Election of Pezeshkian and U.S. Policy
After a 40% turnout in the first round, Pezeshkian managed to bring some of the voters who stayed home in the first round to the polls, increasing participation to 50%.
The significance of Iran’s presidential elections being downplayed by foreign observers stems from the fact that the most powerful person in Iran is not the president but the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
This is true, but it does not mean that the election of the president is insignificant.
The President of Iran is considered a center of power and has influence and impact in adopting a wide range of policies.
The ideological approaches of previous presidents, ranging from reformists to hardliners, have always been reflected in Tehran’s foreign policy.
The most important product of interaction between Iran and the West in recent years, namely the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was largely the result of the work of the former moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif.
However, the power institution also accompanied Rouhani and Zarif on this path, as it also benefited from the improvement of Iran’s economy as a result of the lifting of sanctions.
Now, for any interaction and cooperation, the ball is in the court of the West, especially the United States.
American policymakers should draw on one of the clearest histories of success and failure available to foreign policy agents when deciding how to hit this ball.
During the three years that the JCPOA was being implemented, from 2015 to 2018, the agreement managed to achieve all of its non-proliferation goals and closed all possible paths for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.
In fact, Iran was placed under strict limitations regarding its nuclear program.
Conversely, ever since former U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018, the U.S. government’s alternative option, namely the policy of maximum pressure on Iran, has failed in all aspects.
Tehran, freed from the JCPOA’s restrictions, accelerated its nuclear program and reached a stage where it can now produce the fuel needed to make a nuclear weapon in just a few days or weeks.
For anyone who makes it to the Oval Office in the White House, the most significant political obstacle to overcome for any serious new engagement with Iran is the mistrust built over the past four decades, Israel’s influence, and the repeated assertion that Iran is the main destabilizing factor in the Middle East and only deserves isolation and punishment.
Paying close attention to politics in Iran and the reasons why this country took the path leading to Pezeshkian’s election, especially the desire and willingness of Iranian citizens to improve economic conditions and their emphasis on lifting sanctions to help overcome these obstacles, will be essential.
The nuclear issue, especially given the state of Iran’s nuclear program after Trump’s mistaken withdrawal from the JCPOA, is clearly the first and foremost priority for resuming interactions.
However, other issues related to regional conflicts and instability must also be addressed.
As long as Israel continues its attacks on the Gaza Strip, this issue will remain challenging.
But negotiations between Iran and the U.S. will align with the recent efforts of Gulf states to reduce tensions among themselves.
Not disrupting this favorable regional environment is another reason why the United States should refrain from accepting a security agreement with Saudi Arabia, which many, though not all, Iranians would interpret as part of an anti-Iran military alliance.
Any new engagement between the United States and Iran will not be harmed on the Iranian side by the long learning curve that the Raisi government has shown since taking office in 2021.
Apparently, the main architect of the Pezeshkian government’s foreign policy is Zarif, who had extensive interactions with American parties during his ministry and in the course of the JCPOA negotiations.
