Ankara’s Third Way
Turkey’s Ankara Third Way for the Global South
Ankara’s Third Way refers to a strategy or approach that Turkey has adopted in its foreign policy. This third way, especially in recent years, has been presented as a balanced and independent policy that neither leans entirely towards the West, the European Union, and the United States, nor towards the East, China, and Russia. Instead, Turkey strives to expand its relations simultaneously with various countries in different parts of the world. This country has increased its diplomatic and commercial presence in the macro-regional area of Afro-Eurasia, not only under the banner of the Ankara agreement.
A unique model of cooperation that today also includes the defense industry.
Until the early 2000s, Turkey’s strategic approach was considered a pro-Western one, focusing solely on strategic and economic ties with the West. However, from 2005 onwards, Turkey’s foreign policy strategy was rebuilt based on new principles, including the principle of multilateralism, which allows the country to exploit various economic, political, and strategic interests without being dependent on a specific bloc.
This principle is often mistakenly interpreted as a shift from the West towards an undefined East, whereas in reality, the multidirectionality results from the formation and then internalization of a new concept of national role by Turkey’s political elites under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Within a few years, the public perception of the Anatolian state as a bridge country between East and West gradually gave way to the concept of a central or pivotal country from a macro African-Eurasian region. As a result of this role, national political elites have developed new foreign policy orientations, including a southern orientation aimed at the Global South.
Multidirectional foreign policy as a step-by-step process
Turkey’s inclination towards a multilateral foreign policy is not entirely new.
Sanctions imposed on Turkey by the United States following the Cyprus crisis in 1974 and subsequent economic policy choices, such as liberalization and privatization during the Turgut Özal administration (1982-1992), facilitated the first openings towards multiple regional areas like the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. With the end of the bipolar era, Turkey gradually diversified its political and economic partners, although its foreign policy remained dependent on the West.
However, during the 1990s, the desire to increase diplomatic activities beyond traditional orientations was limited due to internal political instability and the vulnerability of the national economy.
It was only from the early 2000s that the convergence of external and internal conditions allowed the governments led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to implement a policy of multilateralism.
Neoliberal reforms and the opening to foreign trade that began in the 1980s started to yield initial results.
Turkey’s economy changed dramatically, transforming from a state-controlled economy focused almost exclusively on the domestic market to an open and integrated economy in the global market. Turkey gradually emerged as a trading nation, resulting in export markets and direct foreign investments gaining increasing importance in Turkey’s political agenda.
Economic-commercial multilateralism gradually expanded from an initial focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia—regions where the post-Soviet collapse created growing opportunities—to initially the Middle East and Asia, and eventually to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Within a few months, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed and published action plans for Latin America and Africa, laying the groundwork for expanding the southern orientation. In fact, economic and commercial opening was partly accompanied by an increase in political relations and partly preceded it, accompanied by high-level bilateral visits from both regions.
Development of the Southern Path
Turkey’s increased attention to the Global South was due to a combination of internal and external factors. Turkish elites introduced the Global South as a space full of economic opportunities for many entrepreneurs seeking new markets for exporting manufactured goods. At the same time, although Ankara’s political priority remained the process of joining the European Union, the Global South was seen as an opportunity to legitimize Turkey’s growing international stature. As such, decisions were made to launch a series of opening initiatives towards sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries.
The Southern strategy of Turkey’s foreign policy focused on a soft agenda by launching a wide range of institutions and agencies and supporting trade organizations, Islamic networks, and NGOs active in various regional fields. Among the tools Turkey employed to increase its presence abroad—tools that were almost unknown until then—were cultural diplomacy, schools, language courses, scholarships, television series, humanitarian diplomacy, humanitarian aid, hospital openings, medical campaigns, training courses for the health sector, branding, opening air routes under Turkish Airlines, supporting sports and cultural events, and religious diplomacy, including building mosques and training courses for imams.
Economically, within a few years, there was a significant increase in exchanges and relations, especially in the construction, industrial production, and agri-food sectors. Turkey’s economic activity towards the Global South was mainly driven by small and medium-sized Anatolian companies, which received bureaucratic, logistical, and financial support from Turkish authorities. As a result, Ankara has facilitated the development of economic-entrepreneurial relations with low-income countries in various ways over the years. In addition to more traditional direct investments and loans, Turkey has sought to strengthen medium- and long-term ties through vocational training programs and language courses.
