Qalibaf and His Perpetual Confusion
Qalibaf and His Perpetual Confusion
Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the Speaker of the Parliament, tried to take a conciliatory stance yesterday by calling the uproar caused by hardliners to remove Mohammad Javad Zarif legitimate. He stated that if he were in Zarif’s position, he would have politely informed the President and resigned.
However, Mr. Qalibaf should be informed that Zarif, on the day the cabinet was introduced, resigned when he learned of the legal considerations and restrictions preventing him from serving as the President’s Strategic Deputy. He left the government without creating any controversy. But after some time, due to the President’s follow-ups and negotiations, and the expectation that the elites and the majority of voters had for Zarif’s presence in the government, seeing him as the most important symbol and representative of their demands in the new cabinet, and the country’s need for Zarif’s responsible presence in the government amid the current complex international conditions, he returned to his position.
Therefore, even if Zarif, as always, intended to prioritize national interests over himself and avoid controversies by staying out of responsibility from the start of the government, he did this long before Mr. Qalibaf’s advice. He resigned at the very beginning of the government, stepped aside, and then returned to his responsibility with the President’s decision and necessary approvals.
Therefore, if according to the Speaker of the Parliament, Zarif’s presence in the government is a legal violation, the accused and responsible party here is not Zarif but the President, who, despite Zarif’s resignation, insisted on his return to the government and taking responsibility. As a result, if the Parliament and possibly the judiciary intend to take action against the violator, it would be appropriate to address the President. If needed, as some hardline representatives have also suggested, they could dismiss, prosecute, and even imprison Mr. Pezhmanian for employing his main electoral supporter and the country’s strongest diplomat amid today’s complex international and quasi-war conditions in Iran.
However, before Mr. Qalibaf and the government’s opposing representatives summon Mr. Pezhmanian to the Parliament for prosecution and indictment, it would be better to recall the cabinet confidence session and think subtly about what the President might say and to which authorities he might attribute his decision. Regardless of this point, it seems that the majority of citizens, or at least the voters in the recent elections, have shown who they want, with what discourse and approach, and where. The majority of voters, just as they voted for Masoud Pezhmanian to prevent Saeed Jalili’s victory and the continuation of the Thirteenth Government’s path and the dominance of purists over all matters of the country, also voted for the discourse and approach of which Zarif was the main symbol.
A discourse that, domestically, seeks to elevate and promote developmental elites to achieve national and effective decisions, and externally, emphasizes de-escalation and pursuing the JCPOA model to get the country out of the current crisis. Mr. Qalibaf should know that Zarif’s current position and responsibility are minimal compared to the support the majority of voters showed him, and the winning team formed with his presence alongside Pezhmanian. Zarif’s acceptance of this responsibility is a sign of his avoidance and restraint from internal conflicts to gain responsibilities that, from the perspective of elites, political supporters, the majority of voters, and even the President himself, are his least right.
If Zarif did not want to prioritize broader interests over himself, he could have easily engaged in disputes and conflicts over higher government positions or refrained from implementing democratic models in appointing ministers and other officials through committees and the government’s strategic council, and used this opportunity to employ his close associates, like-minded individuals, and friends.
The more important point here is not about Zarif but about Qalibaf himself. Qalibaf has taken off his military uniform two decades ago and now considers himself an experienced politician to whom the system, the country, and the people still owe a presidency.
However, despite this long experience, which has been accompanied by repeated failures in various presidential elections, Qalibaf has still not been able to recognize his position in the political arena. After the recent parliamentary and presidential election experiences, where hardliners and, in Qalibaf’s own words, super-revolutionaries did whatever they wanted and could with him and his close associates and like-minded individuals, he practically reached the brink of retirement with the fourth rank in the Tehran parliamentary elections and three million votes in the presidential election.
If Qalibaf managed to somewhat rebuild his image and position after the recent presidential election, it is due to the rise of the Pezhmanian government and the centrality of the discourse of consensus, which emphasizes the cooperation and agreement of moderate and rooted forces from both factions. Qalibaf has shown over the past three months that he has recognized this position to some extent, but his way of dealing with Zarif in the parliament yesterday and his statements in the press conference yesterday afternoon showed that Qalibaf still does not recognize his position in the political arena and thinks that moderation means making deals with everyone.
He perceives politics, including the discussion of consensus, not as a historical-social process but as a project, like his tenure in the municipality and the police force, that he is willing to contract. Interestingly, like most contractors, he is willing to have no standards and make deals with any employer if it is profitable for him.
Thus, one day he becomes a strong supporter of Pezhmanian and a defender of Zarif, and the next day he becomes an executor of the policies and orders of the Stability Front, some of which have been legislated in the eleventh Parliament.
This situation prompts a political observer to address Qalibaf and tell him that before trying to be in Zarif’s place or show him his position, he should recognize his own position and his own best interest. All of Qalibaf’s failures over these two decades stem from not recognizing himself and perceiving politics as a project, and apparently, the severe blows of the two recent elections have had no impact on him.
