Consensus: Very Far, Very Near
Consensus: Very Far, Very Near. Everyone breaks our hearts in their own way. Strangers break it separately, friends separately. If a stranger breaks it, there’s no issue.
Ask a friend why they break it.
These were the verses recited by Masoud Pezeshkian in defense of his cabinet as a whole, addressing the critics.
A poem that, rather than having a tone of complaint or argument, carried a theme of questioning and wonder. It was as if the president not only wanted to ask some of his supporters why they had joined the ranks of critics, but beyond that, it showed that such an occurrence was neither understandable nor imaginable for him.
But why and how have some of Pezeshkian’s supporters so quickly joined the ranks of critics to the extent that they speak against the entirety of the cabinet? And why and how has Pezeshkian managed to turn his supporters into critics in such a short time, with some sitting aside, some turning to criticism, and some adopting a silent complaint?
It seems the root of this issue lies in the different understanding Pezeshkian has of politics. Although he seeks a kind of national convergence in his statements and talks about Iran for all Iranians, in practice, when faced with harsh realities and conventional mindsets, he encounters challenges and reactions. It is possible that in the not-too-distant future, his government’s social capital may erode.
In analyzing this different situation on two levels of discourse and field, declaration and application of mindset and reality, or any other formulation that could be applied, one can speak of the complexities of politics and how things that seem easy on the surface or in mindset or speech are very difficult and exhausting in practice.
It is as if politics, with all its bitterness, violence, and difficulty, shares this point with gentle love: it seems easy at first, but as it continues, difficulties arise. Many disappointments, stops, breaks, and fatigues in the path of politics, much like love and even more so, are due to this initial ease and the subsequent difficulties. From this perspective, there is not much difference between different models of change, whether revolution, reform, or the term ‘Islahghalab’ coined by Hamidreza Jalaeipour, except that the dimensions of difficulties, disappointments, and consequences are broader in revolution, Islahghalab, and reform, respectively.
Pezeshkian and his audience, both supporters and opponents, are now caught in this duality of initial ease and increasing difficulties.
In his vision of the political field, Pezeshkian speaks of the necessity of national consensus and reconciliation, reducing conflicts and internal divisions, and strengthening bonds, believing that based on what he considers right and just, this is achievable.
It is as if, in his mindset, he sees this issue as so natural and obvious that he cannot imagine that when things go beyond speech and reach the field of action, various segments of political and social forces will oppose it. These are forces not only benefiting from the current path but also those whose struggles in domestic politics feed their purification mills, and many of the same disadvantaged, voiceless, marginalized, and deprived critics whom Pezeshkian sees his discourse as representing and elevating, and who have the potential to rise in criticism or even opposition to him.
When Pezeshkian says if a stranger breaks it, there’s no issue, it shows that he is realistic enough in the political arena to know that his opponents and adversaries, and those benefiting from cleansing and staging, will rise in opposition and resistance to him, and such an occurrence was predictable for him.
The issue and Pezeshkian’s question and wonder are why a friend breaks it.
This is where the difficulties of consensus reveal themselves, and the beautiful face of reality emerges from the window of mindset.
Gathering everyone and paying attention to all marginalized, minority, and voiceless forces is as easy during elections and vote-attracting as it is difficult and vote-losing during the establishment of the government.
Like ice melting in the summer heat and a tree left bare by the autumn storm, naturally, the forces that, in Pezeshkian’s words, have been deprived of their rights are still engaged with real power barriers.
Barriers that produce this deprivation, and the government and the president can only moderate it to some extent, but it is clear that this moderation does not match the electoral demand and slogan.
Thus, it leads supporting forces to criticism or inactivity, and they do not feel a difference between the new government and the old approach.
On the other hand, the cabinet takes on a mosaic arrangement where different and sometimes conflicting pieces are present, and assembling them and presenting a consensus structure from their outcome seems very complex and sometimes impossible.
Nevertheless, this difficult and perhaps impossible mission is a necessary condition for any change in the current situation.
In fact, Pezeshkian has a model in mind where the background and result or input and output are practically the same.
He considers national consensus a prerequisite for changing the current situation, and at the same time, the current situation itself is in conflict with national consensus.
Whether from opponents who do not accept it or supporters who demand much more than what they see in practice.
In this context, Pezeshkian’s confrontation with radical opponents might be simpler.
Because they have enjoyed many special rights in the context of purification processes, taking which away brings credibility to the government, and if it brings challenges and resistance, which it naturally does, this challenge leads to greater cohesion among supporters and mobilizes public opinion, and there is not much cause for concern.
Pezeshkian’s current situation and his national consensus slogan can be seen as similar to Hassan Rouhani’s position at the beginning of his term in pursuit of reaching the JCPOA, where although opponents and worriers constantly attacked him and Mohammad Javad Zarif and the negotiation process, in practice, it built credibility and legitimacy for Rouhani and his government.
Now, too, national consensus as the government’s mega-project to bring conflicting and different forces to agreement and understanding can be considered an internal JCPOA, with radical opponents’ attacks adding to the government’s image and position.
Even in yesterday’s parliamentary session, this inactivity and predicament of radical opponents were evident. They were at a loss for what to say in the face of the consensus slogan and Pezeshkian’s reliance on the seventh program and the general policies of the system, and from which angle to oppose him.
Meanwhile, the disappointment of supporters with realizing their demands within this government, especially for ethnic and religious minorities, which has occurred in this short period, detracts from the government’s credibility and will weaken and limit its social base, which was already limited and fragile in the elections.
Therefore, it seems that what should be more important and prioritized for Pezeshkian and his discourse is more than gaining a vote of confidence from the parliament for ministers, which is also necessary, but maintaining the trust of voters and presenting an image consistent with the slogan ‘Iran for all Iranians’ from the cabinet and the government’s approach at the societal level.
It is the same difficult and at the same time shared mission that Pezeshkian and his diverse supporters have ahead of them, like a love story that begins with an easy and romantic view but later encounters the difficulty of the path, constraints, and sometimes tragedy.