A symbol of this commitment is the scholarship financing programs, which are annually allocated to young people from target countries for Turkey’s economic and strategic interests. Additionally, Turkish Airlines has significantly contributed to facilitating increased economic relations. Turkey’s national airline, which is state-controlled, has expanded its connections with Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The new routes have enabled many entrepreneurs from the Global South countries to benefit from special visas for business purposes by purchasing plane tickets.
This system has reduced the time and costs of accessing Turkey, consequently turning the Anatolian state into a hub for establishing economic relations with third countries. Over time, the gradual concentration of political power in Turkey was accompanied by the emergence of large entrepreneurial groups, some of which were somehow linked to the political elites of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). These groups, like Lidya Mining in the mining sector and Aksa Energy in the energy sector, rapidly expanded their activities in the Global South markets and soon became significant players.
New Goal: A Global Player
After the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the regional balance shifts following the Arab uprisings in 2011, and increasing signs of democratic backsliding domestically, Turkey’s foreign policy entered a new phase aimed at achieving the status of a global player. At the center of the newly formed strategy, the Global South gained more prominence, where Turkey played an increasingly significant role with unique characteristics compared to other actors. Although Turkey is neither considered a Global South country nor sees itself as such, it has begun to experiment with a model of horizontal development and relations that has many similarities with South-South cooperation.
In sub-Saharan African countries and some Latin American countries, Turkey promotes the Ankara agreement. Although this is not a fully defined concept, the Ankara agreement is considered a new model of economic, political, and social development for low and middle-income countries, presented as an alternative to the Washington Consensus, which is a neoliberal economic and democratic development agenda, and the Beijing Consensus, known as a proposal for state-led economic growth and prioritizing stability over democracy.
Turkey seeks to promote a middle path or third way in the Global South through implementing a beneficial and sustainable developmental policy that also includes efforts to create a mutual liberation policy. Instead of creating new dependency relationships, Turkey’s approach, especially towards sub-Saharan Africa, tends to focus on political equality, economic development, and building long-term social relations. Ankara’s idea neither rejects the benefits and opportunities of capitalism and integration into the global market nor denies them. Therefore, Turkey seeks to share its development model or formula, which was particularly successful in the first decade of the 2000s, with low and middle-income countries.
In terms of narrative, Turkey recalls many concepts of South-South cooperation, such as the idea of mutual growth and partnership development based on interdependence. Turkey’s aid aims primarily at the self-sufficiency and sustainability of the countries it intervenes in. The increasing diplomatic and commercial presence in the Global South gradually took on political and security dimensions as well. Ankara believes that greater engagement in political affairs in various fields, even those geographically distant from its traditional areas of interest, serves to achieve the status of a global player.
Therefore, Turkey has sought to increase its attention and appeal by leveraging one of its fastest-growing economic sectors, the defense industry. This sector has demonstrated to be a strategic area where Turkey’s economic and commercial interests align with the needs of the elites of many Global South countries and, in some cases, overlap. Turkey has used its defense industry products as a bargaining tool, especially to obtain concessions in the energy field.
Advantages of a Hybrid Nature
Turkey’s increasing global activity has led it to look with interest at the evolution of the BRICS group. Regardless of statements often made in Turkish politics to gain negotiation margins at other tables, the idea of Turkey joining this coalition is challenging. Within the same political and economic apparatus at the national level, there is concern that the potential path of joining BRICS might lead to a situation similar to the deadlock with the European Union. Most likely, Ankara will try to exploit the current state of international disorder to its advantage and gain more maneuvering space and strategic independence against the United States and, more generally, its traditional Western partners.
However, Turkey is aware that many of its interests, even in the context of the Global South, depend on its hybrid nature as an emerging power with a Muslim majority and a NATO member. In a globally increasingly polarized context and competition between democracies and non-democracies, or the West and the rest of the world, Turkey’s political elites try to present themselves as mediators capable of maintaining good relations with both sides.
Consequently, many Global South countries choose to cooperate with their Anatolian counterpart and increase their relations because they perceive the political costs of this connection to be lower than the costs of making a definitive choice. This aspect is one of the factors that Ankara exploits to increase its significance globally and navigate effectively in an international environment that is increasingly unstable and unpredictable.
