Where Iran paid the price and Turkey reaped the benefits
Where Iran paid the price and Turkey reaped the benefits
According to IranGate News Agency, examining the trend of foreign policy-making over the past two decades in Iran and Turkey shows that the art of diplomacy, as a determining factor in the global power game, has become a factor for strengthening Turkey’s strategic position and a missing link in Iran’s foreign policy. This issue has shifted the balance of interests in organizations like Shanghai and BRICS to Ankara’s favor.
The tragedy of the art of diplomacy in Iran and Turkey’s foreign policy-making
Foreign policy-making is a complex power game in the global system that reproduces power relations and requires knowledge and effective diplomacy to determine an actor’s domain in international relations. Understanding foreign policy-making and utilizing the art of diplomacy can lead to conceptualizing the ideas and goals of an actor in the global and regional order and sketch a vision based on this actor’s image in the international arena. Conceptualizing foreign policy ideas and goals is a very complex and sometimes inconsistent process that is difficult for other actors and policymakers to comprehend.
In the past two decades, the Turkish government has designed and implemented a model of foreign policy-making based on conceptualizing the ambitious and expansionist ideas and goals of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This model, which is difficult for policymakers and analysts to understand, traps them in the subtleties and cunning of Erdoğan’s policy-making art.
The reality is that Erdoğan’s art of diplomacy has operated beyond the knowledge of Turkey’s foreign and strategic policy-making. This policy-making is based on the strategic depth thought of Ahmet Davutoğlu, but its art of policy-making returns to Erdoğan’s personal cunning and skill.
Erdoğan’s cunning ability in the tumultuous conditions of the second decade of the 21st century has proven much more effective than Davutoğlu’s knowledge in ensuring the survival of the Turkish government.
Erdoğan’s conceptualization of the idea of a ‘Great Turkey’ and the ‘Turkish Century’ with goals such as establishing hegemony and territorial expansion is a component of defining policy as a power game. The manifestations of this policy can be seen in the increasing adaptability to the transformation of the global system and Ankara’s dual behavior in relations with the West while simultaneously engaging with anti-Western actors such as international organizations like Shanghai and BRICS.
In contrast, the depletion of Iran’s foreign policy-making from the art of diplomacy over the past two decades, which has been the opposite of Turkey’s model, has led to the diversion of Iran’s strategic resources and benefits towards its long-standing rival, Turkey.
The current situation of Iran and Turkey in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization can be seen as a symbol of the superiority of Turkey’s art of diplomacy over Iran’s, which can be examined in the following three axes:
First: The principle of the power game
Foreign policy-making is a framework of actions that must secure an actor’s interests in the global system and international power relations. Therefore, desirable foreign policy has its own complexities. If we consider foreign policy-making as a power game in the global system using geopolitical tools, Erdoğan’s government model can be analyzed based on the tactic of ‘one to the nail, one to the horseshoe,’ meaning security and military alignment with Western states while simultaneously engaging economically with anti-Western organizations.
This is the secret of Turkey’s survival in international relations, as Hans Morgenthau states in ‘Politics Among Nations,’ international politics, like other areas of politics, is a struggle to acquire and maintain power.
The Turkish government has based its foreign policy-making on the principle of struggle and power game. Within this framework, while actively participating in the military and security organization NATO and pursuing Western goals in Southwest Asia, it simultaneously holds observer or dialogue partner status in major anti-Western economic-focused organizations like Shanghai and BRICS.
In contrast, Iran has distanced itself from any action based on the Western axis and relies solely on Eastern or anti-Western organizations, which, of course, has not yielded significant benefits.
Second: Turkey’s dual-level dynamism between East and West
The Turkish government’s foreign policy is based on the tactic of cunning, a tactic that designs and guides the idea of Turkey’s dual-level dynamism between the West and anti-Western institutions. This dynamism includes simultaneous strategic action with the West and the United States and leveraging economic benefits from the East and organizations opposing U.S. hegemony. Such dynamism has allowed Turkey, as a NATO member, to purchase the Russian S400 defense system while simultaneously being in the process of buying American F35 fighter jets, whereas Iran, despite active membership in Shanghai and BRICS, has not yet been able to acquire the S400 system.
Third: The tragedy of Iranian art of diplomacy
The dialectic of art and knowledge in politics, especially in public policy-making, has persisted from previous centuries to the present. In today’s turbulent world, this dialectic has increasingly leaned towards the art of policy-making, especially in foreign policy or the art of diplomacy. The most prominent example of this dialectic can be found in the title of Sun Tzu’s book, the great Chinese strategist, known as ‘The Art of War,’ not ‘The Knowledge of War.’
In the past two decades, Turkey’s art of diplomacy has effectively strengthened the country’s power resources and secured its strategic interests in international power relations. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s active presence at the Shanghai summit in Tianjin, China, and his meeting with the major leaders of this organization, followed by his strategic absence at the Chinese army parade in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, can be seen as a manifestation of the Turkish government’s art of diplomacy.
In contrast, Iran, as one of the main members of the Shanghai and BRICS organizations, has positioned itself against Western standards and powers, especially the United States, but Iran’s art of diplomacy has not been able to secure tangible benefits for the country from these organizations.
A correct understanding of power relations by policymakers, along with possessing both the knowledge and art of policy-making, especially in foreign policy, can lead to conceptualizing the ideas and goals of the policymaker and create standards for the power game in their favor. Although the Shanghai organization is interpreted as an East-oriented and economy-focused entity, security and economy should be considered the two main components of the Shanghai summit in Tianjin, components that indicate the transformation of this organization and efforts to build a new world order centered on the East.
The presence of the leaders of this organization at the grand Chinese army parade in Beijing has added to its security nature and can push the global system towards the formation of a new order and perhaps a new war.
The influential leaders of the Shanghai organization, namely China, Russia, and Iran, who are mostly recognized by the security component and the new East, have paid heavy costs for strategic confrontation with the West, especially the United States.
However, despite its prominent position in this organization, Iran has gained the least benefits in return for the costs paid.
Iran’s inability to gain tangible benefits from the Shanghai organization, while Turkey economically benefits from interaction with the same organization, highlights the tragedy of Iran’s art of diplomacy. This tragedy deepens when the Iranian president is seated in the second and third rows of protocol during summits, whereas Erdoğan sits in the front row, and precisely when the Shanghai leaders participate in the grand Chinese army parade, he showcases Turkey’s art of diplomacy and NATO identity with his calculated absence.
Erdoğan, by striving to create a legend of himself as the wizard of Turkish politics in the interaction between the West and East, has shown shrewd behavior in relations with opposing powers.
His absence from the Chinese army parade after meeting with the Shanghai leaders indicates that Turkey views Shanghai not as a strategic commitment but as a tool for economic gain.
Ultimately, Erdoğan’s art of diplomacy in the global power game has resulted in the Shanghai organization being in Iran’s name but to Turkey’s benefit, leaving the security costs for Iran and the economic benefits for Turkey.
