Putin at the Dinner Table of Power Between the Kremlin and the White House
Putin at the Dinner Table of Power Between the Kremlin and the White House
According to Iran Gate News Agency, more than a decade after the Syrian civil war and the fall of the Assad regime, the power scene in Damascus is once again taking shape. However, this time the main player is not on the battlefield but behind the scenes of diplomatic and economic relations.
Russia, which has maintained the deepest military and financial ties with Syria since the Cold War, is now using debt instruments, energy contracts, and security mediation to solidify its position as the most influential foreign power in Damascus’ equations.
In the meantime, Ahmad Al-Shara, the transitional president of Syria, is trying to establish a fragile balance between the Kremlin and the White House, an effort that, while strengthening his international legitimacy, carries the risk of reproducing the same dependencies that marked the political legacy of the Assad era.
The Continuation of Russian Influence in Syria After Assad’s Fall
Despite Assad’s fall, Russia has maintained its influence in Syria through debt leverage, military presence, and security mediation roles.
In a historic trip to Washington, Ahmad Al-Shara, the transitional government president, became the first Syrian leader to visit the White House. This trip is considered a turning point in Damascus-Washington relations, as Syria is ready to join the US-led anti-ISIS coalition.
However, this trip is not a sign of a fundamental change in the geopolitical balance but rather a reflection of Al-Shara’s broader strategy to pursue a policy without foreign enemies, a stance that was revealed during his visit to the Kremlin a month before this meeting.
This policy, while increasing his international legitimacy, relies on a fragile balance of conflicting foreign interests, which will increasingly be difficult to maintain.
Al-Shara’s recent approach to Moscow was the result of months of increased diplomatic interaction, during which Russia resumed wheat and oil shipments to Syria and agreed to print new Syrian banknotes through Goznak, the same supplier from the Assad era.
This closeness in relations was facilitated by Maher Al-Shara, the president’s brother and an obstetrician-gynecologist who has lived in Russia for over two decades and is now the country’s second-highest official.
Although this visit is seemingly perceived as a rebuilding of the two countries’ relations, Al-Shara has emphasized full adherence to previous agreements and announced his intention to deepen bilateral cooperation.
These agreements include the continued Russian military presence at the Hmeimim and Tartus bases, as well as the preservation of energy and reconstruction contracts from the Assad era, many of which were concluded under the influence of Syria’s extensive debts to Moscow.
This process has effectively led to the revival of the structural dependencies of the Assad era and the return of Russia’s long-standing influence in Syria.
The Historical Legacy of Russian Influence
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union sought to expand its influence in Syria by supporting leftist and Pan-Arab movements, particularly the Ba’ath Party after it came to power in 1963.
The strategic importance of Damascus for Moscow increased in the 1970s, especially after the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 and Cairo’s pivot towards Washington.
With the loss of Egyptian ports, the Soviet Union became increasingly reliant on the port of Tartus, and Syria became Moscow’s main Arab ally.
In this framework, military cooperation between the two countries expanded. Moscow helped Hafez Assad consolidate his control over the army and ensure the country’s political stability against coup threats by sending advanced weapons, training military forces, and providing technical and logistical support.
This dependency led to the structural linkage of Syria’s defense system with Soviet equipment and left Damascus with a debt equivalent to $134 billion, a large portion of which Russia forgave in 2005 in exchange for access to energy and infrastructure contracts.
This legacy of cooperation formed the basis of Russia’s initial support for the Assad regime after the 2011 uprising and then its direct military intervention in 2015. Russia’s military operations in Syria, less than a year after the annexation of Crimea, were designed not only to maintain Moscow’s strategic position in the Middle East but also to demonstrate its return as a global power.
In 2017, Russia gained unrestricted 49-year control over the Hmeimim airbase and Tartus naval base, a privilege that enabled the expansion of military influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and support for operations in Africa.
Meanwhile, Syria’s foreign debt to Russia became a tool for acquiring a major share in key sectors of the country’s economy. The Russian company Stroytransgaz, affiliated with Russian oligarch Gennady Timchenko, a close associate of Vladimir Putin, is one of the key players in this field.
