Choosing Between Conservative and More Conservative
Twelfth Parliamentary Elections The twelfth parliamentary elections are approaching their final stage. This is the first election held under Ebrahim Raisi’s administration and in the context of a unified conservative governance.
In this election period, the Ministry of Interior and the Guardian Council have resorted to playing with numbers from the very beginning. Continuing the trend that began in 2019, the electoral space has become more restricted, resulting in an electoral competition that is increasingly meaningless.
In this period, the authorities have focused on the numerical abundance of registered candidates, most of whom are affiliated with conservatives or are unknown individuals lacking political and executive experience. Meanwhile, the diversity among approved candidates is significantly less than in previous periods.
Among them, the reformists and moderates who have passed the Guardian Council’s filter are few in number and are marginal figures, whose positions are far removed from the average demands of the protesting public seeking change.
Despite extensive advertising by the thirteenth government and the Guardian Council’s spokesperson, the percentage increase in registered candidates from the twelfth to the eleventh period is 15%, which is less than the 22% increase between the tenth and ninth parliamentary elections. However, the major and important difference is their quality.
In the tenth parliament, the increase in candidates was natural, but this year it is artificial and organized. Additionally, the diversity among the tenth parliament candidates was much greater than the almost identical group of twelfth parliament volunteers. The inclination to candidacy even among reformists and moderates has noticeably declined in this period.
Another notable point is the steady percentage of women among all registered candidates in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth parliaments. Since the tenth parliament, the upward trend has stopped. The total number of approved candidates is 15,220, equivalent to 61% of all registered volunteers. This ratio is higher than previous periods, eleventh 51% and tenth 40%. However, since the candidates mostly belong to a single governmental political inclination, the increase in approvals does not imply openness and flexibility in the Guardian Council’s performance and reflects a kind of superficial and showy increase.
The number of clerics and those with seminary education is about 200. Five thousand of the candidates were born in the 1980s, and 400 were born in the 1990s. According to statistics from the political deputies of the provinces, the highest disqualifications occurred in the provinces of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Ardabil, North Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchestan, and Kermanshah, ranging from 55 to 48 percent, while the lowest disqualifications were in the provinces of Ilam, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, and Central Province, ranging from 28 to 20 percent.
Overall, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of registered volunteers had a conservative inclination or lacked political activity experience, and despite the low inclination of reformist and critical tendencies to candidacy in this period, the rate of disqualifications remains high.
Additionally, there is no meaningful connection between the degree of disqualification and the level of dissatisfaction and political opposition in the provinces. However, it seems that in provinces where disqualification was higher, critical tendencies were relatively more prevalent among the candidates.
Ultimately, 25 representatives of the eleventh parliament did not receive permission to participate in the twelfth period’s competition. Esfandyar Ekhtiyari, the Zoroastrian representative, is one of the most notable, whose qualification was not approved due to a letter to Mahsa Amini’s family, defending the Achaemenids, and rejecting the unfounded accusation of dual loyalty to Zoroastrians. Additionally, some critics of Raisi’s administration were also disqualified.
The parliamentary elections in this period are held in 1,218 main and subsidiary constituencies. There are about 59,000 polling stations, of which 44,000 are fixed and 15,000 are mobile. There are 35,000 urban stations and 24,000 rural ones. Fully electronic voting is being tested only in four constituencies: Abadan, Malayer, Qom, and Rasht. The total population eligible to vote is about 61,173,000, as announced by the head of the election headquarters, with three and a half million of them being first-time voters.
Internal Battle of Conservatives
The trivial and insignificant competition in this election period has paved the way for widening differences and confrontations within the conservative front. Three distinct groups among the conservatives are competing in this election period. The first is the Islamic Revolution Forces Coalition Council, known as Shana.
This force essentially represents the hard core of power. The majority faction of the eleventh parliament belongs to this force. Ebrahim Raisi, in a way, leads this coalition, and Gholamali Haddad-Adel coordinates its activities.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also plays an influential role in leading this coalition. Previously, there were disagreements within it from the Stability Front, which seem to have been resolved with the fulfillment of their demands for their desired quotas. Groups such as the Veterans, Pathfinders, and Ansar Hezbollah, and supporters of Saeed Jalili are also present in this coalition.
Another group is the Coordination Council of the Islamic Revolution Forces. This group operates with the centrality of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom and the Combatant Clergy Association of Tehran, and essentially continues the traditional conservative stream in the form of the Followers of the Imam and Leadership Front. Manouchehr Mottaki and Mohammad Reza Bahonar are the main coordinators of this group. These two groups may have common candidates, but it is still unclear whether Shana can reach a consensus on presenting a complete list in the elections. Alongside these two old groups, there is a new coalition called the People’s Coalition of the Islamic Revolution Forces, known as Amna.
Amna is actually composed of 20 fronts, parties, unions, and political and ideological groups. These forces are essentially the most radical part of the conservatives, forming a combination centered around Mehrdad Bazrpash, Ali Akbar Raefipour, and Hamid Rasaei. They aim to attract a portion of Basij and young conservative forces and confront Ghalibaf and pragmatic and old conservative figures. The Kayhan newspaper recently launched a severe attack on them, claiming they are seeking positions and are under enemy influence to disrupt the elections and discourage people from participating.
The sustainability of this coalition is uncertain and may have been formed within the framework of the government’s policy to create artificial competition in a mushroom-like manner to heat up the electoral atmosphere or to satisfy the ambitious goals of conservatives who have no chance of being included in the main lists. In this election period, numerous spontaneous and power-building organizations have been formed, one of which is the Society for the Promotion of Popular Institutions of the Islamic Revolution, led by Zohreh Elahian, a representative of the eleventh parliament. There is a possibility of a joint list between Amna and the Unity Council, but it is unlikely.
Increasing Rift in the Reformist Front
The main reformist stream, centered on the Reformist Front, has decided not to present an electoral list in Tehran. Although provinces have the discretion to provide lists, the vast majority of provincial reform councils have taken a similar approach. The negative stance of most reformist groups towards the twelfth parliamentary elections has widened their internal rift.
Groups like the Executives of Construction, Democracy, National Trust, and Neda have decided to participate. Negotiations have taken place among them between Ali Motahari and the Moderation and Development Party, allies of Hassan Rouhani, for joint electoral activity. In addition to them, a group of marginal conservative forces close to the leadership institution among reformists has also decided to participate in the elections with justifications such as borderline participation and opening windows. However, the turning away of the majority of reformist figures, especially well-known forces and their social base, from the ballot boxes is a characteristic of this period.
In fact, it is not incorrect to say that given the widespread public indifference to the elections, the dispute over participating or not participating in this period exists more within the reformists.
Major Alignment of Election Boycotters
The refusal to participate in the twelfth parliamentary elections has created the largest alignment among opposing and critical political forces and various components of civil society forces. This alignment includes everyone from moderate reformists to the classic overthrowing opposition. In this period, national-religious forces and the Freedom Movement have also explicitly said no to participating in the elections, indicating a significant change in their political behavior over the past decade.
It is almost unprecedented for this number of political forces, both in terms of quantity and diversity, to decide not to participate in the elections and to take a negative stance, deeming it meaningless. Therefore, it can be said that the Islamic Republic is grappling with its largest electoral crisis in this period.
