Four-Sided Elections

Four-sided elections

The Ministry of Interior announced the approval of the eligibility of 6 final candidates for the ninth presidential election in Iran.

It is commendable that the Ministry of Interior did not delegate this role to other election affairs and the mechanism for determining eligibility, which does not allow candidates to defend themselves against potential reports against them, is of course open to criticism.

It is not clear on what basis they concluded that Ali Larijani, with a 12-year tenure as the head of the Islamic Consultative Assembly for three consecutive terms and with connections to several clerical families, including the son of Ayatollah Mirza Hashem Amoli and the son-in-law of Martyr Morteza Motahari, is not qualified while others are. This question can also be extended to other candidates, but it is more relevant to him.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the 1403 model is not similar to 1400.

Because in the 1400 model, the main face is predetermined and any challenger is eliminated, leaving only those who do not pose a real competition to the main candidate.

But now it is not like that, and it is not unreasonable to say that a four-sided electoral square has been drawn, and reformists, not proxy or supportive candidates from outside the reformist camp like in 1992 and 1996, who have direct candidates, as mentioned in Friday’s statement, Masoud Pezeshkian, one of the three main candidates, is present. So, reformists are either present with the main and first-degree candidate or proxy or second-degree candidate in the elections or can have.

The second side is, of course, principlism with the symbol of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has entered the field for the fourth time, and everyone wants to know that Ghalibaf in 1403 is similar to 1984 when he appeared as a technocrat or 1992 when he was close to principlism or 1996 when he wanted to resemble Ahmadinejad.

Now we have to see which Ghalibaf we will face in 1403 and whether there is an attempt to simulate the late former president while some candidates who had this potential have been eliminated, although the spectrum of the government and radical principlism have representatives and are not willing to introduce him as the heir of the deceased president.

The third side of radical pragmatism or the spectrum of the government, as mentioned, is represented by three individuals: Saeed Jalili, who, although not a formal member of the government, was pulling the strings of the current government and turned IRIB into the exclusive and propaganda tribune of the government through his brother. Besides him, Ali Reza Zakani and Amir Hossein Qazizadeh Hashemi can also be mentioned.

The fourth side is the traditional right with the symbol of the Secretary-General of the Combatant Clergy Association, in the absence of Mostafa Pourmohammadi. It seemed that in these elections, unlike the previous 11 rounds, no clergy were present, which was not considered a positive point for the clergy.

If Ali Larijani was also confirmed, the 4-sided shape would turn into a 5-sided one. Currently, the moderate or centrist side of pragmatism is absent, and it is not unlikely that Mr. Pourmohammadi will try not to stop at the traditional right and also move towards moderate pragmatism.

Even if Eshaq Jahangiri was confirmed, it would not be unlikely for the final choice of the Reformist Front to be Masoud Pezeshkian, as Zakani cannot place him like Homayoun Sameh. However, in the case of Jahangiri’s presence, it would not be unlikely for him to try to play the same role.

By drawing a four-sided shape in the early elections of 1403, it can be said that the 1400 model has not been repeated. The reason for this may be that a person with the characteristics of the late president was not found for the principlists to unite around, or a general policy was adopted to end the belonging to the majority of people with the ballot box, which happened in the first and second stages of the elections in Esfand 1402 and Ordibehesht 1403 in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Fakhri did not pursue it and no one except the current minister of the country called it a heroic act, and he himself soon realized that an 8% participation is not a heroic act.

Another reason could be the anticipation of Donald Trump’s return to the White House or a serious interest in reforming the partial procedures, which did not include public interest in the past three years and only placed some with the lowest managerial ranks with rent-seeking leaps at the forefront.

In a non-competitive environment without a four-sided shape and with the repetition of the 1400 model, the social backlash after the mourning ceremony was at risk, and perhaps the preference for a four-sided shape and a model similar to 92 over 1400 was for this reason.

Another feature of the 1403 presidential election is that although the likelihood of it turning into a two-pole situation is high, it is unlikely that the other 5 candidates will fall under one pole of 4 individuals in favor of one. Even though some are depicting a 1 vs. 5 scenario from now, this also benefits the reformist candidate, and of course, none of them deny the role of gray layers that come to the field with motivations beyond political, social, economic, administrative, lifestyle, and cultural divisions. Their absence led to a significant decrease in participation in the three elections of 98, 1400, and 1402.