Tehran denies, Riyadh tries, Washington hopes
Tehran denies, Riyadh tries, Washington hopes
According to Iran Gate News Agency, while Washington speaks of ongoing contacts and Tehran’s willingness to reach an agreement, and Riyadh highlights its role in facilitating talks, there is no sign of any official change in Iran’s positions. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s quiet mediation and the secret message from Iran’s president to the Saudi crown prince have intensified speculations about the resumption of the diplomatic path between Tehran and the U.S.
Donald Trump, the President of the United States, amidst reports about the Saudi crown prince’s mediation efforts after receiving a message from Iran’s president, has spoken of ongoing contacts with Tehran and also of Iran’s willingness to reach an agreement.
Observers evaluate this development as noteworthy despite the absence of significant signs from Iran.
Background and current realities
On November 18, 2025, during a joint press conference, journalists asked Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Crown Prince, whether Riyadh is aware of the details of the talks and whether there are concerns about their impact on Saudi Arabia’s security interests.
The Crown Prince, while emphasizing the closeness of Riyadh and Washington and the ongoing cooperation between the two sides, announced that the Saudi Kingdom will use all its capacity to help shape an agreement between the United States and Iran.
He stated that reaching a good agreement for Iran, which satisfies the region, the world, and America, would be beneficial for Iran’s future.
In contrast, Donald Trump announced that Iran is eager to reach an agreement with the United States and that he is very ready to accept this. The U.S. president clarified that talks with Tehran have begun and a process is underway.
He added that Iran might say something else on the surface, but it is very keen on an agreement. Trump went on to praise the U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear program — including the Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow reactors in June 2025 — and said that Iran was close to reaching the stage of producing a nuclear weapon within a month.
On November 19, 2025, Ismail Baghaei, the spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denied Trump’s statements and said that there is no negotiation process between the two countries.
He emphasized that given Washington’s history of betrayal and its repeated and excessive demands, negotiating with a party that does not believe in real dialogue and boasts about military operations against Iran is not justifiable.
On the same date, Kamal Kharazi — the head of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations and advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic — in an exclusive interview with CNN, announced that Tehran is ready to resume nuclear negotiations with the U.S.
However, he stressed that Iran will not back down from the conditions it set before the U.S. and Israeli attacks in the 12-day war.
Kharazi expressed that Iran will continue uranium enrichment and described the missile program — which he said is being expanded — as outside the framework of negotiations.
In his view, any potential negotiations will focus solely on the nuclear issue.
According to a Reuters report on April 25, 2025, an official familiar with the talks said that negotiations are not limited to the nuclear issue and also include Iran’s missile program.
American media also reported that the United States had proposed a plan to Tehran during the suggested talks, which included investment in Iran’s civilian nuclear program and participation in a consortium to oversee low-enrichment uranium within Iran.
This consortium was expected to include several regional countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency. According to American sources, Iran had initially agreed to the proposal but emphasized internal control over enrichment.
On November 17, 2025, just a few hours before the Crown Prince’s arrival at the White House, the Saudi Press Agency announced that he had received a written message from Masoud Pezeshkian, the President of Iran.
The agency did not release the content of the message and only stated that the message was delivered by Alireza Rashidian, the head of Iran’s Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization, to Prince Abdulaziz bin Saud bin Nayef, the Saudi Minister of Interior, and matters of mutual interest were also discussed in the meeting.
In May 2025, a Reuters report, citing informed sources, indicated that Riyadh had warned Tehran that failing to reach a nuclear agreement with Trump could expose Iran to a potential Israeli attack.
This warning was given during the visit of Prince Khalid bin Salman, the Saudi Minister of Defense, a figure who has previously served as ambassador in Washington. This visit was perceived as a gesture of goodwill from Riyadh and an effort to mediate between Tehran and Washington.
Iranian circles evaluated President Pezeshkian’s message as having hidden dimensions, although its official transmission was framed within the context of Hajj issues.
Media also reflected scenarios regarding Saudi Arabia’s new role in mediating to revive Iran-U.S. negotiations, while Muscat and Doha continued to be identified as the main channels of communication with Washington.
In February 2025, Iranian public opinion sources, considering the improvement in Tehran-Riyadh relations after the Beijing agreement in March 2023, the close connection between Saudi Arabia and the Trump administration, and the personal relationship between Trump and the Saudi Crown Prince, found the possibility of Riyadh playing a mediating role between the two countries noteworthy.
On the other hand, some American observers raise the question of whether a potential nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia — similar to the agreement with South Korea — would allow uranium enrichment on Saudi soil, a matter that, if realized, could weaken Washington’s stance against Iran’s enrichment.
Meanwhile, ideas about a consortium scenario have been proposed, in which components of the nuclear fuel cycle would be divided among different countries, or limited enrichment would be allowed in Iran and Saudi Arabia as a symbolic measure.
Conclusion
There is no credible public data to confirm the U.S. President’s claim about ongoing contacts with Tehran or Iran’s willingness for a short-term agreement with Washington. Tehran continues to insist on continuing enrichment on Iranian soil and excluding the missile program from negotiations.
Despite Iran’s repeated denials and Tehran’s emphasis on its conditions, some observers do not rule out the possibility that the information provided by Trump could be accurate.
The Saudi Crown Prince’s remarks about using all efforts to help achieve an agreement are seen as indicative of Riyadh’s undeclared mediatory role in encouraging the resumption of Washington-Tehran talks, especially since the Iranian President’s message likely reached Washington hours before the Crown Prince’s meeting with Trump.
The growth of Riyadh-Washington cooperation — in areas of economics, finance, energy, critical minerals, technology, and artificial intelligence — necessitates avoiding any new military confrontation with Iran that would threaten regional stability and bilateral cooperation.
Based on this, a potential nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia could serve as a model for shaping the lines of a potential Washington-Tehran agreement.
If the Washington-Riyadh nuclear agreement permits enrichment on Saudi soil, this would weaken the U.S. argument against Iran’s enrichment.
Conversely, any agreement that recognizes Iran’s right to continue enrichment would naturally pave the way for enrichment in Saudi Arabia — within the framework of a bilateral agreement with the U.S.
