Raisi’s Second Government or the Government of Consensus
Raisi’s Second Government or the Government of Consensus
Abdolnasser Hemmati, the Minister of Economy in the fourteenth government, who was impeached and dismissed after only 192 days of service, was not a popular figure among conservatives and parliament members from the start. However, his impeachment was a political move against a government that came to power with the slogan of depoliticization. Although Hemmati could not improve the country’s economic situation, the increase in problems and lack of a hopeful outlook were not solely due to his poor performance. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that Hemmati’s performance was weak. Before Trump signed the executive order for maximum pressure two, the wave of price increases had begun, and the dollar had risen from 59,000 tomans to 84,000 tomans, a result of the foreign payment balance deficit, inflationary expectations, and the gap between supply and demand.
Overall, the market reacted positively to Abdolnasser Hemmati’s departure. Hemmati sought shock therapy and the cessation of interventions by accepting short-term market fluctuations, which did not work. However, his efforts to move towards a single exchange rate somewhat curbed rent-seeking and angered the beneficiaries of strategic and systematic corruption from this angle.
Since the main factors of Iran’s structural and chronic economic crisis lie in the realm of political economy, it can be said that Hemmati was sacrificed to temporarily absolve the institution of the Supreme Leader from responsibility by blaming him. Meanwhile, the main factor behind energy imbalances, high inflation, unemployment, poor performance, and the increase in the poor population is Ali Khamenei’s macro policies as the leader of the Islamic Republic, which have sidelined rational governance and conventional bureaucracy within the framework of ideological views and living in a parallel world with reality.
The analogy made by Ali Moradi Maragheh’i, a contemporary historian, is enlightening. He compared Hemmati’s impeachment to the punishment of the tutors of Qajar princes. In those times, any mistake by the princes, regardless of the tutors’ fault or innocence, resulted in the tutors being punished. Mohammad Javad Zarif also eventually complied with the demand of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliament speaker, to resign from the government, although this occurred after a meeting with Mohseni Ejei, the head of the judiciary, and possibly implicit threats.
Zarif was dismissed by ignoring the internal legal mechanisms of the system, just as his strategic deputy position was appointed by overlooking the official enacted law. Zarif had no role in decision-making and policymaking in the diplomatic apparatus.
When his views diverged clearly from those of Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister, the fate of the Supreme Leader’s institution and the majority of the parliament was clear. The regional and global conditions and Trump’s administration left no room for his continued activity, which from the start seemed to be a temporary guest in the fourteenth government.
Ultimately, Zarif and Hemmati were not desirable to the core of power. Their limited revisionism and positive view of modern bureaucracy made their loyalty seem unreliable.
The Islamic Republic system prefers to use them opportunistically only in specific periods and not have them permanently in decision-making circles. The expulsion of Zarif and Hemmati dispelled doubts about the fact that the Pezhkian government is the second government of Ebrahim Raisi and has begun to work in a kind of security design for purifying and strengthening the relations of the mafia state.
Mohammad Javad Zarif’s position in explaining and promoting the national consensus project clearly showed the early failure of this project, which aimed to create a compromise between the two factions of the government by giving space to forces that accepted Ali Khamenei’s hegemony and guidance. Another goal was to persuade public opinion by strengthening the perception of the government moving away from extremism towards moderation, to distance from subversive and revolutionary approaches, and to hope for the capacities within the legal framework of the Islamic Republic.
However, the Supreme Leader’s institution sought to draw people towards the system’s desired policies and create a mirage that failed in the first step during the elections. Subsequently, Zarif’s efforts and those of his close circle, known as the ‘openers,’ not only failed to attract more supporters but also could not prevent a decline.
In reality, the Supreme Leader’s institution’s expectation from the claimed consensus was the opposite, meaning discord. From this angle, when Zarif and his colleagues could not advance the national consensus project, their role ended.
But now, especially considering the statements made by Pezhkian in the session defending his Minister of Economy, Hemmati, and once again declaring that he follows Khamenei in all decisions, including contentious matters, the national consensus has reached its end. Even conservative and compliant reformists no longer fit in, and it has become a gathering place only for staunch supporters of the Supreme Leader.
All claims by supporters and carriers of the Pezhkian government during the election competition were that the hardliners within the government were obstacles, and by building trust with Khamenei and moderating demands, they could be sidelined.
However, this incorrect formulation, which ignored the characteristics of the power structure and the path taken over the past two decades, and hoped for depoliticization, quickly vacated the scene in the face of the main source of extremism.
They now stand where Saeed Jalili was.
The only difference is that Jalili, at the theoretical level, fully aligns with Ali Khamenei’s views and the classic views of the Islamic Republic, but Zarif and the Pezhkian team have different, albeit not very extensive, views but ultimately submit to Khamenei’s commands and prohibitions. The experience of maximal and minimal reformist approaches in Khatami and Rouhani’s governments taught the majority of Iranians that these two views, despite limited differences, ultimately reach the same point in practice.
Khamenei resists any meaningful change in macro policies that would lead to the semantic transformation of the system and wants to preserve the current trend as an achievement of his leadership and transfer it to the period after himself.
The first red card the government received from the fourteenth parliament is not a temporary and recoverable defeat but rather illuminates the true security nature of this government and its inherent sterility due to the wrong and delusional strategy it has taken.
In this framework, perhaps Masoud Pezhkian will unknowingly close the election-centric file in Iranian politics.
With all these conditions, it seems Pezhkian is personally happy to have settled in Pasteur, and the results of the government’s performance ultimately do not matter much to him, and he will not be open to fulfilling the vague promise of resignation in case of failing to fulfill his commitments.
