Europe aligns with Israel and the US, Tehran in the crosshairs of the trigger
Europe aligns with Israel and the US, Tehran in the crosshairs of the trigger
According to Irangate News Agency, with only a few days left until the end of the 30-day deadline set by the three European countries in the JCPOA, the political and diplomatic environment between Tehran and the European trio is in a tense state.
These three countries have issued a warning with three specific demands from Iran, stating that if their demands are not met, they will activate the snapback mechanism, an action that could lead to the automatic reinstatement of international sanctions against Iran.
Despite some recent diplomatic efforts from Tehran, especially regarding technical cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, it seems Europe, in full coordination with the United States and Israel, has taken the path of maximum pressure, and the announced conditions are more a cover for a pre-decided action than an effort to preserve the agreement.
The following note examines the dimensions of this crisis, the extent of Iran’s fulfillment of European conditions, and the potential outlook for future developments.
The snapback mechanism, a deadline for a pre-decided action
Iran and the three European countries in the JCPOA are currently in a 30-day deadline, referred to as the last chance to prevent the activation of the snapback mechanism. According to the official announcement from London, Paris, and Berlin, this deadline was set for Iran to take certain actions to prevent the return of international sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
Ostensibly, three conditions have been raised: initiating direct or indirect talks between Iran and the US, reaching a technical agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and resolving the issue of Iran’s 60% enriched uranium.
In two of the announced conditions, the Islamic Republic of Iran has somewhat clarified its positions. The agreement between Iran and the Agency, recently signed in Cairo during the meeting of our Foreign Minister with Rafael Grossi, is a direct response to one of the technical demands of the Western side.
Regarding the 60% enriched uranium, Iranian officials have explicitly stated that a major portion of this material is located in facilities that were previously targeted by direct US attacks and are practically unusable.
However, the main knot remains in the third condition: negotiating with the United States. Tehran has repeatedly stated that direct dialogue with Washington is not on the agenda, but it welcomes indirect negotiations on nuclear issues.
Nevertheless, the US has not shown a positive reaction so far, and it seems that on the eve of the presidential elections, there is no political will to invest in returning to the negotiation table with Tehran.
The noteworthy point is that the European countries are aware of this reality, yet they continue to insist on the condition of negotiation, as if this precondition is more of a diplomatic cover for a pre-decided action than an effort to preserve the agreement.
The existing evidence, including the unprecedented alignment of London, Paris, and Berlin with the positions of Tel Aviv and Washington, indicates that Europe is moving towards activating the snapback mechanism, and the threefold conditions are merely tools to justify it in public opinion.
On the other hand, information published in Western media and statements by European officials show that their goal goes beyond achieving a mere nuclear agreement.
The Westerners seek to include Iran’s missile programs, regional influence, and security issues in the negotiation agenda, topics which from Tehran’s perspective are not only unrelated to the JCPOA but also cross the defensive and sovereign red lines of the Islamic Republic.
Even the recent agreement with the Agency could not satisfy the Europeans. Some internal factions, pointing to Grossi’s background and his overt interactions with the United States and Israel, considered the Cairo agreement fruitless from the start.
Nevertheless, Iran did not refrain from making such an agreement to show its goodwill in technical cooperation, but the response from the other side was nothing but further pretexts.
In these circumstances, what matters most is Iran’s diplomatic initiative. Sitting in a passive position and merely reacting to destructive actions not only does not reduce the pressure but may also accelerate decision-making processes in European capitals.
Now is the time for the foreign policy apparatus to present a more comprehensive plan for crisis management, a plan that not only focuses on preventing the snapback mechanism but also envisions a broader outlook.
In the end, one must ask, even if Europe decides not to activate the snapback mechanism, does this mean a reduction in tensions in Iran-West relations?
Previous experiences, including field tensions and the 12-day war, have shown that even in the absence of the snapback mechanism, the possibility of conflict and crisis-making exists.
Therefore, it is essential for policymakers in Tehran to seek a strategic framework for smart, resistant, and at the same time flexible interaction with the West, beyond temporary tactics.
