Netanyahu’s Plan for Lebanon
Netanyahu’s plan for Lebanon follows a series of Israeli attacks on Hezbollah and widespread disruption of Hezbollah’s communication structure. Following the assassination of the Secretary-General and senior military commanders and political leaders of the group, Israel has entered a phase of ground attack in the south.
It seems that Israel is trying to take advantage of the shock inflicted on Hezbollah’s command and communication structure while Hezbollah is attempting to reorganize and compensate for its losses. Israel sees options for a ground attack on southern Lebanon, but the reality is that no ground operation in southern Lebanon can make the south of this region safe for Israel.
As a result, Israel’s ground campaign in southern Lebanon might turn into a long and more extensive campaign, and even this prolonged campaign will not be able to achieve all of Israel’s goals but will inflict devastating damage on Lebanon. Two days ago, Israeli tanks were deployed on the northern borders with southern Lebanon. American officials immediately announced that Israel had informed them of its intention to launch a limited ground invasion in southern Lebanon, which might occur in the coming hours. Signs of Israel’s readiness to carry out this operation have since appeared.
However, before that, on September 28 and 29, Israeli army forces launched extensive airstrikes across the Bekaa Valley, Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Syria-Lebanon border. These attacks followed the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on September 27. The aim of these operations was to weaken Hezbollah’s capabilities, dismantle its command structure, and block the routes of arms shipments from Syria to Lebanon. In fact, Israel’s goal was to put Hezbollah under military siege and isolate it from its allies, destroying Hezbollah’s supply lines.
Parallel to these attacks, Sheikh Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah Lebanon, in his first speech after the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, pledged that Hezbollah would continue to fight and that the group still has the capacity and capability to conduct mid-range and short-range attacks. Naim Qassem also announced that Hezbollah’s leadership and command structure had been quickly reorganized after Israel’s assassination operations, and the group is ready to defend against an Israeli ground invasion.
Some Israeli officials, who wished to remain anonymous, claimed that the Israeli army had launched a special operation against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in recent days and months and had found routes to gather information about Hezbollah forces and assess the group’s readiness to enter a ground war. On the same days, September 28 and 29, Israel carried out other attacks on Lebanon, assassinating senior Hamas commanders such as Fathi Sharif and several other Palestinian officials.
It seems that Israel has so far taken advantage of the temporary chaos created in Hezbollah’s control and command structure. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is likely trying to use the opportunity to eliminate Hezbollah’s military wing in Lebanon. Some of Israel’s tactical victories in recent weeks, including persistent attacks on September 17 and 18 and the subsequent damage to Hezbollah’s command and control structure, as well as the group’s military capabilities, have encouraged Israel to use the opportunity to create a territorial buffer zone in southern Lebanon.
Israel hopes that the Jewish settlers in northern Israel, who were displaced following Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on northern Israel, can return to their homes. Additionally, given that Hezbollah has not been able to retaliate for Israel’s recent attacks despite launching dozens of rockets, including ballistic missiles, towards major cities, Israelis have become bolder and concluded that Hezbollah has significantly weakened and is unable to defend itself in a ground confrontation in southern Lebanon, nor does it have the capability to target major Israeli cities.
Ultimately, Israelis are taking advantage of Iran’s apparent reluctance to rush to defend Hezbollah or seek harsh revenge against Israel for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. On September 30, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Galant indicated that a ground operation inside Lebanon might be imminent. On the same day, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Iran would not send forces to fight alongside Hezbollah.
Israel will likely initiate at least a limited ground invasion of Lebanon as its first choice. Although Israel may adopt more aggressive strategies to create the desired buffer zone in southern Lebanon, it has announced that it is not seeking to destroy Hezbollah as in the 33-day war of 2006 but aims to weaken Hezbollah to the point where the group is forced to retreat from the borders to behind the Litani River and end its attacks on Israel.
If what the Israelis say is implemented, it must be said that this goal is not so extensive that it requires a comprehensive and all-out ground attack on southern Lebanon. As a result, Israel will carry out this attack with the aim of breaking Hezbollah’s political will to resist and defend and creating a buffer zone in the south while trying not to divert its attention from military and security developments in Gaza and the West Bank. Overall, given the current conditions, four scenarios can be envisioned regarding Israel’s ground attack on southern Lebanon.
Israeli Ground Invasion
1. The most likely option is an Israeli ground invasion of southern Lebanon, followed by a withdrawal towards the border. This scenario is similar to the scenario Israel implemented at the start of the ground attack on Gaza. If Israel wants to implement this scenario, it would naturally have to deploy a limited number of forces to southern Lebanon, similar to the tactics used against Hamas. The task of these forces is to target Hezbollah’s infrastructure, inflict casualties in direct combat, capture prisoners, and then retreat to the border. Such an operation is likely carried out with the aim of creating a limited safe zone so that Hezbollah forces cannot settle or enter it.
After the withdrawal of Israeli forces, Israeli artillery and air forces will control this safe zone with long-range fire, similar to Israel’s initial operations in Gaza. Israel’s goal with this action is probably to reduce the risk of its ground forces getting caught in guerrilla and partisan warfare. Additionally, this action will be less problematic from the diplomatic perspective of the United States and other Israeli supporters, as justifications can be provided to argue that this action does not count as an overt occupation of southern Lebanon.
