A New Chapter for the Middle East

Parisa Pasandepour
8 Min Read
A New Chapter for the Middle East

A New Chapter for the Middle East

A New Chapter for the Middle East

A Decisive Year for the Middle East

From direct and indirect conflicts between Tel Aviv and Tehran to the weakening of Iran’s regional network, the structure of the Middle East has significantly changed in 2024.

If 2024 was a year full of major changes across the international arena, the Middle East is certainly the region where these transformations have had the greatest significance. On the other hand, although the turning point for this region was marked on October 7, 2023, with Hamas’s attack on Israel, the broader consequences of these transformations were mainly observed in 2024.

From Gaza, where the death toll from Israeli operations exceeded 45,000, the war expanded to Lebanon and directly or indirectly spread to Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran.

Until a year ago, the region witnessed a competition between two strategic models: on one side, what was known as the ‘Axis of Resistance,’ a collection of movements, militias, and governments close to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and on the other, a project supported by the United States, an anti-Iranian front focused on normalizing relations between Israel and some Arab countries.

Today, more than a year after the events of October 7, the political and security architecture of the Middle East has profoundly changed.

Direct Conflict

One of the biggest changes witnessed by the Middle East in 2024 was the increased level of conflict between Israel and Iran. These two countries see each other as strategic and existential rivals, but have never been as close to open and full-scale conflict as they are now.

Over the years, there have been exchanges of fire between Israel and Iranian proxy forces in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and various Tehran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria.

However, the potential for an overt war between Tel Aviv and Tehran was added to this hidden war, fought indirectly, with mutual and direct drone and missile launches on two occasions in April and October. In both cases, the crisis subsided after symbolic attacks and retaliations, yet these events were new and unimaginable occurrences that had not happened until a year ago.

Axis of Resistance in Crisis

Israel was able to directly hit the Islamic Republic for another reason: a year of war significantly weakened the ‘Axis of Resistance,’ which had been built by Tehran over the years with the idea of outsourcing its defensive lines after the bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s and creating a deterrent shield against the Jewish state.

Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah and the elimination of prominent leaders of the Axis of Resistance, including Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in Beirut in September, Ismail Haniyeh, who was even killed in Tehran, and Yahya Sinwar, known as the mastermind behind Hamas’s attack on Israel, put Iran’s regional network in a severe crisis.

But the final blow came less than three weeks ago with the sudden and surprising downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Assad, one of Tehran’s historic regional clients, saw the collapse of his country, which has now been added to Turkey’s sphere of influence, disrupt the territorial continuity of a corridor that for years was known as a route from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to the Eastern Mediterranean.

The New Middle East

What can be expected for 2025? More pessimistic analyses assume that Tehran, having lost the deterrence provided by the Axis of Resistance, may now increase pressure on its nuclear program, although Iranian officials emphasize that no change has occurred in the nuclear doctrine of the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, the war that started on October 7 halted negotiations for normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which were under the framework of the Abraham Accords supported by the United States during the first Trump administration.

Riyadh’s joining of this agreement was supposed to be the culmination of an initiative that had previously involved the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. However, this is the only operational framework through which the Americans intend to persuade their Gulf allies to entrust their security to Israel while containing Iran at the regional level.

Today, more than a year after that, none of the Arab countries that officially support the Palestinians have officially withdrawn from the agreement, and even Riyadh does not rule out its possible entry into it in the future. With Trump’s return to the White House, Washington will likely attempt to end the remaining hostilities, especially in Gaza, and revive the Abraham Accords as the foundation for a new Middle East structure.

In conclusion, it can be added that a year ago, it was unimaginable that within 12 months, Iran and Israel would face each other militarily twice, Hassan Nasrallah along with much of Hezbollah’s leadership would be killed, and Bashar al-Assad would lose control of Syria in a matter of days. These two recent events have dealt a severe blow to Iran’s deterrence, which has dramatically diminished over the past months. What remains of what is known as the ‘Axis of Resistance’ is difficult to say.

Nevertheless, what happened in the past year represents a clear defeat for Tehran, which is at risk of watching passively as its control over the Levant and much of the Middle East gradually collapses. On the other front, even the Abraham Accords do not seem to be in good condition.

Although these agreements have survived regional tensions, nothing remains of the three-year momentum of 2020-2023. Furthermore, despite more than a year of discussions about the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia, no tangible achievements have been made so far.


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Master's Degree in International Relations from the Faculty of Diplomatic Sciences and International Relations, Genoa, Italy.