The Risk of a New War in the Region: Is Peace Still Possible?
The Risk of a New War in the Region: Is Peace Still Possible?
According to Iran Gate News Agency, Middle Eastern tensions remain fragile, and the shadow of war has not yet lifted from the region. From Gaza and Lebanon to Yemen and Iraq, unresolved issues and diplomatic deadlocks indicate that no regional or extra-regional actor can achieve its goals without considering major powers like Russia and China. Meanwhile, developments in Ukraine and global economic competitions have a direct impact on the path to peace or the escalation of crises. Any decision made without considering all aspects could have widespread regional and global consequences.
The atmosphere in the Middle East these days oscillates between fear and hope—fear of the return of war and hope for the end of conflicts and the region’s move towards peace. The main question is whether we can expect the shadow of war to lift from the region anytime soon, while the Gaza ceasefire is fragile and Israel, despite officially declaring a halt to hostilities and holding a loud Sharm el-Sheikh summit, claims the war has ended. It is still unclear whether the danger of resuming battles has been eliminated. In Lebanon, a year has passed since the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, but the Litani River, which was supposed to be the line of cessation, has not effectively played such a role, and reports indicate thousands of ceasefire violations by Israel.
In Iraq and Yemen, too, the shadow of war has not completely lifted, and the absence of attacks in recent months is more due to delays in operations than the result of a lasting agreement. The 12-day war cessation between Iran and Israel was based on an unwritten verbal understanding, and there is no indication of guarantees to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized that they are ready to face any scenario, and the experience of the 12-day war has increased their level of preparedness. Meanwhile, some analysts warn that the current situation should not be seen as the end of tensions, as the possibility of renewed conflict remains real.
Field realities show that neither the United States, nor Israel, nor even Europe consider their plans in the region to be concluded. After the events of October 7, 2023, Israel, as the frontline force, and the United States and Europe, as its main supporters, defined a framework for war, and events of the past two years can be analyzed within that framework.
Although apparently the intensity of tensions has decreased, an underlying fire remains that not only might reignite but, from the perspective of some actors, its reignition is certain.
Israel has not yet achieved its declared objectives in the cases of Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, and the West continues to emphasize intensifying pressures in the UN Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and international forums. Western officials’ statements about the diplomatic path remaining open with Iran are seen by many not as a step towards understanding but as a move to advance targeted pressures.
Israel’s Objective
Since October 7, Israel has pursued a strategy aimed at ensuring security on all borders and eliminating threats in its surrounding environment.
Within this framework, Israel has conducted operations not only in Gaza but also in Lebanon and Syria, extending the scope of threats to Tehran, Turkey, and Pakistan.
The multiple attacks by this regime in Syria and advances up to 15 kilometers into Damascus are also evaluated within this approach, an approach that now, with the absence of Iran in Syria, has increased Israel’s concern about Turkey filling this vacuum.
The Gaza case, despite the announcement of a ceasefire, remains open. Israel’s ultimate goal of completely destroying Hamas has not been achieved, and this group is still in the process of rebuilding its structures. The issue of disarming Hamas has neither entered the implementation phase nor been based on clear negotiations. In Lebanon, Hezbollah still possesses the largest missile reserves and military capabilities, reportedly stronger than the Lebanese army, according to American and Israeli officials. The disarmament of Hezbollah has become a complex dilemma, with no party offering a practical and executable plan for it. Daily Israeli attacks in Lebanon and recent reports from this regime’s security agencies, recommending a few days of war in Lebanon, indicate Tel Aviv’s deep concern about Hezbollah’s capabilities.
In Iraq, many political groups close to the Popular Mobilization Forces expect a surprise attack from the United States or Israel against resistance forces, especially after these groups managed to gain significant seats in parliament.
In Yemen, the cessation of Ansarullah’s attacks on Israel after the Gaza ceasefire is not the result of any formal agreement and is merely considered a political decision.
Regarding Iran, Israel and the West view the case as still open, and the 12-day war is not seen as the end of tensions. Simultaneously, the halt of negotiations between Iran and the United States and the implementation of a snapback by Europe have put diplomacy in a state of deadlock.
Iran emphasizes its distrust of Western parties but simultaneously declares its readiness for an agreement within the framework of the nuclear file.
The American side only accepts comprehensive direct negotiations that include missile issues, regional matters, and the path to normalization of relations, and is not willing to talk outside this framework. Therefore, American officials’ statements about negotiations are more colored by pressure than a genuine desire for an agreement.
Time to Exit the Deadlock
This deadlock cannot continue indefinitely. The accumulation of crises alongside Arab countries’ efforts for economic prosperity and intensified competitions in the region could create conditions where the smallest spark could escalate tensions.
Such a spark might pave the way for the resolution of pending cases, but it will also intensify the confrontation of wills.
Three scenarios are possible: 1) The failure of the West and Israel’s strategy and a fundamental change in priorities—unlikely. 2) The complete victory of the West and Israel and the full imposition of their demands—very costly in terms of regional consequences and thus possible but weak. 3) The resilience of Iran and its allies until the parties reach a point where they accept each other’s conditions and a process for reducing tensions takes shape—a more realistic scenario. The escalation of tensions in the Caribbean Sea and pressure on Venezuela can also be analyzed within this framework, as Venezuela and Nicaragua are part of Iran’s network of allies, and any event in these areas can have a direct link to developments in West Asia.
Russia and the Impact of the Ukraine War
In this arena, the roles of China and Russia cannot be overlooked. Russia remains an effective player on the international stage, and Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow is evidence of this role. Although Russia is involved in the Ukraine war, its political influence in the Middle East is still palpable, and Nicolás Maduro’s move to seek Moscow’s support is an indication of this reality.
Ignoring Russia means ignoring an important reality in global relations. The escalation of the Ukraine war has led to the intensification of other global crises and the return of geopolitical divisions.
For this reason, the end of the Ukraine war could have a direct effect on other developments and pave the way for broader cooperation between the West and Russia, even in the form of trans-regional deals.
China’s Interests
China, to advance its goals and become the leading player in the global economy, needs economic stability worldwide. This country only enters a regional file when there are specific benefits for it.
The Middle East holds special importance for China in terms of energy, trade, and investment. China’s trade volume with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries is expected to reach $380 billion by 2025.
Exchanges with Iraq and Iran in recent years have been approximately $35 billion and $32 billion, respectively, and China has made significant investments in Israel, including the construction and 25-year lease of the Haifa Port.
The importance of this region for Beijing led China to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia and likely play a role in other cases as well. From this perspective, excluding China and Russia from the Sharm el-Sheikh summit is considered a non-strategic move, as these two players have direct interests in the peace process or tensions.
Conclusion
Any development in the region—whether escalating war or moving towards peace—can only be understood by considering a set of regional and extra-regional factors.
The United States is well aware that any strategic action might provoke a reaction from China or Russia. For example, Washington’s potential efforts to establish a presence in Bagram could trigger sensitivities from these two powers.
The experience of the JCPOA also showed that an agreement that does not include the interests of multiple players will face resistance or sabotage. Therefore, delays in many decisions are due to the need to consider all aspects and learn from past experiences. If the current situation is considered a deadlock, as multiple indications suggest, exiting or deepening it is entirely dependent on factors such as the state of the Ukraine war, the level of tension between China and the West, and the network of regional and extra-regional interactions of Iran. Reducing tension is only possible when the main cases reach a clear point unless the goals of the West and Israel change, a possibility that does not seem very close to reality.
