Ineffective Performance of Araghchi as Minister
Ineffective Performance of Araghchi as Minister
It seems that the set of performances over the past six months has been such that at least in three areas, the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is being diminished and weakened.
It appears that the Foreign Minister needs serious advice for caution, and before taking any steps towards any deal or negotiation, it is appropriate for the leader of the diplomatic apparatus to abandon hasty and showy behaviors and slogan-driven speeches lacking realistic backing.
Seyed Abbas Araghchi was the first figure whose presence in the fourteenth government was confirmed.
Almost no faction rose to seriously criticize or oppose him, except for the most radical right-wing factions who fundamentally oppose the approach of negotiation and interaction with the world. Other political factions welcomed Araghchi’s ministry with a positive outlook.
Even the concerned right-wingers did not seriously oppose Araghchi during the parliamentary confidence vote. In fact, Araghchi can be considered one of the most consensus-driven government figures who came to power with a discourse and idea of unity.
The consensus on Araghchi was so obvious that practically, before the formation of the Steering Council and committees of the fourteenth government, his name was heard as the definite candidate for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In the camp of government supporters, Araghchi’s background in the nuclear negotiation team and as deputy to Mohammad Javad Zarif in Hassan Rouhani’s government gave hope to reformists and moderates.
At the level of government institutions and main right-wing factions, Araghchi’s background in the Revolutionary Guards and his inclination towards the Islamic Coalition Party made him a more familiar and trustworthy figure than Mohammad Javad Zarif and even Hassan Rouhani. During the three-year period of the thirteenth government, Araghchi was appointed by the leader as the secretary of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations.
This set of backgrounds placed the Foreign Minister of the Unity Government in an agreed-upon position, which was also considered a prerequisite for solving foreign issues in Masoud Pezeshkian’s electoral speeches. This political-sovereign backing and positive diplomatic-executive backgrounds raised expectations from Araghchi, but after about six months of the fourteenth government, this backing is gradually fading.
Although national interests require that the Foreign Minister, as a national figure representing the country internationally, be less criticized, it is also appropriate for the Foreign Minister to protect the dignity and status of this national position, as the saying goes, the custodian must uphold the sanctity of the shrine more than anyone.
Meanwhile, the performances of the past six months indicate the weakening of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ position in three areas. Firstly, unlike Hassan Rouhani’s government, in the fourteenth government, we see that the role of the executor and agent of negotiations, especially in potential talks with the U.S., is not very clear, and it seems that competitions and alignments among various negotiation-supporting factions have already formed.
Some figures, like Ali Shamkhani, the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, despite having no official responsibility, still present themselves as responsible for the nuclear dossier, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government remain silent in response to this claim. This silence, if not out of satisfaction, stems from neglecting the dignity and position of the diplomatic apparatus.
Or some positions of Seyed Kamal Kharrazi, the head of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, expressed in interviews with foreign media, although seemingly coordinated, display elements of competition and independent action beyond usual relations, and it feels as if this council is gradually exceeding its consultative and strategic role and directly entering the diplomatic executive domain.
Here too, we witness a kind of silence and passivity from the official foreign policy apparatus.
While in Rouhani’s government, the management of the nuclear dossier and negotiations with European and American parties were completely concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Moreover, the history of unofficial and hidden negotiations in various periods after the revolution has practically shown that it yields no achievements for the country and merely exacerbates divisions and conflicts, an experience that peaked in the McFarlane affair.
Secondly, the behaviors and sometimes statements of Araghchi in the past six months differ from those of a seasoned Foreign Minister and recognized diplomat, and the repetition of certain actions damages the principles of the country’s diplomatic leader.
Frequent travels to various countries in the early days of the government, when there was a risk of the country getting involved in an all-out war, were meaningful and seemed to have brought a positive record for Araghchi in the first hundred days.
But after that, during the effective Middle East tour and travels to important regional and Arab countries, we witnessed trips that, as time passed, distanced from diplomatic initiative and approached a sort of display.
The trip to Beirut during the peak of Israeli attacks on Lebanon and worse, the trip to Damascus just days before Bashar al-Assad’s fall, left negative marks on the record of the Foreign Minister of the fourteenth government.
In these trips, Araghchi tried to portray a kind of field presence and bravery, showing that Iran stands by its allies even in crisis days and the toughest times, but in practice, the Lebanon ceasefire and worse, Assad’s fall, presented an image of incorrect and unrealistic analyses, reducing Iran from an effective player to a passive observer of events.
