Russia, the Greedy Neighbor
Since the early 1990s, when the five countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan declared independence from the Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been striving to establish close relations with these countries as a friend. Tehran had unique characteristics to offer these countries.
On one hand, the shared civilizational domain connected Iran and the Central Asian countries, and on the other hand, Iran’s geopolitical advantage as a route to open waters could free these landlocked countries from their geographical trap. The Central Asian countries, newly liberated from nearly a century of Moscow’s communist rule after the Cold War, were eager to diversify their foreign relations and open a new chapter in their foreign policy and international relations.
Iran’s first step to develop relations with Central Asia was initiated by the late Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, with the signing of the South-North transit agreement and the connection of Central Asian railways to Iran’s national railway. In 1996, with the opening of the last segment of the Mashhad-Sarakhs railway, the Central Asian railways were effectively linked to Bandar Abbas and Bandar Imam Khomeini in Iran, completing the railway connection from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. That same year, an energy cooperation agreement with Turkmenistan was signed, and Iran began importing gas from Turkmenistan to supply the northern regions and swap gas in Turkey and the southern regions.
The transit and energy connections between Iran and Central Asia could have been the beginning of extensive long-term cooperation between Iran and the five Central Asian countries. However, over the past three decades, things have not progressed as Tehran desired. Some errors on Tehran’s part, the authoritarian regimes in Central Asian countries, and Russia’s unrivaled influence in these countries have prevented Iran from leveraging its advantages to develop relations with Central Asian countries.
From the very beginning of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Moscow exerted all efforts to maintain its influence over the former Soviet Union’s sphere through the Commonwealth of Independent States agreement, preventing any foreign power from becoming a hegemon and rival power in regions previously under Soviet control. Despite the ups and downs of Russian power over the past three decades, this global power, although largely unsuccessful in maintaining control over the Baltic states, has consistently managed to maintain its dominance in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Moscow’s political dominance in Central Asia has ensured that, despite significant efforts by rival global powers like China and the United States to gain influence in the region, these efforts have remained unsuccessful. Over the past decade, China has managed to expand its influence in Central Asian countries significantly through loans and mega infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. Nevertheless, the political orientation of the governments in this region remains under Russian influence.
Russia and China, by expanding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in this region, have managed to broaden their cooperation within security mechanisms in these areas. Iran has recently become a full member of this organization, but it is unclear whether Iran can influence the regional security mechanisms with the presence of China and Russia. It seems more likely that being part of this organization will subject Iran to security frameworks devised by China and Russia.
Simultaneously, Iran is attempting to join the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan alongside Russia, Belarus, and Armenia, to benefit from free trade and tariff-free commerce with these five countries. Iran’s recent efforts to increase its influence in the Central Asian region have been in the form of joining mechanisms devised by Russia or Russia and China.
However, Iran’s conflicting interests with Russia have consistently prevented it from benefiting from these mechanisms. For example, while energy-producing countries in Central Asia are interested in using east-west energy transmission lines to deliver energy to Europe, Russia is unwilling to accept a competitor in selling energy to Europe and attempts to obstruct this. In the North-South Corridor project, Russia is trying to bypass Iran’s existing connection with Central Asia and redirect the corridor towards the South Caucasus.
To achieve an independent relationship with Central Asian countries, Iran is compelled to, alongside cooperation with Russia and China, once again pursue independent policymaking and bilateral and multilateral initiatives independent of Beijing and Moscow, to overcome Russia’s obstructions and hindrances.
