Terrorists are at work
The security we no longer have
Terrorists are at work: the dual suicide bombings in Kerman once again showcased the vulnerability of Iran’s security structure to terrorist operations within its borders. A heavy incident that, based on observing reactions, is difficult for Iranian society to digest. Once again, it became clear that the Iranian government’s claim of justifying regional interventions based on combating insecurities beyond its borders is baseless.
Political, security, and military officials of the Islamic Republic argued that confronting ISIS was inevitable and that to neutralize their attacks, they had to be fought outside Iran’s borders. However, after years, it became clear that ISIS did not plan operations within Iran in the early years after establishing the caliphate.
Although within ISIS’s ideological and political framework, Shia and Iranian civilization were considered irreconcilable enemies, they decided for various reasons to engage with the Iranian government within the territorial boundaries of Iraq and Syria during their peak power years.
A limited and narrow change in this strategy occurred in 2017 when two groups of ISIS affiliates attacked the Iranian Parliament building and Ayatollah Khomeini’s mausoleum. This attack followed ISIS bombings in London and Manchester cities. Two weeks before these terrorist attacks, which resulted in 22 deaths, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the then-spokesperson for ISIS, wrote on the social media platform Twitter: ‘Get ready, be prepared.’
After that, ISIS claimed responsibility for the armed attack on the military parade in Ahvaz in 2018 and two attacks on Shah Cheragh in Shiraz in 2022 and 2023, which resulted in nearly 40 casualties. However, the latest ISIS terrorist attack within Iran differed significantly in terms of method and scale. The previous four attacks were not suicide bombings but armed assaults. Their scope was limited, and the total number of civilian casualties was roughly half the number of fatalities in the Kerman attack.
This incident sounded the alarm that, firstly, the timing cycle of ISIS operations within Iran has shortened, and their destructive intensity has increased. Organization has also evolved from a simple lone wolf model to organized coordination between semi-independent cells. Previous operations were technically rudimentary and almost designed and executed by amateur forces, but the Kerman terrorist incident was complex.
The expansion of ISIS’s terrorist attacks and heinous violence within Iran is noteworthy from two perspectives. First, it seems that in ISIS’s new organization for regaining power and strengthening itself, Iran has gained a special position. The deadly confrontation with Shia, considered polytheists by ISIS, has existed since the formation of this criminal organization.
Now, the massacre of Shia within a country that has been the center of Shia in the world for the past five centuries has become a more serious agenda for ISIS. ISIS’s predicament in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has led to increased attention to operations in other countries and regions. In this context, the growth of the Khorasan branch of ISIS has also impacted the increased focus on Iran.
The Khorasan branch of ISIS has had the most conflict with Shia and Iranians and is more motivated to destabilize and annex northeastern Iran to the desired caliphate in Greater Khorasan. This group is also characterized by greater cruelty and brutality. Thus, ISIS considers the increased tensions in the Middle East after the Gaza war an opportune moment for revenge against Qasem Soleimani and to surprise the Islamic Republic. ISIS’s behavior indicates that, in their view, the evil of Shia and the Islamic Republic is greater than that of Jews and the Israeli government.
On the other hand, the incompetence and misguided mindset prevalent in Iran’s security apparatus have also made the country vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Dealing with terrorist groups has its challenges, but a capable security system can create effective deterrence after repeated terrorist operations and either stop or curb the scope of destructive incidents.
The security failure in Kerman and the step-by-step expansion of ISIS’s terrorist attacks have multiple layers. First, the inability to create deterrence against suicide bombings that occurred less than a kilometer from Qasem Soleimani’s grave. Setting up a checkpoint near Soleimani’s grave and providing security coverage for officials and close associates was insufficient.
However, the second layer was the intelligence failure to be aware of the dual martyrdom operation, which caught them completely off guard. After previous operations, they should have gained insight into ISIS’s methods of employing forces, transferring military equipment and financial resources, and identifying residence locations.
After the terrorist operation, the dissemination of a large volume of incorrect and contradictory information disturbed public opinion and prepared the ground for other terrorist operations, which apparently was not considered in ISIS’s design. Otherwise, the crowd in front of Shiraz hospitals could have been an opportunity to expand the terrorists’ malicious objectives.
The Kerman attack showed that there is fundamentally no counter-terrorism program within the country as part of crisis management. The increase in the number of illegal weapons in the country, neglecting the security of the eastern borders, and shifts in the country’s security priorities have turned insecurity into a serious problem, to the extent that a significant portion of citizens do not feel safe and have resorted to self-protection.
