Russia blew the JCPOA agreement away
Russia blew the JCPOA agreement away. The revival of the JCPOA, which seemed very close, has once again entered a loop of suspension. The responses from the American side suggest divergence more than convergence. But who should be held accountable for the current situation?
Can the traces of a specific country or a movement be seen in this? Some speculations point to the recent visit of Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian to Russia last week and suggest that what transpired between him and his Russian counterparts likely influenced the content of the text sent by Iran to the American side.
There is talk that although the Foreign Minister’s trip to Russia appeared to be in line with mediating in the Ukraine war, in reality, Iran was seeking to finalize its views and consult with the Kremlin for sending a final response to the European and American sides.
Especially since less than 48 hours after Amir-Abdollahian’s presence in Moscow, Iran’s response to the draft was given—a response in which many believe Moscow also played a role. The main question is how much the northern country’s footprint in the lack of convergence in the negotiations has been so far, and as some analyses predicted, has Russia really blown the Iranian nuclear agreement away?
Of course, this isn’t the first time the finger of blame has pointed at Russia. Last March, when the negotiations entered a suspension phase, this country’s name was heard again, and it was said that Russia was seeking assurance to ensure that U.S. sanctions do not violate Russia’s rights in the JCPOA.
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov officially stated that they asked their American colleagues to give them written guarantees at least at the level of the foreign minister that recent U.S. sanctions would not harm their right to free and full trade, investment, economic cooperation, and military-technical cooperation with Iran under any circumstances.
The soup that got too salty
With the start of a new round of JCPOA revival negotiations, or as Iran insists on calling it, negotiations to lift sanctions, one name became very prominent: Ulyanov, the Russian representative in international organizations, who was sometimes even referred to as the spokesperson for the Iranian side of the negotiations.
The visits of Iranian officials to Moscow and the request for more Russian involvement in the Vienna negotiations, as well as the statements of Mikhail Ulyanov, the representative of this country, showed that the Russians were playing a central role in the post-Zarif negotiations, and in the news silence of the negotiators of the countries, especially Iran, only the Russian representative was providing information. The soup had become so salty that in August, Ulyanov tweeted asking a BBC reporter to refrain from spreading false stories about Russia’s role in the nuclear negotiations.
The finger of blame is frequently pointed at Russia these days because Zarif, both in his secret six-volume collection about the negotiation process leading to the JCPOA and in his leaked interview file, directly and indirectly revealed Russia’s lack of willingness or its sabotage in the negotiation process.
This issue reached a point where even an Iranian user questioned Ulyanov about this on Twitter, and Ulyanov’s response was a criticism of Mohammad Javad Zarif, which faced a strong reaction from Iranian users and forced him to change his stance.
Russia’s interests in Iran
It is said that the Russian Federation government, led by Vladimir Putin, views the Vienna negotiations from three perspectives: political-security, diplomatic, and economic. Russia sees Iran as its infantry in the Middle East, which can act against the interests of the U.S., NATO, or any hostile country or group at critical moments. The Vienna negotiations allow Russia to enhance its weight in the domestic and international political equations surrounding Syria.
On the other hand, following Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions by the U.S. and Europe against Moscow, some Western officials claimed that Russia was obstructing the Vienna negotiations by requesting guarantees regarding the continuation of its exchanges with Iran.
In a new alignment between the Eastern and Western blocs, Russia can have a stronger hand in resolving the Ukraine issue in exchange for controlling Iran’s nuclear program, which is a red line for European countries and the U.S. Moscow knows well that even if the JCPOA is revived, few European companies will be willing to cooperate with Tehran, creating a favorable environment for Russia to increase economic interactions with Iran in various fields.
Russia is a very good market for Iranian food products. On the other hand, this country can be a vast and untapped market for Russian industries, especially in metals and oil and gas. Additionally, Iran has a particular interest in acquiring weapons from Russia.
Strategic or tactical partner
It seems that Iran is satisfied with this situation and not only has it pinned its hopes on Russia, but it has also opened a special account for it. To the extent that in August, Babak Negahdari, the head of the Parliament’s Research Center, told Levan Jagarian, the Russian ambassador to Iran, that so far good agreements have been made in the field of oil and gas and swap between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia, which will be effective in neutralizing sanctions against the two countries.
He also added that prolonging the time in advancing cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia will be detrimental to both parties and will provide grounds for conspiracy and exploitation by the U.S. and its allies.
Iran believes it has reached a level of strategic cooperation with Russia that this country is now its strategic partner or friend, while it seems that this view is not rooted in reality. Not only do no Russian officials acknowledge such a thing, but the Russian strategic foreign policy doctrine also does not testify to such a thing.
In contrast, there are numerous pieces of evidence that Russia views the Islamic Republic as a card in its gamble with the West. In line with this view, Iran has always denied any negative role of Russia in the negotiation process.
Noor News, a site close to the Supreme National Security Council, wrote some time ago, referring to the core of criticisms, that one of the issues that has mistakenly become the axis of some of these side issues is the claim of the Iranian delegation being led by the eastern side of the negotiations, especially Russia.
This claim is generally based on some comments by Mikhail Ulyanov, the Russian representative in the negotiations, who, incidentally, following the smart actions of the Islamic Republic to encourage this country to accompany Iran, tries to facilitate the path for achieving a good agreement.
These internal side issues align with the efforts of hostile foreign media to create a rift between Iran and the eastern side of the negotiations, one example of which was the incorrect and deliberate translation of Ulyanov’s statements by the Iran International network, leading to Ulyanov’s strong reaction and the return of this network’s reporter from Vienna.
