Are the Kremlin’s Divisions Increasing

Are the Kremlin’s cracks widening?

The fate of the Wagner Group after Prigozhin

Are the Kremlin’s cracks widening? According to Iran Gate, the end of the lives of the charismatic founders and leaders Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, along with other important members of the organization, in the plane crash in the Tver region on August 24th marks the beginning of a period of uncertainty and turmoil for the Wagner Group.

The news of the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the private military group Wagner, raises many questions about the future of mercenary activities in various fields, including geopolitical issues and the impact on the balance of power in the Kremlin. After leaving the battlefield in Ukraine, where it once again proved its important and decisive role in maintaining the positions gained since the onset of Russia’s aggression, Wagner is forced to reorganize and redefine its objectives.

After the ‘March of Justice’ in June, the first and most visible rebellion led by Prigozhin against Putin’s system, which had begun the process of integrating Wagner mercenaries into Russia’s official army, Wagner gradually weakened in its operations and began a wear-and-tear process. While maintaining offices in Russia, it relocated to Belarus and focused on operations in Africa.

The departure of the charismatic founders and leaders Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, and other important members of the organization following last week’s plane crash in the Tver region, has not only deeply mourned the Wagner Group’s mercenaries but also endangered the group’s survival. According to Radio Liberty, more than 100 out of 273 tents have been dismantled, and around 2000 Wagner members have left Belarus.

In Telegram channels related to the Wagner Group, there is talk of transfers to Africa, and according to expert hypotheses, it is expected that other private military companies, like Gazprom Patriot, close to the Ministry of Defense’s positions, or Redut, owned by oligarch Gennady Timchenko, are undergoing changes and preparations that can allow the Kremlin to maintain its influence in Africa.

The option of integrating Wagner mercenaries into the Russian army, who are currently displaying their loyalty, respect, and personal affection for Prigozhin’s character through memorial ceremonies in various Russian cities, does not seem suitable or easy. Also, the hypothesis of retaliatory or terrorist actions in Russia by Wagner members against military officials, politicians, and some government institutions should not be ignored or completely dismissed. However, there are statements from some Wagner supporters aimed at calming spirits, asking them not to reveal themselves and to wait for further signals that might come from Sergey Chubko, the commander of the garrison in Belarus.

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Volodymyr Havrylov believes that Prigozhin’s death signifies the end of Wagner. The entire organization relied on the charisma of its chief and co-founder. With their departure, nothing can function or progress as before. There are still many mercenaries, but they are fragile, under psychological pressure, lacking funds and a coherent path.

The most evident fact is that there are no significant consequences on the progress of the conflict in Ukraine, as the Russian Ministry of Defense had already organized the military hierarchy, which included the tasks and positions of Wagner members, to face another fall of war. From a domestic policy perspective, Prigozhin’s death may be an opportunity for President Vladimir Putin to strengthen his image with the public and, more importantly, with the Kremlin elites.

In a video message in June, the Russian president said that traitors to the homeland would be punished. Yet, since then, many Russian citizens and various analysts have been constantly puzzled about how Prigozhin continued to move freely and was not arrested, even having met with the Kremlin leader after the rebellion.

Therefore, the Prigozhin case has sparked a series of speculations, hypotheses, and scenarios that can effectively be summarized in two Russian concepts. On one hand, there was talk of a secret agreement between Putin and Prigozhin, whereby everything that happened since last June was nothing more than a ‘maskirovka,’ one of the foundations of Russian military doctrine, meaning the use of various deceptions and denials to hide true intentions. This allowed Putin to understand who his traitors and enemies in the army and political scene were and allowed Prigozhin to leave the scene and disappear from the reach of his numerous enemies.

On the other hand, the discussion is about ‘razborka,’ a settling of scores, often violently, between the different factions forming Russia’s vertical power structure. In recent months, we have witnessed intense conflicts, more than just verbal disputes, between the Wagner chief and the heads of the army and security organization. It is very likely that we will never be able to know with certainty which hypothesis prevails.

But with Prigozhin’s departure, President Vladimir Putin wants and needs to show that he is politically strong and has the reins of power firmly in his hands as before. He acts like a faction manager, managing the differences among the elites and exploiting these differences to his advantage, just as he has done since he first took power.

Of course, this does not mean that Putin is not a weak leader. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the gradual erosion of the Kremlin and weakened the country’s political stability, a fundamental principle underpinning Putinism. However, it is still too early to say that Putin’s weakness will lead to his removal and, consequently, a regime change in the short term.

Currently, the plane crash with Wagner’s main team alleviates the existing tension in the Kremlin, considering two important electoral appointments. The local electoral competitions on September 10, including the Moscow mayoral election and the upcoming March 2024 presidential elections, are important for President Vladimir Putin beyond the expected weak results due to executive and legal constraints, repressive policies against opposition outside parliament, and the state’s media monopoly.

He must avoid any political scandal that would destabilize the electoral campaigns. Certainly, the Kremlin leader will continue the strategy of a war of attrition in Ukraine and is preparing to lead the country for another six years.

According to some analysts, even though the problem named Prigozhin has completely disappeared, Putin still faces a complex political situation in managing the Kremlin, where the ‘siloviki’—meaning military forces, and in Russian political terminology, politicians who have come to power from security forces or similar—who had a strained relationship with the Wagner chief and did not appreciate him, have been strengthened more than before. It seems that anyone intending to challenge them must study very carefully and deeply about how to proceed in the future.