Tracking signs and leads for ISIS operations and other extremist groups should be done before incidents occur, and the country’s security system should monitor conditions nationwide. Instead of resorting to slogans and covering up negligence and shortcomings after incidents and the killing of innocent people, they should focus on effective actions.
Incorrect analysis and the dominance of political perspectives over security matters are other aspects that deprive the country of effective preemptive actions against terrorism. The occurrence of two widespread suicide bombings in the neighboring province of Fars five months after the second terrorist attack in Shiraz shows that the country’s defensive shield has collapsed, and terrorists can easily operate in a government ceremony that should theoretically have high security and intelligence protection.
Thus, negligence and weak security performance of the system have reached a concerning stage. Instead of finding solutions, they are creating narratives to portray Israel and the USA as culprits and exploiting the situation politically. This view finds accepting ISIS as the sole perpetrator of the Kerman suicide bombings humiliating and seeks to use it to intensify political blockage internally and increase participation in the upcoming elections in March by stirring emotions and hostility toward Israel abroad.
The fundamental problem is that the Islamic Republic has reduced security to cemetery security and a tool of repression. From the perspective of the institution of the Supreme Leader, observing human rights standards, freedom of dress for men and women, freedom of expression, freedom of political party activities, and freedom of religions are considered threats to security. Therefore, this institution has directed the country’s security capabilities towards suppressing independent and dissenting forces.
The security doctrine of the Islamic Republic is based on emphasizing militarism, dominating a police state, and hostility. In reality, it has sought to establish the desired security in the country through the use of force internally, destabilization beyond its borders, and confrontation with the global system and the West.
The outcome of this perception of security has been the fragile authoritarianism of the government at the cost of intensifying social rifts and deepening security challenges due to the increasing gap between the people and the government. Now, the country has become vulnerable in the realm of terrorism and harmful armed conflicts.
Of course, the overwhelming negative opinion of the majority of the Iranian people towards terrorism and the killing of human lives and ordinary citizens because of political and religious beliefs is the country’s most important asset in preventing the formation of a wave of terrorism. Otherwise, Iran could have experienced conditions similar to Afghanistan and Syria.
The high volume of sabotage operations, the continuation of arrests, the formation of related courts, and the relatively large number of those convicted of espionage have also questioned the Islamic Republic’s claim of intelligence dominance and the arrest of espionage and extremist terrorist networks.
Currently, not only are the security institutions of the Islamic Republic facing the challenge of an information tunnel instead of a repairable information gap from powers or involved groups, but large gaps have also emerged within the country’s security structure that disrupt the effective protection of the people. Infiltration into the governing institutions of the Islamic Republic is not difficult. This reality has increased the government’s weakness in containing terrorism.
In contrast to authoritarian regimes like the Islamic Republic, intelligence institutions in democratic countries with rule of law focus on the public good within criteria such as maintaining community and public security, convergence between governing institutions, protecting civil rights, assisting in sustainable diplomacy, creating a surrounding environment for decision-making institutions within the framework of national interests and collective welfare, creating opportunities, neutralizing threats, and striving to create peace and hope in society.
On the other hand, the capability of security and military forces is limited. If priority is given to repression and securitizing non-security issues, and if the opposition of Israel and the USA becomes the main target of security planning and actions, then the preventive capability of these forces against organized crime and terrorism will decrease, and their legitimacy and acceptance in society will also be lost, which in turn encourages the actions of terrorist groups.
Therefore, the escalation of tensions outside the borders within the framework of ideological ambition and the expansion of organized repression internally against opponents have left little room for security, military, and law enforcement forces to control terrorism and armed thefts within the country. Reviewing the positions of the main institutions and government agents after the Kerman terrorist operation does not show hope for a change to base security on elements such as increasing soft power, public satisfaction, and security-building through shared perceptual frameworks and homogeneous norms.
The continuation of the cemetery security approach and reliance solely on hard power and hardware tools within value criteria lacking social consensus have elevated the country’s security threats to a dangerous level and expanded instability in society by weakening the foundations of national cohesion.
The threatening statement by ISIS regarding the continuation of operations in Iran is extremely concerning given the current situation. Within the framework of the current security capability and mindset of the Islamic Republic, this group can threaten not only government and religious ceremonies but also the everyday lives of Iranian citizens.
