The people are the ultimate losers of the failure to revive the JCPOA.
The people are the ultimate losers of the failure to revive the JCPOA, while in the days following the resumption of JCPOA negotiations in Vienna, hopes for reaching an agreement increased day by day. Initial interactions after the meetings ended led to several rounds of exchanging views between Iran and the United States.
Meanwhile, the Iranian people on one side and Europeans on the other followed and continue to follow the interactions of both parties with their worried eyes. Serious optimism in the days after the negotiations was reflected by European Union officials in their media reactions and statements. After each round of exchanging views between Iran and the United States, the EU’s foreign policy chief and some officials from European countries expressed serious hope about finalizing the agreement based on the text prepared by the Union.
However, developments at the end of August were initiated by Iran sending its viewpoints, and after that, the first day of the new month saw the U.S. heat things up with a serious reaction to Iran’s demands. The U.S. is dissatisfied with what it received from Iran. American officials believe that Iran’s demands are neither constructive nor reasonable, and they have stated that they will continue to review what has been proposed by the Iranian side.
Europe is once again standing on the platform of hope and speaking. Borrell has expressed hope that the coming days will be the days of signing the agreement, and the French President has clearly and explicitly stated the same point.
The Iranian regime and the government in power in Iran, which have put forward their demands, were certainly aware in advance of the cold American reaction. Now, in media talks, they resort to the same phrases used by the Americans a few days ago, saying that the ball is in the Americans’ court. From the perspective of the Iranian regime, statements have been made, and they are waiting to receive a response to those statements.
Sanctions and exemptions, the role of agency inspections
Two specific issues can be considered as key topics that have slowed down the JCPOA process, even though the exact text of Iran’s viewpoints has not been published. One of these is the issue of guarantees. The apparent story is that Iran is seeking specific and strong guarantees for the potential withdrawal of a hardline American government from the JCPOA in the coming years.
Some experts insist that a multi-year exemption for companies contracting with Iran from U.S. sanctions, conditioned on Iran’s full compliance with the agreement in case of U.S. withdrawal, does not solve the problem and takes away specific tools and solutions based on the 2015 JCPOA text from Iran. It should be considered that there is a long way to go before resolving the issue of Iranian cooperation with American companies and businesses.
These sanctions and exemptions, and the discussion of guaranteeing non-sanctioning of foreign companies contracting with Iran, will mainly focus on non-American companies. Both the European Union and China and India have important tools in this regard to ensure non-sanctioning of their companies. The American guarantee structure regarding non-sanctioning of companies contracting with Iran in case of a U.S. government withdrawal from the JCPOA in the coming years can be achieved with the agreement of the European Union and the U.S., as well as the agreement of countries that Iran selects and introduces to the U.S.
This solution is neither a miracle nor a special magic that has been discovered by us at this moment. The current U.S. government is in office until January 2025, and the power of Congress, even if entirely in the hands of Republicans, is not sufficient to dismantle the structure described. It is very obvious and simple that convergence and de-escalation between Iran and the Arab Gulf countries will help improve the guarantee structure. The JCPOA is the structure for controlling Iran’s nuclear program.
We have previously narrated and explained in JCPOA writings that this control structure is operational and the space for bargaining and creating sensitivity within the framework of changing and transforming the nuclear program has not been open for Iran. The current U.S. government cannot provide a guarantee that potentially allows Iran to exit the agreement.
Not because Iran would suddenly reach a nuclear weapon overnight in response to a U.S. government withdrawal from the JCPOA, but for the simple reason that the control structure of a country that has violated the non-proliferation treaty and has been documented to pursue nuclear weapons cannot be shaped with foundational exceptions and by providing a space for exiting the control structure.
The same two-and-a-half-year guarantee for non-sanctioning foreign companies in case of a U.S. government withdrawal from the JCPOA is a good achievement if it is accompanied by the agreement of Europeans, China, India, and other countries with the U.S.
The role of agency inspections
The final closure of the safeguards case and the arrangement of the inspection and control process of the International Atomic Energy Agency is an issue that, if resolved based on priorities and national security interests in a consensus-based environment, will benefit Iran. The reality is that resolving this issue is not possible without finalizing the review of materials discovered in Iranian facilities and the Agency’s final opinion on Iran’s safeguards violations.
After the discovery of uranium in some Iranian facilities, it is no longer easy to expect Rafael Grossi to overlook and not pursue the matter. The main function of the JCPOA is this process, which is in progress. The control tools included in the 2015 JCPOA process are strong enough to monitor such instances in the future. The best way was to form a technical and expert team to collaborate and discuss with the Agency’s experts during the review of these cases.
The best and indeed the only way has been and still is Iran’s active participation in the control structure of its program by the Agency in the form of expert collaborations. We have previously discussed the details and functioning of the JCPOA and the importance of understanding the reality that the JCPOA, as a control structure for Iran’s nuclear program, is operational, and we will explain further in more detail after this writing.
The current situation and political developments in the Middle East, and especially the new interactions that Russia has initiated in opposition to the West, which have also involved Iran, have made the urgent revival of a complete JCPOA more and more necessary.
Otherwise, people will struggle with the pressure of ongoing sanctions and the problems arising from them, even if the benefits of monopolies resulting from the sanctions highlight the advantage of not lifting the sanctions for certain groups.
The U.S. elections will be held in November alongside the Israeli elections, and the heated atmosphere of election campaigns in tense conditions will never be suitable for showing flexibility towards Iran. The Iranian regime is well aware of this point, and it is hoped that understanding this reality will help ensure that before the American and Israeli elections become more and more serious, the good concessions obtained from the U.S. are realized by the Iranian regime and its seal of approval is placed on the agreement. Europeans, who until this moment are optimistic and even confident, are hoping for the same.