Iran’s foreign policy between emotions and interests
The assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, just hours after attending the inauguration ceremony of President Ebrahim Raisi, has sparked widespread discussions in domestic and international political and media circles about the reasons, methods, and consequences of this significant event, which could be a turning point in the political history of Iran, the West Asia region, and even the world.
Regardless of the discussions about the reasons, various speculations have been made, especially creating a scenario to involve Iran and the United States in a full-scale war in favor of Israel by Netanyahu, and the manner in which this incident occurred, whether through Israeli infiltration agents in Iran, missile firing by aircraft, or guided drones. The important discussion revolves around the shape, dimensions, and extent of Iran’s response to this major incident, which reminds many of the major assassinations that altered the course of history, such as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, which led to World War I.
The fact that Israel planned the assassination of the Hamas leader in Tehran both in terms of location and timing, just hours after the participation in the inauguration ceremony of Iran’s new president, has put the political authority in Iran in a difficult decision-making position.
A decision that must definitely be accompanied by an effective response in order to not only restore the credibility of the country’s security structure in the eyes of both domestic and foreign public opinion but also to have the necessary deterrent power to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.
However, the conditions and possibilities for a proportional response to Israel, such as the assassination of one of its influential figures, are limited for Iran. If Iran decides to react, it is forced to resort to a different action, namely launching missile and drone attacks on security and military centers inside Israel.
At the same time, Iranian officials are aware of the real goal of the Israeli regime in planning and carrying out this assassination. They know that Netanyahu is seeking to drag Iran and the US into a full-scale war and to politically benefit Israel from this war on one hand, and to create the grounds for Trump’s victory in the future US presidential elections on the other hand.
Israel’s assassination attempt on Ismail Haniyeh, even in Tehran and on the day of the inauguration of Iran’s president, has shocked and worried many governments and political leaders around the world, including some supporters of Israel, and is sometimes referred to as a political suicide or madness.
Netanyahu intended with this action to not only target Iran but also to put many other governments against the act and limit their ability to choose an appropriate response.
It was in this context that some world leaders, in addition to condemning this assassination, began extensive efforts to persuade Iran to refrain from an effective response and not engage in playing into Israel’s hands.
This reaction sometimes paved the way for discussions between the US and some European governments with Iran, and news about the possibility of reviving the JCPOA by the US in case of Iran’s non-reaction was raised.
The new Iranian government, faced with such a major challenge in the early hours of its tenure, prioritized diplomatic response to Israel over any military action, utilizing international political capacities more accurately.
The request for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council, as well as the convening of an extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers of the OIC member countries in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and repeated contacts by the President with some leaders, including two phone conversations with the French President, and Ali Bagheri’s intensive negotiations with Islamic and Western countries in the region are evidence of this approach.
This approach is naturally analyzed with the aim of gaining international support in case of any military reaction against Israel and also intensifying international pressures against Israel.
On the other hand, the public opinion in Iran was shocked by this incident, while they were preparing themselves for a new government different from the thirteenth government in terms of domestic, foreign, and economic policies, and were expecting a period of political stability and social peace. The occurrence of this incident disrupted all their perceptions and expectations.
The new government of Iran came to power with the slogan of interaction and cooperation with the world, but the Israeli regime practically made the implementation of this policy difficult and costly from the beginning.
However, the question that can be raised despite all these interpretations and issues is whether it could have been prevented the occurrence of such difficult conditions, especially for a new government with different policies and programs. Another question is how to prevent such difficult conditions from recurring in the future for the country.
The reality is that Iran’s policies and approaches in foreign affairs, in general, need a reassessment and redefinition in the strategic and tactical aspects of regional and bilateral relations in international affairs, considering the conditions that the country has faced in the past two decades and the heavy costs imposed on the country.
Iran has incurred heavy costs in regional relations and to some extent, its international relations have also been influenced by its regional behaviors and policies.
Iran’s regional policy, taking into account the variables of Israel and the Resistance Front, has taken on a nature of supportive, emotional, and ideological nature. This form and content may have created a high-cost environment and at the same time reduced the effectiveness of Iran’s regional policies.
The experiences of various countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, and even Russia in recent decades, show that when emotional and sentimental issues dominate policies and behaviors, the effectiveness of policies decreases, and costs increase.
The Vietnam War, Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe, and the war in Ukraine are examples of such behaviors.
Naturally, political behaviors accompanied by emotional and sentimental issues will not be sustainable in addition to low efficiency and high costs. Emotions and sentiments have no place in the political world, even with ideological content. Proper redefinition of Iran’s regional relations can be achieved while maintaining the ideological basis and supportive strategic nature.
In this form, the country’s national interests are also considered, and the effectiveness and efficiency of regional policies increase. Political, security, and economic costs decrease, leading to more sustainable and stronger relationships.
Successful examples of this type of regional policy are countries like Qatar and Turkey.
Qatar and Turkey have extensive and effective relations with the Islamic movement Hamas.
The main organization of Hamas outside of Palestine is located in Doha, Qatar. Additionally, the majority of Hamas’s political activities outside of Palestine are in Istanbul, Turkey.
However, Israel chooses Tehran instead of Doha and Istanbul for its terrorist activities against Ismail Haniyeh because it is aware of the heavy costs imposed on Iran. Meanwhile, Iran could have prevented Israel’s extensive activities in the country and its terrorism by taking strategic support and not exposing itself to heavy costs.
The emergence of a new government in Iran provides a suitable opportunity to redefine Iran’s regional relations and strengthen strategic approaches.
