Pezeshkian, the Heir of Political Ruin
Pezeshkian, the Heir of Political Ruin
Three months have passed since Dr. Masoud Pezeshkian’s government began its activities. Pezeshkian’s victory in the presidential election was unpredictable for a large portion of observers. Over the past three years, the course of events was such that even the approval of one of the reformist candidates seemed unlikely. Nevertheless, Dr. Pezeshkian’s eligibility was approved, and he succeeded in securing the majority of votes in a breath-taking election.
The process of selecting the cabinet with the formation of the Steering Council and various working groups was a new experience that did not meet the expectations of the new president’s supporters. The selection of governors and mid-level government managers also intensified the criticism from the president’s supporters. On the other hand, the new government, on the verge of formation, faced international tensions. The expansion of these tensions will thwart the government’s economic slogans.
The government also has limited choices in foreign policy. There is no clear outlook for implementing some of the president’s other slogans. Despite the successes the government has had in employing women and Sunni Muslims in government positions and its efforts to reduce tensions, all the above has led to a spread of despair. This rapid spread of despair indicates the emergence of a new political phenomenon in Iranian society, which, if not taken seriously, will have destructive effects and consequences.
Some political activists attribute this trend to Pezeshkian himself and believe that he has retreated from his promises. According to these activists, the president’s personal stance plays a significant role in appointments and advancing his programs. Although the views of an individual in the presidency play an influential role, reducing all issues to the president alone oversimplifies the matter.
Another segment considers this issue structural and points to the dual nature of power in Iran. This perspective, over the past two decades, has resulted in nothing but pointing fingers without offering a solution.
Both of the above views may be correct, but they fail to provide a practical and executable solution for Iran’s political issues. One personalizes the issue, and the other merely points to structural matters.
One of the most significant obstacles facing any government in Iran, which leads to political tension, is the position and role of the government. The executive branch has a defined place in Iran’s political structure, but over the past century, the role and impact of the government as the country’s administrative institution have been questioned. These tensions lead to various solutions being proposed to solve the issue.
In his book ‘Political Order and Political Decay,’ Francis Fukuyama attempts to explain how political order is organized within a country and how political decay occurs, illustrating the formation of a balanced political system. He enumerates the three main components of political order as the state, the rule of law, and accountability.
From his perspective, all societies need states that can generate enough power to defend themselves in both foreign and domestic arenas and to enforce consensus-based laws. (Political Order and Political Decay, Rozaneh Publications, 1379, p. 47)
Fukuyama extensively examines the needs of the state, the rule of law, and accountability, emphasizing that worldwide, we face a shortage not of states but of modern, competent, impersonal, well-organized, and independent states. (Same, p. 47) Fukuyama’s discussion relates to Iran’s issue in that while a state organization exists, it has been weakened in various ways.
Laws such as the selection and appointment to sensitive positions are among the factors that tie the government’s hands in exercising its powers and prevent the employment of qualified individuals.
On the other hand, the formation of various councils with different powers that operate outside the government’s scope but target the government’s legal powers has exacerbated existing problems.
The government’s decision-making power in areas such as foreign policy has also eroded.
In Iran, we are facing a kind of political disorder, with its most prominent manifestation being the comprehensive limitation of the government. The state institution must be accountable but is deprived of its legal powers.
This political disorder has become institutionalized, and Pezeshkian’s government has inherited it. Reducing the issue to the president or turning it into a power duality does not solve this problem.
The state institution in Iran needs reconstruction and renewal to fulfill its role in governance and law enforcement correctly. In all countries, influential institutions outside of power and opposition exist, but in Iran, the aforementioned issues have led to political disorder by limiting the state institution.
If there is no perspective on the state institution as a professional entity for governance, changing individuals or even debating the dual nature of power will not bring about transformation. The government must be able to function as a professional institution, employ professional forces, and engage in policy-making and decision-making in various fields. Efforts to renew the state structure and restore it to its rightful place are crucial steps in solving the problem of political disorder.
