The Third Way Ankara

15 Min Read

Ankara’s Third Way

Turkey’s Ankara’s Third Way for the Global South

Ankara’s Third Way refers to a strategy or approach that Turkey has adopted in its foreign policy. This third way has particularly emerged in recent years as a balanced and independent policy that neither fully leans towards the West, the European Union, and the United States, nor towards the East, China, and Russia. Instead, Turkey strives to simultaneously expand its relations with various countries across different parts of the world. The country has increased its diplomatic and commercial presence in the larger Afro-Eurasian region, not only under the banner of the Ankara agreement.

A unique model of cooperation that today also includes the defense industry.

Until the early 2000s, Turkey’s strategic approach was considered to be a Western-oriented one, meaning it was solely focused on strategic and economic ties with the West. However, from 2005 onwards, Turkey’s foreign policy strategy was rebuilt on new principles, including the principle of multilateralism, which allows the country to exploit various economic, political, and strategic interests without being dependent on a specific bloc.

This principle is often mistakenly interpreted as a shift from the West towards an unspecified East, while in reality, the multidirectionality is the result of the formation and subsequent internalization of a new concept of national role by Turkey’s political elites under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Within a few years, the public perception of the Anatolian government as a bridge country between East and West gradually gave way to the concept of a central or pivotal country within a larger African-Eurasian region. As a result of this role, national political elites have developed new foreign policy orientations, including a southern orientation aimed at the Global South.

Multidirectional foreign policy: A step-by-step process

Turkey’s inclination towards multilateral foreign policy is not entirely new.

The sanctions imposed on Turkey by the United States following the Cyprus crisis of 1974 and the subsequent economic policy choices of liberalization and privatization during the Turgut Özal government (1982-1992) facilitated the first openings towards multiple regional areas such as the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. With the end of the bipolar era, Turkey gradually diversified its political and economic partners, although its foreign policy remained dependent on the West.

However, during the 1990s, the desire to increase diplomatic activities beyond traditional orientations was limited due to internal political instability and the vulnerability of the national economy.

It was only from the early 2000s that the convergence of the country’s external and internal conditions allowed the governments under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to implement a multilateral policy.

The neoliberal reforms and opening up to foreign trade that began in the 1980s started to yield initial results.

Turkey’s economy dramatically changed from an economy under state supervision and almost exclusively focused on the domestic market to an open and integrated economy in the global market. Turkey gradually shaped itself as a trading nation, resulting in export markets and direct foreign investments increasingly gaining importance on Turkey’s political agenda.

Economic-commercial multilateralism gradually expanded from the initial focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia—areas that had created growing opportunities following the collapse of the Soviet Union—to first the Middle East and Asia, and eventually to Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Within a few months, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed and published its action plans for Latin America and Africa, laying the foundations for expanding the southern orientation. In fact, the economic and commercial opening was partly accompanied by increased political relations and partly preceded them, with high-level bilateral visits from both regions.

Development of the Southern Path

Turkey’s increased attention to the Global South was driven by a combination of internal and external factors. Turkish elites introduced the Global South as a space full of economic opportunities for many entrepreneurs seeking new markets for exporting manufactured goods. At the same time, although Ankara’s political priority remained the process of joining the European Union, the Global South was seen as an opportunity to legitimize Turkey’s growing international standing. As a result, decisions were made to launch a series of initiatives towards Sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries.

The southern strategy of Turkey’s foreign policy focused on a soft agenda by launching a wide range of institutions and agencies and by supporting trade organizations, Islamic networks, and NGOs active in various regional fields. Among the tools Turkey employed to increase its presence abroad—tools that were almost unknown until then—were cultural diplomacy, schools, language courses, scholarships, TV series, humanitarian diplomacy, humanitarian aid, opening hospitals, medical campaigns, training courses for the health sector, branding, opening air routes under Turkish Airlines, supporting sports and cultural events, and religious diplomacy, such as building mosques and training courses for imams.

Economically, within a few years, we witnessed a significant increase in exchanges and relations, especially in the construction, industrial manufacturing, and agri-food sectors. Turkey’s economic activity towards the Global South was mainly led by small and medium-sized Anatolian companies, which Turkish authorities supported with bureaucratic, logistical, and financial assistance. Thus, Ankara has facilitated the development of economic-entrepreneurial relations with low-income countries in various ways over the years. In addition to more traditional direct investments and loans, Turkey has sought to strengthen medium- and long-term ties through vocational training programs and language courses.

