Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and the Nuances of Foreign Policy: Diplomacy’s Outcome versus Prolonged Negotiations
Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a conversation with reporters, pointed out some strategic aspects of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, which he oversees. However, in presenting these strategies, he demonstrated that there are still fundamental differences in foreign policy within the power structure.
He referred to some strategies regarding the JCPOA negotiations, first noting that in diplomatic negotiations, one must be flexible in accepting the other party’s demands and persuading them of one’s own views. In this regard, he mentioned his session with members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, stating that the representatives emphasized that the draft of the JCPOA agreement has flaws, but added that the Assembly should be aware that even if an agreement between Iran and Western countries is reached tomorrow, there may still be flaws in the text of the agreement.
The representatives of the Assembly have emphasized that the draft of the JCPOA agreement has flaws, but he added that the Assembly should be aware that even if an agreement between Iran and Western countries is reached tomorrow, there may still be flaws in the text of the agreement.
حسین امیرعبداللهیان وزیر خارجهHowever, he attributed this to the demands of the other party and stated that the other party also has demands from Iran, and Iran cannot tell the other party that what they say is incorrect and that their words are unacceptable to the Iranian side. He added that there is currently a text that may include the flaws of the JCPOA. He considered these flaws to be inherent in the nature of negotiation and emphasized that those who negotiate are knowledgeable about the art of negotiation.
Political Perspective on the Nuclear Negotiation Team
These statements by Amir-Abdollahian come at a time when this very negotiation team had, for years, accused the previous negotiation team of showing flexibility in negotiations and repeatedly emphasized that Iran had granted concessions to the other party without regard for the system’s limitations and red lines. The fact that this approach is inherent to negotiation, and that negotiators cannot incorporate only their own demands into the agreement and must also consider the other party’s considerations, had been repeatedly stated by the negotiation team and had been criticized by JCPOA critics.
What Will the Final Text Be?
Now, after several months of negotiations and months of repeating the same previous positions that Iran will not back down from its positions, the negotiation team has just come to the realization that the final text might not fully meet the Iranian side’s demands.
The second strategy Amir-Abdollahian mentioned is the issue of result-oriented diplomacy, which is practically in opposition to the negotiation model of thought by Jalili-Baqeri in political negotiations, which believes that negotiation should be conducted to achieve results.
Amir-Abdollahian emphasized that what people currently want is results, and added that the people’s message is that enough negotiations and talks have been conducted, and now results must be achieved. The goal of a result-oriented approach is to unlock negotiations that have been stalled and is not aimed at showcasing negotiations. It is unclear why, with such a strategy that he speaks of, these negotiations have taken over ten months, even though the main agreements were reached in the previous government.
Another issue Amir-Abdollahian mentioned is that the main approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is national interests, and this approach has empowered the negotiation team at the negotiation table. Stating this strategy without specifying the indicators of national interests and how to achieve them practically remains a slogan, and in this regard, Abdullahian does not provide details to support his statement.
Amir-Abdollahian also pointed out an important issue that could ultimately lead to a strategic shift in Iran’s foreign policy regarding direct negotiations with the U.S. He said Josep Borrell, during his visit to Tehran, criticized the reciprocal transfer of requests between Iran and the U.S., stating that Europe is not a postman to return Iran’s envelope to the U.S. and vice versa.
Borrell’s critical statement indicates a fundamental weakness in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, which has so far refrained from direct negotiations with the U.S. after Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. The operational logic of this abstention and its relation to national interests remain unclear, which even Ulyanov, the Russian representative, criticized.
Plan B is on the Table
Amir-Abdollahian also said that the American side, in recent Vienna negotiations, has verbally shown relative flexibility on two issues, but emphasized that this flexibility must be turned into text. This could confirm speculations about parallel negotiations between the two countries. It seems that if a JCPOA agreement is reached, there will be more opportunities for direct negotiations between the two countries in the post-JCPOA era, given Amir-Abdollahian’s history of conducting negotiations with the U.S.; he might act more actively in this area.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister also pointed to another strategic element in the government’s foreign policy, which is the readiness to implement a Plan B or an alternative to the JCPOA agreement. He said that even if the U.S. does not show the necessary flexibility, the world will not end, and Iran, like the U.S. and European parties, has its own Plan B.
Many observers and experts emphasize that Iran can best use the opportunity of Europe’s and the U.S.’s need for natural gas and fuel to secure Iran’s economic interests and assert that ignoring this advantage could inflict irreparable damage on Iran’s development and economic growth plans.
And the Islamic Republic’s Plan B could also confront the country’s current position with serious risks and challenging prospects, and practically will not yield a desirable result. It seems Amir-Abdollahian knows that if he does not pursue result-oriented diplomacy, as he himself emphasized, the people and public opinion expect results from him, and his ministry’s report card will not receive a satisfactory grade.