The contracts of this company include managing the port of Tartus, investing in oil fields and fertilizer factories, and a 50-year concession to exploit Syria’s largest phosphate mines.
Although the details of these agreements remain vague, it is clear that 70% of the phosphate mines’ revenue belongs to the Russian company, while only 30% goes to the Syrian state company Gecopham, raising concerns about the exploitative nature of other agreements as well.
Converging Interests, Fragile Trust
Russia’s main priority is to maintain its military bases in Syria, as replacing these facilities in the short term seems practically impossible. Moscow’s efforts to establish alternative bases in Libya and Sudan have been halted due to political instability and logistical obstacles.
Russia’s presence in Tartus has been established since 1971, and even under favorable conditions, developing similar infrastructure in other countries would take years.
In addition to military considerations, Russia is concerned about the return of Chechen and Caucasian fighters from Syria, an issue that has gained more importance with the deteriorating health of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Moscow’s intelligence cooperation with Damascus is part of the effort to contain this potential threat.
From a geopolitical perspective, losing Syria could mean a broader retreat of Russia’s global influence, especially as the pressures from the Ukraine war have limited the country’s resources.
For Damascus, relying on Moscow is part of a strategy to rebuild military and governmental institutions and gain foreign legitimacy amid internal fragility. Al-Shara, who does not yet have full territorial and political control, is thinking of strengthening power through military means, not political compromise.
While Turkey plays an important security role, it does not have the capacity for comprehensive reconstruction of Syria’s military structure. Therefore, Russia, with its historical ties, is considered one of the few reliable security partners for Damascus.
Unlike Western powers, Moscow is not bound by the legal and credit limitations of supporting an authoritarian regime.
Moreover, ignoring Russia could be dangerous because some influential figures of the former regime, especially from the Alawite community, reside in exile in Russia, and the Kremlin could use them to exert political pressure if necessary.
Economically, Syria continues to face an energy crisis and electricity shortages due to infrastructure destruction and ongoing severe drought. In this context, Russian exports of wheat, oil, and gas condensates play a vital role in Damascus’s economic survival.
Russia’s control over most key contracts, except for the civilian port of Tartus, which is managed by the Emirati company DP World, reflects the continuation of Moscow’s structural influence.
Thus, the status quo inherited from the late Assad era continues for now. The flow of goods persists, internal corruption and support networks are maintained, and Russia still dominates Syria’s military, economic, and financial levers.
Mediation and Influence in a Fragmented Syria
Throughout the civil war, Russia did not limit its relations to the regime and engaged with a diverse range of local and regional actors. Its mediating role in the southern and northeastern areas allowed Moscow to maintain its position in the complex post-Assad structure.
This approach allows the Kremlin to ensure its interests regardless of future political changes in Damascus.
In recent months, Russia has strengthened its military presence at Qamishli airport in northeastern Syria, under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.
This move coincided with the relative withdrawal of American forces, the halt of Kurdish negotiations with Damascus, and increased Turkish threats, giving Russia the opportunity to act as a mediator between Damascus, Ankara, and the Kurdish forces.
Al-Shara has also expressed his willingness for the redeployment of Russian military police in southern Syria to manage tensions with Israel, a move reminiscent of Moscow’s previous role during the Assad era when Russian forces acted as a buffer between Iran and Israel.
Although this presence had little impact on reducing Israeli attacks, it helped to relatively control the crisis.
Now, with the deadlock in Syria-Israel negotiations under US support and Washington’s inability to curb Israeli attacks, the redeployment of Russian forces could play a decisive role in regional stability.
If this plan is realized, Russia will have an active military presence in three crucial axes of Syria—south, northeast, and Mediterranean coasts—areas where Damascus faces serious challenges in asserting sovereignty.
The south, in particular, is vital for Damascus from a security perspective, as it is considered the direct route to the capital.
In such conditions, Russian forces can act both as a stabilizing factor and as a potential pressure tool against the Al-Shara government.
As a result, the power structure in Syria is shifting towards an asymmetric balance, where Al-Shara’s authority will increasingly depend on Moscow’s support.
