of several bulk carriers using rents from bitumen sales and is still seeking to exploit dollar sales rents via the Hormoz Pasargad route. According to the data provided, this individual is considered one of the key players in the foreign sales line of this network.
In this context, Pasargad Oil Company and routes like Hormoz Pasargad are identified as the main platforms for these activities. It is also said that this network, by creating sales lines from the UAE, Europe, India, and Turkey, has facilitated sales, money transfers, and the non-return of foreign currency resources, effectively removing a significant portion of the country’s export revenues from the official economic cycle.
The continuation of such a network’s activities, as presented in this exposé, would not have been possible without oversight negligence, inaction, or managerial incapacity at higher levels. For this reason, sharp criticisms are directed at the Ministry of Oil and its management, as well as the management of Shasta, as one of the country’s largest economic holdings. These are the entities directly responsible for overseeing these processes but have not taken effective action against the non-return of currency and the uncollected guarantees.
The consequences of this situation, if these claims are true, are directly observable in Iran’s economy. The reduction of foreign currency resources, pressure on the currency market, intensified inflation, increased prices of materials and construction projects, and deepening of the livelihood crisis are all natural results of currency outflows and the non-return of export revenues. Alongside these effects, public trust in economic, supervisory, and judicial structures has also been severely damaged.
What makes this case more sensitive is the clear contradiction in the approach to corruption and protest. While citizens and youths face swift and harsh responses for protesting economic conditions, those accused in this exposé of massive national resource outflows are either fugitives or continue to operate within the circles of rent and economic power.
The exposé presented by Saeed Aganji is more than an individual claim; it is a public demand for action against organized corruption. If there is a genuine will for reform, the focus should be on the main perpetrators of rent-seeking networks and the managers who, through decisions of silence or inaction, have paved the way for this corruption. Transparent, public, and immunity-free investigation is not a political demand but a vital necessity for saving Iran’s economy and rebuilding public trust.
