What will be the future political system of Syria?
There is a center of attention and various analyses on the future of Syria and its governmental system after the fall of Bashar al-Assad.
The future of Syria is not limited to internal political matters alone, and it cannot be confined to the consequences of the regime’s collapse and the initial consensus among internal actors to achieve a goal.
The success of Syria’s political system depends largely on a set of requirements and considerations of internal, regional, and international actors that must be taken into account in the light of the transitional phase and what will ultimately be established.
Among the most important of these considerations are international consensus on controlling weapons by the government, power concentration management during the transitional period, and achieving social convergence. The future of Syria is exposed to several scenarios, all of which involve challenges for actors and relevant requirements.
The mutual influence of these factors will shape the model and form of the future political system of this country. These scenarios can be summarized as follows:
The first scenario is a governmental system similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan.
This scenario assumes that Tahrir al-Sham, initially founded based on a Salafi jihadist ideology when it was known as Jabhat al-Nusra, may evolve to follow a similar governmental structure to that implemented by the Taliban in Afghanistan.
There are similarities between the control dynamics and ideological features of both backgrounds. This scenario envisions Tahrir al-Sham and other aligned forces moving towards shaping the future of the country into a more centralized and strong-state government. This could lead to Ahmad al-Shar’a becoming the future President of Syria and members of this group forming the core of the future Syrian army.
A governmental system based on Sharia laws will be established, with Islamist forces taking control and the constitution reflecting Islamic values. This scenario requires controlling these forces over minority areas, especially Alawite and Kurdish-controlled regions.
The second scenario models the political system in Iraq.
This model assumes the formation of two unified states in Syria, one being a central government in Damascus and the other a self-governing entity in the northeast. The former will be responsible for defense, foreign policy, and financial matters, while the latter will be responsible for managing the Kurdish-controlled areas in Syria, similar to how Iraq controls a portion of the country’s oil and gas resources. Given this scenario, there is a possibility that the Kurds will maintain their armed forces like the Peshmerga.
There is a possibility that countries like Iran and Iraq may perceive Kurdish autonomy as a threat, but this is likely to be approved by the United States, Israel, and possibly Russia. In this scenario, the future governance system in Syria will be federal and will achieve a balance between the Damascus government and Kurdish regions.
This will include both local and federal elections. This model provides the possibility of dividing the country into autonomous regions with varying degrees of self-governance, granting authorities to manage affairs while also preserving the central government’s powers to address governance issues.
The third scenario is the security-focused confederal model.
This scenario assumes that the government system in Syria will move towards the division of the country based on geographical security bases of ethnic and sectarian groups. Doubts exist among minorities, including Alawites, Druze, and Kurds, regarding the direction determined by the controlling forces. Each of these minorities has their own armed factions.
In addition, Alawite officers and leaders of the previous regime have initiated possible uprisings against the transitional power to disrupt its progress and create security and political challenges.
This means that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham faces serious challenges in implementing a centralized government throughout Syria, which, if realized, will be daunting and costly in the face of security incidents. The emphasis of this scenario is on the geographical distribution of minorities supported by foreign powers.
While Turkey supports the transitional government, the United States supports the self-governing Kurds in the northeast. Meanwhile, Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and Iraq support the Alawites and remnants of the previous regime, and Israel also seeks to establish communication channels with the Druze community in Syria.
Overall, the US pressure tools, including economic sanctions and military presence in Syria, along with Damascus’ need for European and Arab investments and budget for reconstruction and development, compel the transitional power to consider the demands of these actors in shaping the future trajectory.
This governance system, especially with the return of refugees, could face a different form of pressure on authorities resulting in increased population and economic burden. These scenarios for the future of Syria’s political system and its potential forms require stable stability, which is a complex and major challenge for the transitional government.
Managing the future outlook comes with various sensitivities that could turn Syria at any moment into a state of power vacuum and geographical division along ethnic and sectarian lines. Despite the implicit regional and international consensus on the necessity of creating stability in Syria, the risks associated with the transitional power process may have various consequences and multiple warnings, especially regarding tactical agreements between Syrian armed and political forces that have not yet reached a strategic level of unity in terms of goals and institutional structure.
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