The Future of the Internet in the Hands of Internet Enemies
Is the Minister of Communications merely responsible for cable installation, or does he also have authority over filtering and unblocking? With changes in governments, can the governing policies over the internet in Iran change or not? Will the state of the internet be different under Masoud Pezeshkian’s government compared to Saeed Jalili’s government?
These days, amidst the strange and unpredictable electoral struggle, such questions are repeated more than ever, as it seems the issue of the internet in Iran has become one of the most important concerns for a broad section of the population. The feasibility of its improvement could influence many people’s decisions on whether to participate in the presidential elections.
Is the Minister of Communications merely responsible for cable installation, or does he also have authority over filtering and unblocking? With changes in governments, can the governing policies over the internet in Iran change or not? Will the state of the internet be different under Masoud Pezeshkian’s government compared to Saeed Jalili’s government?
Since March 2012, when faced with the troublesome phenomenon of the internet, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace was formed. Until today, this council has acted as a superior body for internet policy-making and coordination among other institutions in this field, having diverse resolutions. The further this institution progressed, the broader powers it assumed for itself. Along with the National Cyberspace Center as its executive arm, the High Commission for Regulation as the regulatory body, and the reference for complaints, it effectively assumed the duties of all three branches in legislation, execution, and supervision.
The idea of the National Information Network, mistakenly referred to as the National Internet, and all the resolutions defined under it, are the handiwork of this council and center. These resolutions have outlined a clear vision for the future of the internet in Iran: the complete independence of the National Information Network in three layers: infrastructure, software services and platforms, and content from the internet as an interconnected international network.
This means that this network should be able to meet users’ needs without the internet, and various positive and negative incentives should be considered for users to use services based on this network instead of the internet.
However, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace is not the only supra-governmental body in the field of internet governance. The Working Group for Determining Instances of Criminal Content, which operates under the supervision of the Cyberspace Deputy of the Attorney General’s Office, local courts, the National Security Council, and the Supreme National Security Council are other important institutions, each of which has had a hand in filtering. In such conditions, it seems the executive branch cannot do much beyond implementing the orders from above.
So far, the common narrative among the people has been proven legally. However, the governance system in Iran, despite the hierarchy that makes the players conservative, like any other system, is the result of the opinions of various stakeholders. The role of the government in many of these institutions, although not the most important or effective, can sometimes act as a negotiator or implement its interpretation of the resolutions.
The government, not as a policymaker but as an executor, has limited authority in the timing and method of implementing resolutions and may sometimes be willing to pay the necessary costs to oppose a resolution if it has the will and motivation, like not implementing the Instagram filtering order in the previous government, which even led to the Minister of Communications being taken to court. In such a case, with some friction in implementing resolutions, new technologies may emerge, and the cat-and-mouse game of filtering and circumvention tools might advance in favor of the right to free internet access.
But the more important issue is the other side of the story, where the government not only doesn’t negotiate but acts as a facilitator and pioneer to further restrict internet rights, putting all its efforts into it. Here, the government has a lot of leeway and can execute resolutions faster and even beyond expectations.
It can also independently enter the field for more restrictions, and in the conservative governance structure, no one will stop it. Even if one day it succeeds in cutting off the internet without creating problems for the country’s routine mechanisms, it might even be encouraged by the aforementioned bodies. This is where it can be said that it matters who is in the government, not because they can implement widespread unblocking or take positive steps for internet access rights.
But because the enemies of the internet are eager to quickly reach ideals, the costs and consequences of which do not matter to them, just as the consequences of sanctions do not matter to them, just as low public participation in elections does not matter to them.
