A Serious Opportunity for the West
It was surprising for many in the West that a relatively unknown candidate won the presidential election in Iran. Masoud Pezeshkian, a member of parliament and former health minister, who was virtually unknown outside the country and even within Iran was not a prominent figure, defeated the ultra-hardline candidate Saeed Jalili in the second round of the election on July 5th.
The unexpected victory of a reformist figure in the limited political sphere of the Islamic Republic, for the first time since 2001, raises many questions about his powers, his approach to the nuclear deadlock with the West, and his ability to steer an unstable regional landscape.
Given his outspoken criticism of the country’s current path, Pezeshkian’s election shocked many observers. Some in the West may perceive Pezeshkian as similar to his reformist predecessors, as a wolf in sheep’s clothing, presenting a more moderate face of a regime whose nuclear and regional ambitions remain unchanged.
Others might see him as a savior with a mission to pull Iran out of social and economic crises, ready to make concessions in exchange for a reduction in Western sanctions. Which one will he be?
Several elements can help predict the future path. The first relates to the nature of Iranian politics.
The president is far from absolute power and must contend with numerous overt and covert centers of rival power and influence. The basic principles have not changed; Ayatollah Khamenei still has the final say, and the conservative control over all other state institutions will limit Pezeshkian.
At the same time, presidents in Iran are not merely symbolic figures. The differences in style and substance between Hassan Rouhani, who negotiated and signed a nuclear deal with global powers and recognized the need to ease some social restrictions, and Ebrahim Raisi, who failed to restore that nuclear deal and doubled down on enforcing Islamic dress codes for women, leading to widespread unrest and brutal crackdowns in 2022, testify to this reality.
Secondly, the new president has both a unique advantage and a weakness. During his election campaign, he avoided specific commitments and instead focused on his governance style, acknowledging the limitations he might face as president.
By not presenting himself as a figure who would overly disrupt the political structure and by managing social expectations, he has created some room for maneuver.
However, the election has granted him weak support given one of the lowest participation levels in the history of the Islamic Republic, 49.8% according to official reports, and the fact that he only secured a quarter of the eligible votes.
Thirdly, what Pezeshkian can achieve in foreign policy is determined more by factors beyond his control than by his own ability and willingness to engage with Iran’s adversaries, above all the United States.
The more significant factor will be the outcome of the U.S. presidential election.
Most diplomatic advances between Iran and the United States since the 1979 revolution, including early efforts at détente in the late 1990s and the nuclear deal in 2015, occurred during the second term of a Democratic president.
Unlike the late Raisi, whose administration largely ignored relations with the West, Pezeshkian and his team have promised to balance a reopening towards the West with growing relations with non-Western powers, especially Russia and China.
However, experienced diplomats likely to return to power in Pezeshkian’s administration have expressed frustration with what they saw as the Biden administration’s sluggishness during the brief overlap with the Rouhani administration in 2021, which cost them the opportunity to restore the nuclear deal.
A second Trump term poses an even greater challenge, given the criticism from Trump’s advisors that Biden weakened Washington’s hand with weak sanctions enforcement and his enduring belief in negotiating from a position of strength. Trump would likely return to his maximum pressure policy, which instead of bringing Iran back to the negotiating table on more favorable terms for the United States, pushed it to pursue a more aggressive nuclear program and a greater display of power in the region, bringing Iran and the United States alarmingly close to a serious confrontation on several occasions between 2019 and 2020.
There is also a deep-seated animosity between Iranian leaders and Trump, who ordered the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in 2020.
Meanwhile, the United States is suspicious that Iran is plotting to assassinate senior American officials in retaliation for Soleimani’s killing.
The expansion of the war in Gaza to other parts of the Middle East could also limit Pezeshkian’s ability to engage constructively with the West.
If hostilities turn into a full-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the crown jewel of Iran’s non-state partner network in the region, this development could further toxify Iran’s image in the West at a time when domestic crackdowns, arms transfers to Russia, the continued expansion of nuclear activities, and the imprisonment of dual nationals and foreign citizens have brought relations to their lowest point.
The same could happen if Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen resume cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, reversing the de-escalation path that Iran and its Gulf Arab neighbors have pursued in recent years.
Nevertheless, the presence of more voices calling for moderation in Iran’s decision-making process, especially compared to the potential presidency of Jalili, is a positive note.
Iran’s strategic decisions are made by a small group of senior officials who are relatively insulated from changes in formal structures, including election outcomes, and yet reflect them.
Political uncertainty in Washington and chaos in the region leave little room for the United States and Iran to reach a new agreement in the short term, but they should at least try to revive some of the informal understandings reached in 2023. These understandings aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear advancements, prevent attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, and limit the extent of Iran’s support for Russia in the war against Ukraine in exchange for access to some of Iran’s frozen assets abroad.
This would help Biden keep tensions with Iran low and provide Pezeshkian with a short-term economic reprieve.
This would be a temporary solution. Today, envisioning the achievement of a nuclear agreement is more challenging than it was on the eve of 2015.
The positions of both sides have hardened, and the little trust that existed at that time has dangerously eroded, not least because of Trump’s withdrawal from the previous agreement. Iran’s nuclear program has significantly advanced, and sanctions have increased.
Western skepticism about Pezeshkian’s ability to deliver an agreement matches Tehran’s doubts about whether the U.S., in particular, can accept a coexistence with the Islamic Republic or is capable of offering effective and lasting sanctions relief.
Moreover, the deadline is quickly approaching as the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the 2015 agreement expires in October 2025, depriving the West of a major point of leverage to keep Iran under pressure with the threat of reimposing international sanctions that were lifted in 2015.
Given Iran’s understandable concerns that another Trump administration would scrap any agreement negotiated now, and the toxic image of Iran in U.S. domestic politics, the Biden administration is not in a position before November to engage with Pezeshkian’s administration in a forward-looking process to find a more sustainable diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis and other points of contention.
Once again, the burden will fall on the Europeans, who have led nuclear negotiations with Tehran since 2003.
The first opportunity for serious negotiations will be on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September.
Providing the infrastructure could help a future Democratic administration in the U.S. make rapid progress after the November elections.
In the event of a second Trump presidency, such infrastructure might at least offer him an option: finding a mutually beneficial arrangement with Tehran or risking another dangerous confrontation that would only further entangle Washington in the Middle East.
The prospect revealed by Pezeshkian’s election may become a reality or may falter.
As he begins his work and faces numerous domestic and foreign challenges, it would be best for the United States and Europe to engage constructively with President Pezeshkian, offer him limited economic facilities, and at least test whether his administration can pivot Iran’s policy both domestically and internationally.
