New Chapter in the Middle East
New Chapter in the Middle East
Middle East: A Fateful Year
From direct and indirect conflicts between Tel Aviv and Tehran to the weakening of Iran’s regional network in 2024, the structure of the Middle East has changed significantly.
If 2024 was a year full of major changes on the international stage, the Middle East was definitely the region where these transformations were most significant. On the other hand, although the turning point for the region came on October 7, 2023, with Hamas’ attack on Israel, the broader consequences of these changes were mostly observed in 2024.
From Gaza, where the number of casualties from Israeli operations exceeded 45,000, the conflict spread to Lebanon and indirectly or directly dragged in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran.
Until a year ago, the region witnessed a competition between two strategic models. On one side was what was known as the Resistance Axis, a collection of movements, paramilitaries, and governments close to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and on the other side were projects supported by the United States, anti-Iranian fronts focused on normalizing relations between Israel and some Arab countries.
Today, more than a year after the events of October 7, the political and security architecture of the Middle East has undergone profound changes.
Direct Confrontation
One of the biggest changes witnessed in the Middle East in 2024 was the escalation of tensions between Israel and Iran. These two countries now see each other as strategic and existential rivals, but had never been as close to open and full confrontation in their history as they are now.
Over the years, there have been exchanges of fire between Israel and Iranian proxy forces in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and various paramilitary groups supporting Tehran in Iraq and Syria.
However, the possibility of open war between Tel Aviv and Tehran has been added to this hidden war, which is fought indirectly. With mutual drone and missile strikes in April and October, both crises de-escalated after symbolic attacks and retaliatory actions. Nevertheless, these events were new and unimaginable occurrences that had not happened until a year ago.
Axis of Resistance in Crisis
Israel was able to directly strike the Islamic Republic for another reason. One year of significant war has weakened the Axis of Resistance, which was built over the years by Tehran with the idea of outsourcing its defense lines. After the bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s and creating a deterrent barrier against the Jewish state.
Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah and the elimination of prominent leaders of the Resistance Axis, including Hassan Nasrallah who was killed in Beirut in September, Ismail Haniyeh who was even killed in Tehran, and Yahya Sinwar who is known as the mastermind of Hamas’s attacks on Israel, had severely destabilized Iran’s regional network.
But the final blow came less than three weeks ago with the downfall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, which happened suddenly and surprisingly. Assad, who was one of Tehran’s historic regional clients, the fall of this country, which today has been added to the sphere of influence of Turkey, disrupted the continuity of a route that has long been known as a corridor from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to the eastern Mediterranean.
The New Middle East
Expectations for 2025 could be more pessimistic. Some analysts speculate that with Tehran losing the restraint provided by the Resistance Axis, it may now increase pressure on its nuclear program. However, Iranian officials emphasize that there has been no change in the Islamic Republic’s nuclear doctrine. On the other hand, the war that started on October 7 halted negotiations to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which were under the Abraham Accords during the first Donald Trump administration.
Riyadh’s joining of this agreement was supposed to be the peak of the initiative that had previously involved the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. However, this is merely an operational framework through which the Americans intend to persuade their allies in the Persian Gulf to hand over their security to Israel and simultaneously contain Iran at the regional level.
Today, over a year after that, none of the Arab countries officially supporting the Palestinians have officially backed out of the withdrawal agreement. Even Riyadh does not rule out its possible entry into it in the future. With Trump’s return to the White House, Washington will likely try to end the remaining hostilities, especially in Gaza, and reinvigorate the Abraham Accords as the basis for a new Middle East structure.
In conclusion, it can be added that a year ago, the idea that within 12 months Iran and Israel would militarily confront each other twice, that Hassan Nasrallah along with much of Hezbollah’s leadership would be killed, and that Bashar al-Assad would lose control of Syria within a few days, was unimaginable. These recent events have dealt a severe blow to Iran’s deterrence, which has significantly diminished in recent months. It is difficult to say what will remain of what is known as the axis of resistance.
However, what happened last year indicates a clear failure for Tehran, which is at risk of witnessing the gradual collapse of its control over Syria and a large part of the Middle East. On the other hand, even Abraham Accords do not seem to be in a good condition.
Although these agreements have defused some regional tensions, there is nothing left of the momentum of the 2020-2023 three-year plan. Furthermore, despite more than a year of discussions about the possibility of Saudi Arabia joining, no tangible achievement has been made so far.
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