The symbol of this commitment is the scholarship financing programs that are annually allocated to young people from target countries for Turkey’s economic and strategic interests. Additionally, Turkish Airlines has significantly contributed to facilitating increased economic relations. Turkey’s national airline, which is state-controlled, has expanded its connections with Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The new routes have enabled many entrepreneurs from the Global South to benefit from special visas for business purposes by purchasing plane tickets.

This system has reduced the time and costs of accessing Turkey, thereby turning the Anatolian government into a hub for establishing economic relations with third countries. Over time, the gradual concentration of political power in Turkey was accompanied by the emergence of large entrepreneurial groups that were somehow linked to the political elites of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). These groups, such as Lidya Mining in the mining sector and Aksa Energy in the energy sector, rapidly expanded their activities in the markets of the Global South and soon became significant players.

New Goal: A Global Player

After the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the shift in regional balances following the Arab uprisings in 2011, and the increasing signs of domestic democratic regression, Turkey’s foreign policy entered a new phase aimed at establishing itself as a global player. The Global South occupied a more prominent place in the newly formed strategy, where Turkey played an increasingly significant role with distinctive features compared to other actors. Although Turkey is neither considered a country from the Global South nor does it see itself as such, it began to experiment with a model of horizontal development intervention and relations that bears many similarities to South-South cooperation.

In Sub-Saharan African countries and some Latin American countries, Turkey promotes the Ankara agreement, although it is not a fully defined concept. The Ankara agreement is considered a new model of economic, political, and social development for low- and middle-income countries, presented as an alternative to the Washington Consensus, which is a neoliberal economic and democratic development agenda, and the Beijing Consensus, which is known for advocating state-led economic growth and prioritizing stability over democracy.

Turkey seeks to promote a middle path or third way in the Global South through implementing a beneficial and sustainable development policy that also includes efforts to create a mutually liberating policy. Instead of creating new dependency relations, Turkey’s approach, particularly towards Sub-Saharan Africa, tends to focus on political equality, economic development, and building long-term social relations. Ankara’s idea neither rejects nor denies the benefits and opportunities of capitalism and integration into the global market. Therefore, Turkey seeks to share its development model or formula, which was particularly successful in the first decade of the 2000s, with low- and middle-income countries.

In terms of narrative, Turkey recalls many of the concepts of South-South cooperation, such as the idea of mutual growth and partnership development based on interdependence. Turkey’s aid aims primarily at achieving self-sufficiency and sustainability for the countries it intervenes in. The increasing diplomatic and commercial presence in the Global South gradually took on political and security dimensions. Ankara believes that greater involvement in political affairs in multiple fields, even geographically distant from its traditional areas of interest, serves its goal of becoming a global player.

Therefore, Turkey has sought to increase its attention and appeal by leveraging one of the fastest-growing sectors of its economy, the defense industry. This sector has proven to be a strategic area where Turkey’s economic and commercial interests align and, in some cases, overlap with the needs of many Global South countries’ elites. Turkey has used its defense industry products as bargaining tools, particularly to gain concessions in the energy sector.

Advantages of Hybrid Nature

Turkey’s increasing global activity has led it to look with interest at the evolution of the BRICS group. Regardless of statements often made in Turkish politics to gain negotiating leverage at other tables, the idea of Turkey joining this alliance is difficult to imagine. Within the same political and economic apparatus at the national level, there is concern that the potential path to joining BRICS may lead to a situation similar to the stalemate with the European Union. It is likely that Ankara will try to exploit the current state of international disorder to its advantage and gain more room for maneuver and strategic independence against the United States and, more broadly, its traditional Western partners.

However, Turkey is aware that many of its interests, even in the Global South, depend on its hybrid nature as an emerging power with a Muslim majority and a NATO member. In a globally increasingly polarized context, competing between democracies and non-democracies or the West and the rest of the world, Turkey’s political elites are trying to present themselves as mediators capable of maintaining good relations with both sides.

As a conclusion, many countries in the Global South choose to cooperate with their Anatolian counterpart and increase their relations because they find the political costs of this connection to be lower than the costs of making a definitive choice. This aspect is one of the factors that Ankara exploits to enhance its global significance and move effectively in an increasingly unstable and unpredictable international environment.

Share This Article
Master's Degree in International Relations from the Faculty of Diplomatic Sciences and International Relations, Genoa, Italy.
Exit mobile version