However, the reality is that this operation will be slow-paced, and this slow pace against Hezbollah, which is much stronger than Hamas and has much more maneuvering space and logistics, may encounter problems. Furthermore, if Israel decides to settle for this scenario, it will likely have to continue it for weeks or even months to possibly break Hezbollah’s political will to continue the war.
The prolongation of the battle, given the increasing fatigue of the Israeli people from the war, may politically weaken the Israeli cabinet to the point where it cannot continue this course. Israelis are generally accustomed to quick and early victories and do not have much endurance for enduring harsh conditions in the long term.
Limited Border Operation
2. The second scenario, which is less likely than the first, is the execution of a limited border operation to occupy a buffer zone within southern Lebanon. Based on this scenario, Israelis will likely have to deploy forces to a depth of 10 kilometers into southern Lebanon. This scenario will be more risky diplomatically and militarily than the first scenario, but Israel will likely try not to use a very large number of forces for deployment deep into southern Lebanon to reduce potential casualties.
However, it must be said that this action will expose Israeli forces to repeated guerrilla and partisan attacks by Hezbollah forces much more than the first scenario. Within the framework of this scenario, if success is achieved for Israel, Hezbollah may eventually be persuaded to agree to a diplomatic settlement to reclaim this area. However, such an agreement will likely be reached after a prolonged conflict between the two sides, and in the midst of this prolonged conflict, we will likely witness Israeli assassination operations against Hezbollah forces and more intense Hezbollah attacks on major Israeli cities.
Pushing Back Hezbollah
3. In the third scenario, which is less likely than the second, Israel’s decision is to push Hezbollah forces back behind the Litani River and then withdraw towards Israel’s borders. Within this scenario, Israel will likely attempt to advance deep into southern Lebanon and reach the Litani River. Israel will try to fill the area with a large number of forces and destroy Hezbollah’s infrastructure, inflicting as many casualties on Hezbollah as possible or capturing prisoners.
If this Israeli scenario succeeds and can shock Hezbollah, then it may announce that it has sufficiently weakened Hezbollah’s capabilities and then return its forces to within 10 kilometers of Israel’s borders and then propose negotiations over this 10-kilometer buffer zone, forcing Hezbollah to accept an end to the conflict.
However, this operation will pose many dangers for Israeli forces. In this scenario, in addition to involving a large number of Israeli ground forces, Lebanese army forces may also intervene and inflict significant casualties on Israeli forces. Additionally, implementing this scenario may face diplomatic opposition from the United States and most of Israel’s supporters.
In this scenario, although Israel’s success cannot be guaranteed at all, if this operation succeeds, Hezbollah’s will to fight will be weakened, and Hezbollah will be forced to agree to a diplomatic settlement that creates a buffer zone, especially if Israel threatens to repeat this action not once but multiple times.
Occupation of Lebanese Territory
4. The fourth scenario, which is less likely than the third, involves Israeli forces advancing to the Litani River and staying in this area. In this scenario, Israel may conclude that occupying Lebanese territory is the only way to achieve Israel’s security goals and force Hezbollah to negotiate an end to the battle. Implementing this scenario requires a very large ground force and a very long time because Israel will have to keep the territory south of the Litani River occupied until Hezbollah agrees to a diplomatic settlement.
This scenario will be seriously considered by Israel if the Israeli army concludes that its recent attacks on Hezbollah have effectively disrupted Hezbollah’s command and control structure and that Israel has gained an opportunity to radically change the dynamics of the battle in southern Lebanon at a lower cost. The United States, Arab countries, and many European countries will certainly oppose the endless occupation of southern Lebanon. As a result, there is a possibility that Washington will stop sending arms shipments to Israel, such as heavy bombs.
However, if Hezbollah can inflict heavy casualties on Israeli forces within this scenario, Israel’s resolve to occupy this buffer zone will be weakened, and Israel may be forced to end the war without achieving a guarantee of Hezbollah’s permanent withdrawal from southern Lebanon and retreat behind the Litani River. Regardless of which of the four scenarios Israel chooses, there is also the possibility that the Israeli army will have the prospect of a ground invasion deep into Lebanese territory and extend the scope of the ground operation to areas beyond the Litani River towards Beirut or the Bekaa Valley. Many of Hezbollah’s supply lines are located east of the Bekaa Valley.
This Israeli action will lead to a severe humanitarian crisis and increased instability in Lebanon. If the options mentioned above cannot achieve Israel’s goals and force Hezbollah into a diplomatic agreement, Israel will be trapped in an endless ground invasion campaign in southern Lebanon and will have to focus its ground invasion more towards northern Lebanon to break Hezbollah’s will to fight, cut Hezbollah’s communication lines, and destroy the group’s arsenals. Within the framework of these operations, the Israeli army may advance north of the Litani River and enter Beirut, similar to the 1982 invasion.
Israel’s advance towards the Bekaa Valley will likely be carried out not with conventional ground forces but with commando brigades. Israeli commandos will likely conduct operations in Syrian territory as well to cut Hezbollah’s supply lines passing through Syria. Meanwhile, Israeli airstrikes on other parts of Lebanon will intensify, and Lebanon’s transportation infrastructure will be destroyed to disrupt Hezbollah’s communication lines.
This action will also lead to another humanitarian disaster and a flood of Lebanese refugees to Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and even Europe. In the event of such humanitarian disasters, there is a high likelihood that internal and political pressure from opposing parties and political movements on Hezbollah Lebanon will increase. If this happens, the prospect of Lebanon entering a period of internal instability and even the outbreak of a civil war is not unlikely.