It was as if the Foreign Minister, with these trips, was saying goodbye to the status of a high-ranking diplomat and assuming the role of a bold tourist wandering through restaurants and cafes to better showcase his actions.
Thus, after the ceasefire, Lebanese officials like Nabih Berri spoke to Iran in an unconventional and critical tone, let alone the new Syrian rulers who have fundamental animosity towards Iran, and Araghchi’s last-minute trip only fueled their fire.
If the trips to Damascus and Beirut and presence in cafes and restaurants of these two capitals can be justified from a bold diplomacy perspective, repeating this behavior in subsequent trips, including the recent one to Kabul, finds no justification and remains merely as a repetitive tourist behavior.
Such behaviors can gradually diminish the principles and status of the Foreign Minister as the main external symbol of Iran, especially in these complex conditions, and reduce Araghchi’s capacities.
Thirdly, the most complex area of Iran’s foreign policy post-revolution has been the United States, an area that turned into an internal conflict subject right after the revolution, and after the embassy takeover, its political-ideological halos increased, reducing the influence of diplomatic discourse.
Attempts made at various times, both openly and secretly, to change this atmosphere have repeatedly failed, with hardliners in the U.S. or Iran striving to thwart them. The most prominent of these was the fate of the JCPOA. This complex situation and negative history make the re-entry of the fourteenth government and its like-minded individuals into negotiations, especially with Donald Trump in power, more challenging than ever, facing serious resistance within the power structure, particularly from the election-defeated faction.
Beyond that, Trump’s authoritative stance towards various countries, from Europe and Canada to Panama, China, Egypt, and Jordan, makes conveying any message, even conditionally and implicitly, fraught with serious political and reputational costs.
The sharp attacks on Mohammad Javad Zarif, Ali Abdolalizadeh, Fatemeh Mohajerani, and even Masoud Pezeshkian in recent weeks indicate the sensitivity of positioning in this area. But beyond these attacks and internal sensitivities, which might somewhat diminish with the clarification of the political system’s grand decision, the most sensitive aspect is the approach towards the new U.S. administration and Trump himself.
Trump is generally known as an unpredictable figure with populist gestures and straightforward, blunt speech. Yet, this very personality of Trump possesses certain known characteristics, including his view of the international system as largely transactional.
One of Trump’s main arguments for withdrawing from the JCPOA was the lack of economic benefits for American companies from the agreement with Iran, while simultaneously criticizing Barack Obama’s administration for unfreezing Iran’s blocked assets.
Regardless of how much Trump’s claims were based on reality, it is clear that in any stance towards the new U.S. administration, one must speak in a way that suits his transactional mindset. In fact, the leader’s remark about keeping our eyes open and being aware of whom we are dealing with and talking to is most relevant to Trump.
In reality, the serious responsibility of the diplomatic apparatus in the current situation is to utilize all possible tools at various levels within the U.S. and international circles to achieve the necessary understanding of Trump and his team of advisors, ministers, and representatives in the region, as the leader of the Islamic Republic mentioned, and then based on that, to design and advance possible and effective policies.
Unfortunately, it is observed that the Foreign Minister, without considering these requirements, in an interview with Al Jazeera, raises the issue of releasing Iran’s blocked assets in the U.S. as steps for confidence-building by the U.S. government. If even a slight understanding of Trump’s mindset and background was considered in this stance, certainly anything should have been said except for demanding claims and assets. This questionable statement by Araghchi is made while, for instance, Mr. Abdolalizadeh, the Vice President for Maritime Development, with language indicative of understanding Trump’s mindset, discusses the possibility of American companies investing in Iran after reaching an agreement.
Or the necessity of a stable, developed Iran with an appropriate level of welfare for the future of the Middle East and reducing ongoing regional tensions could have been discussed, a topic that aligns with Trump’s slogan about ending wars and restoring peace in the Middle East and Ukraine.
In reality, whether intentionally or unintentionally linking Iran with the two major current global wars, while posing serious threats to the country, with a different approach, can create opportunities and seize opportunities for Iran in the new U.S. administration.
That the Foreign Minister in his interviews shows disregard for such obvious matters and presents a topic that could potentially be the final step and ultimate outcome of a possible agreement with Trump as the initial steps for confidence-building and a sort of precondition for negotiation is questionable.
With all these issues, it seems that the Foreign Minister needs serious advice for caution, and before taking any steps towards any deal or negotiation, it is appropriate for the leader of the diplomatic apparatus to abandon hasty and showy behaviors and slogan-driven speeches lacking realistic backing.
