The Start of a War of Attrition

The Start of a War of Attrition

The start of a war of attrition: developments in the Middle East over the past two weeks have entered a new and more challenging phase. Three days after Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, Netanyahu spoke about changing the map of the Middle East and named the operation that led to the death of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah as ‘Operation New Order.’ Netanyahu’s remarks and those of Israeli extremists indicate that from the beginning, they intended to turn the October 7 operation into an opportunity to confront resistance groups and oppose Iran.

Based on this, Israel, which in the first three months focused on Hamas and claimed Iran and Hezbollah were uninformed about the October 7 attack, after relatively dealing with Hamas in Gaza, carried out unprecedented attacks on December 25 and April 2, resulting in the martyrdom of several high-ranking IRGC officials in Syria. Despite Iran’s limited response to the April 2 operation against the consular section of the Iranian embassy in Damascus, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on August 1 was Israel’s next provocative action.

Iranian officials rightly tried to avoid actions that could provide Israel with an opportunity to expand the war in the region. Of course, the U.S. government also played a role in preventing a serious clash between Iran and Israel, as Washington knows that in such a confrontation, it might have no choice but to intervene in favor of Israel.

Ultimately, in the so-called process of changing the map of the Middle East, Hezbollah became the next target on Israel’s agenda. Targeting Hezbollah is a consensus in Israeli domestic politics and offers advantages for Netanyahu’s political future. Diplomatically, almost no country except Iran is a serious opponent of it. However, Netanyahu’s problem was that Hezbollah also avoided an all-out war, and the goal of the operation that began on October 8 was only to pressure Israel for a ceasefire in Gaza.

It is well-known that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said that if he had known in July 2006 that attacking an Israeli armored vehicle, killing three soldiers, and capturing two would lead to the 33-day war, he would not have taken that action. Therefore, Israel only used the return of displaced northern Israeli residents to their homes and the removal of the Hezbollah threat as a pretext for war against Hezbollah. The question now is how far this change in the Middle East map and the new order is supposed to continue.

Israel’s apparent goal is to use the opportunity of the October 7 operation to end the shadow war or the unlimited and managed war of attrition by resistance groups in its surrounding areas. This strategy can be pursued with the support of Europe and the U.S., the silence of China and Russia, and the indifference of Islamic-Arab countries. In a situation where Israel has turned the threat of an all-out war into a tool to halt the war of attrition, the question is what Iran can do. Iran’s policy of avoiding an all-out war has been a correct policy.

Firstly, the expectation is that Hezbollah, despite the blows it has suffered, can maintain its organization and military capability and defend itself. Secondly, the expectation of some factions from Iranian officials to take actions that could lead to an all-out war is not a reasonable expectation. In the event of a serious confrontation between Iran and Israel, especially in these election conditions, the U.S. will not hesitate to enter the war. The military force of no medium power is prepared to confront global powers. Additionally, existing problems in economic, social, domestic policy, foreign policy, intelligence, and security areas further justify avoiding a widespread war.

Thirdly, due to U.S. opposition, it is unlikely that Israel initially intends to enter a war with Iran unless it can find a pretext for this purpose. This pretext could be an attack by Iran against Israel or an action in the nuclear domain. In the latter case, some have recently recommended Iran’s nuclearization as an action to avoid an all-out war and a reaction to the weakening of surrounding deterrent arms, but such a recommendation itself could be a source of a massive threat to Iran’s security. Stepping into such a path requires fulfilling multiple conditions such as having a strong intelligence shield, information protection, nuclear security, and safety.

Serious movement in the nuclear domain will unite many against Iran, and if China and Russia do not join, they will at most remain silent. Moreover, nuclear deterrence requires the existence of a large number of nuclear bombs and a diverse triad of delivery tools through aircraft, missiles, and submarines. One or two bombs not only do not provide deterrence, but if nuclear facilities are immediately targeted and the ability to deliver a second strike does not exist, a large part of the country could become uninhabitable.