Why Iran Does Not Progress
Why Iran Does Not Progress According to Iran Gate, many experts believe that Iran is one of the few countries that had the necessary resources for development in the 21st century, but not only has it stagnated, it is also facing extreme backwardness. Some believe that the Iranian people do not have the necessary capacities for development, while others argue that the governance structure of the Islamic Republic is such that it hinders the country’s progress and development.
Many sociologists believe that the governance in Iran has never been able to put the country on the path of comprehensive development. Indeed, at times such as the 1960s and late 1990s and early 2000s, the governing approach was towards the country’s development, but due to structural weaknesses, this was not realized, and the development process faced serious obstacles. Before the revolution, the Shah and Aryamehr’s despotism blocked the path, and after the revolution, the anti-West ideology and the dominance of the clergy took the country off the development track.
However, the question remains as to why Iran is stagnating and even falling behind in the global development race. Why has Iran, despite having abundant resources, still not managed to even take steps towards development? Iran Gate, in a two-part series, tries to provide a suitable answer to these two questions and inform the audience in this regard. The present report is the first part of this series, which addresses the reasons for the lack of progress and one of its main obstacles in Iran.
We Do Not Recognize the Obvious
Many sociologists believe that for rational governance in a governing structure, obvious factors such as adherence to natural laws, recognition of collective wisdom, technocracy, and understanding of collective interests must be acknowledged. However, looking at the record of governments before and after the 1979 revolution in Iran, one can clearly see the absence of all or some of the above factors.
Significant Gaps
Experts believe that constructive relations with the world, prioritizing the economy over politics, internal consensus for development, and utilizing international opportunities are among the globally accepted basics in development-oriented governance. If we take a step forward, we can observe the absence of factors such as prioritizing the economy over politics or pragmatic foreign policy based on national interests in the approach of the Islamic Republic in governance. Of course, during the second Pahlavi era, some of these elements, including constructive relations with the world, held a special place in Iranian governance, but in other areas, the absence of elements like technocracy or the prioritization of the economy over politics is clearly seen.
The Agent Trapped in a Hard Ideological Shell
Looking at the successful experiences of countries like Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and even China shows that all of these cases benefited from worldly and non-ideological leaders. Of course, almost in all cases, these leaders created an authoritarian framework, but overall, none had an ideological approach to state affairs.
For example, Deng Xiaoping, known as the father of modern China, despite being a prominent leader of the Chinese Communist Party, his performance indicates a completely pragmatic and technocratic approach to governance. In other cases, such as General Park in South Korea, Mahathir Mohamad in Malaysia, and Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, this pattern is clearly identifiable.
Of course, regarding Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the element of worldliness cannot be considered valid, but it should not be forgotten that the authoritarian foundation of the Pahlavi government in Iran was so strong that it cornered and nullified the modernizing approach of the second Pahlavi. However, after the revolution, both the founder of the Islamic Republic and Ayatollah Khamenei were from the clergy who had little familiarity with the outside world and even in many cases supported anti-modern and ultimately anti-development thoughts.
Additionally, one should not overlook the ideological nature of the 1979 revolution in Iran, which naturally paved the way for the emergence of leaders representing the ruling ideology. Although in some cases, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is mentioned as a non-ideological and pragmatic figure among the officials of the Islamic Republic, he also recorded traces of revolutionary and ideological actions in his record until the mid-1980s and even early 1990s.
However, despite all this, many believe that among the officials who worked in the governance structure of the Islamic Republic after the revolution, there are cases that serve as suitable models for future generations. Among them, one can mention individuals like Mehdi Bazargan, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, Hassan Rouhani, and even Ali Larijani, as these individuals are categorized among the elites who, in addition to being familiar with the world and its governing relations, also had a significant distance from ideological and revolutionary actions under the banner of the Islamic Republic.
In the next part of the series ‘Why Iran Does Not Progress,’ two other major reasons that are among the most important obstacles to Iran’s development will be addressed.
