Qalibaf and His Perpetual Confusion
Qalibaf and His Perpetual Confusion
Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the Speaker of the Parliament, yesterday tried to take a conciliatory stance by legally framing the uproar that the hardliners have stirred up to remove Mohammad Javad Zarif. He said that if he were in Zarif’s place, he would have subtly told the President and resigned.
However, for Mr. Qalibaf’s information, it should be noted that Zarif resigned on the very day the cabinet was introduced when he learned that there were legal considerations and constraints for him to hold the position of Strategic Deputy to the President. He stepped aside from the government without creating any controversies. But after some time, following the President’s pursuits and negotiations, and due to the expectations of the elites and the majority of voters who wanted Zarif in the government, considering him the most important symbol and representative of their demands in the new cabinet, and also due to the country’s need in the complex current international situation for Zarif’s responsible presence in the government, he returned to his position.
Therefore, even if Zarif was supposed to, as always, prioritize national interests over himself contrary to his spiteful and anxious opponents, and to reduce controversies, stay out of responsibility from the very start of the government, he did this much earlier than Mr. Qalibaf’s advice and counsel. He resigned at the very beginning of the government, sat aside, and then, with the President’s decision and obtaining necessary approvals, returned to his responsibility.
Therefore, if, according to the Speaker of the Parliament, Zarif’s presence in the government is a legal violation, the accused and responsible here is not Zarif but the President, who insisted on Zarif’s return to the government and taking on responsibility despite Zarif’s resignation. Consequently, if the Parliament and possibly the Judiciary decide to deal with the violator, it is appropriate to deal with the President himself, and if needed, as some radical representatives have also said, dismiss, prosecute, and even imprison Mr. Pezeshkian for employing his main electoral supporter and the country’s strongest diplomat in today’s complex international and quasi-war conditions of Iran.
Of course, before Mr. Qalibaf and the government-opposing representatives want to call Mr. Pezeshkian to the Parliament for trial and indictment, it is better to remember the cabinet’s vote of confidence session and think subtly about what the President might say and to which authorities he might attribute his decision. But beyond this point, it seems that the majority of citizens or at least the voters in the recent election showed who they want, with what discourse and approach, and where. The majority of voters, just as they voted for Masoud Pezeshkian to prevent Saeed Jalili’s victory and the continuation of the Thirteenth Government’s path and the dominance of purists over all the country’s affairs, also voted for the discourse and approach that Zarif was the main symbol of.
A discourse that internally demands the elevation and promotion of developmental elites to achieve national and effective decisions, and externally emphasizes de-escalation and pursuing the JCPOA model to get the country out of the current crisis. Mr. Qalibaf should know that Zarif’s current position and responsibility are very minimal compared to the favor the majority of voters showed him, and the winning team formed with his presence alongside Pezeshkian. The mere acceptance of this responsibility by Zarif is a sign of his avoidance and restraint from internal structural conflicts to gain responsibilities that, from the perspective of elites, political supporters, the majority of voters, and even the President himself, are his least right.
If Zarif did not want to prefer broader interests over himself, he could easily have engaged in disputes and conflicts over higher government positions or refrained from implementing democratic models in the appointment of ministers and other officials in the form of committees and governance councils and used this opportunity to employ his close associates and like-minded friends.
The more important point in this matter, however, is not about Zarif but about Qalibaf himself. Qalibaf has taken off his military uniform for two decades and now considers himself an experienced politician whom the system, country, and people still owe a presidency.
But despite this long experience, accompanied by successive failures in various presidential elections, Qalibaf has still not been able to recognize his place in the political arena. After the recent parliamentary and presidential election experience, in which the hardliners and, in Qalibaf’s own words, the super-revolutionaries did whatever they wanted and could with him and his associates and like-minded people, he practically reached the brink of retirement with the fourth-place finish in the Tehran parliamentary elections and three million votes in the presidential election.
If Qalibaf was able to somewhat restore his image and position after the recent presidential election, it was due to the rise of the Pezeshkian government and the centrality of the discourse of consensus, which emphasizes the cooperation and agreement of moderate and rooted forces from both factions. In the past three months, Qalibaf somewhat showed that he recognized this position, but his manner of confrontation with Zarif in the Parliament yesterday and his statements in the afternoon press conference showed that Qalibaf still does not recognize his place in the political arena and thinks that moderation means making deals with everyone.
He perceives politics, including the discussion of consensus, not as a historical-social process but as a project, similar to his tenure in the municipality and the police force, which he is ready to contract. Interestingly, like most contractors, he is willing to have no standards and to make deals with any employer, provided it is profitable for him.
Thus, one day he becomes a serious supporter of Pezeshkian and a defender of Zarif, and another day he becomes the executor of the policies and orders of the Stability Front, some of which have also been legislated in the eleventh parliament.
This situation compels the political observer to address Qalibaf and tell him that before wanting to be in Zarif’s place or show him his position, recognize your own place and your own good and welfare. All of Qalibaf’s failures in these two decades have been due to not recognizing himself and perceiving politics as a project, and apparently, the severe blows of the two recent elections have also had no effect on him.
