Public Disenchantment: The Achilles’ Heel of Reformists
Public disenchantment was the Achilles’ heel of reformists 19 years ago during the final days of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami’s reformist government. Back then, many analysts and a large number of experts and citizens believed that the train of the Islamic Republic of Iran was on the tracks of development and progress, and it was thought that the outlined visions, including the 2025 outlook, were going to be realized. An election was held with a multitude of reformist and conservative candidates, and to everyone’s astonishment, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s name emerged as the ninth president from the ballot box.
The occurrence of such an event in the country’s political arena, especially given Khatami’s strong position with high social support as the president of the seventh and eighth terms and the leader of the Second of Khordad Front, sparked many discussions on how it happened that after this golden era of the so-called left faction, now known as reformists, the social and political atmosphere shifted in a way that led to their defeat and the victory of not even a traditional right figure, who had long been their rival, but a lesser-known figure from a movement that, although under the conservative banner, according to Behzad Nabavi, would be termed a new left movement if we were to label it in the political spectrum.
Today, we are 19 years later, engaged in another presidential election, with some analysts warning of the possibility of a repeat of the 2004 experience. However, the 2024 and 2004 elections have many differences.
For instance, back then, people, considering the eight-year experience of the reformist government and the relative improvement in their lives, believed that the train on the track would not easily derail. The reformists were so confident in their stable position in society that they were not worried about divisions and the presence of multiple candidates. This was one of the reasons for their failure in that year’s election. In the second round, although part of this movement tried to leverage the polarization between Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad to their advantage by supporting Hashemi, due to pre-election atmospheres and divisions, the outcome was what it shouldn’t have been.
With this experience, many analysts agreed that the multitude of candidates was one of the main reasons for the reformists’ lack of success in the presidential election.
Leaving aside the events and protests of the 2009 election, in 2013, the full backing of Hassan Rouhani by the reformists and the withdrawal of Mohammad Reza Aref led to the victory of this movement, which practically had no opportunity for political presence with their desired candidates after 2009.
In 2021, there was only a minimal option, with no coalition formed and no possibility to persuade a large number of reformists to participate in the elections.
In 2024, the announcement of the qualification results showed that finally, in the fourteenth presidential election, the reformists have a candidate within the framework of reformism. While it may not be their maximum option, it can build a coalition. Now, the reformists, given the situation they face due to the Guardian Council’s performance, unlike in 2004, do not have multiple candidates and only have Masoud Pezeshkian as their candidate in the competition. But what is the problem that analysts are worried about a shock similar to 2004?
The first issue and concern the reformists face is the significant disinterest of a substantial portion of society in participating in the elections, which indeed includes part of their voter base. This was also a notable issue in the days leading up to the June 16 and then July 24, 2004 elections, although not as severe as today, and was ultimately a major factor in their lack of success, especially in the second round of that election.
What the reformists are facing today, and perhaps should be said to be their Achilles’ heel, is public participation in the elections. They must strive to invigorate that gray segment of society that is indifferent to the ballot box and disillusioned with it, and does not welcome the existing candidate because it is not their maximum choice.
In other words, the difference between Pezeshkian and Saeed Jalili, Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Alireza Zakani, and Mostafa Pourmohammadi is as clear as day, and their differing views and approaches are easily definable and explainable, and of course, recognizable. But what people need today might be the same as what they wanted differently in 2004. If at that time, with the feeling that the existing candidates could not stand against the hard core of power and were disillusioned with the elections, they avoided maximum and cohesive participation, today, people need a motivator that makes them believe that their candidate is seeking change and will spare no effort to achieve it, not just a candidate who is striving to reach the presidential seat. They need a reformist figure who believes in the differences in society and has the ability to stand up for the people’s demands.
