Struggle with the West, a slap from the East
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia and his presence at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit marked a new chapter in regional developments, which had the most effects and controversies for the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic.
The Chinese President, by signing an anti-Iranian statement of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which directly questioned Iran’s ownership of the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, also warned against the Islamic Republic’s interference in the internal affairs of regional countries.
This alignment of China with the positions of the Gulf states might have been unimaginable even for the regime, but that faction of conservatives who previously criticized Hassan Rouhani’s government’s policy and generally the moderate and reformist front of the regime, considering the efforts to reduce tensions with the West as stemming from a liberal approach and a kind of surrender, have now adopted a policy of silence towards the communist China’s approach.
Reactions to China’s behavior
Many political activists and former statesmen who had previously warned against a unilateral eastward policy have recently, by recalling past critiques, once again raised serious criticisms of this foreign policy model. Perhaps one of the most notable reactions is from Abbas Akhoundi, the Minister of Roads and Urban Development in Rouhani’s government, who has made references to his experiences and collaborations with China.
Akhoundi expressed these experiences on his Telegram channel, stating that China’s stance was not new, and that a group in Tehran, for whatever reason, did not want to see the signs of it.
The discussion of China’s stance was not new to me. China has adopted this approach for years, but a group in Tehran, for whatever reason, did not want to see the signs of it, perhaps due to the extraordinary level of corruption surrounding Chinese contracts. Let me mention just two examples, one general and one specific.
China has made a very large investment in developing the Oman Sea-Gwadar port corridor to China, a project reportedly valued at over $42 billion. Passing through the Hindu Kush mountains with all its insecurities and Pakistan is, from an engineering perspective, in no way justifiable compared to passing through a relatively flat parallel route from Chabahar to China, which is largely ready for exploitation and requires one-tenth of that project’s investment. The road section is largely available and only needs service level upgrades, and the rail section is also largely executed. The only thing that makes this project meaningful is bypassing Iran.
At that time, I suggested to the Chinese that they invest in this project and if they want to enter Afghanistan, they should do so via Khaf-Herat and then Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which has the lowest cost. I went to Kyrgyzstan and spoke with its president, who said he would also propose the issue to the Chinese. The Kyrgyz were in dire need of this corridor. I shared the same proposal with the Tajiks and made several correspondences, but there was not the slightest response.
It was clear that they had decided
to bypass Iran so as not to have any strategic dependency on Iran for connecting to the Oman Sea and the Persian Gulf. I finalized the electrification project of the Tehran-Mashhad railway with a speed target of 200 kilometers per hour and a capacity of about 40 million passengers per year, with an amount of about $2 billion. During Mr. Xi Jinping’s visit to Tehran, the only contract signed was this one, which he himself had emphasized before his visit that he wanted the contract to be signed in his presence.
Note that it was a contract, not a memorandum of understanding. The contract means that all negotiations regarding the route, technical specifications, price, and details had been concluded and everything was finalized, and both parties were committed to executing the project. After that, we were supposed to deposit 15% of the project amount into the project fund. Despite the government’s foreign exchange constraints, this was done immediately with the coordination of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and today, as I write this, this amount is in the project fund.
That means approximately $300 million was to be paid as an advance payment guarantee to the Iranian side for the Chinese side to start activities, which carries the least risk because the contracting party takes the whole amount in return. Since then, the Chinese have not provided this advance payment guarantee to the Iranian side, and the signed contract is stalled. When the gentlemen proposed the eastward policy, I was not in a position of responsibility.
However, due to national duty, I took time from some friends whom I thought were influential in decision-making or at least in justifying the issues, including Mr. Mesbahi Moghaddam, Ahmad Tavakoli, and Morteza Nabavi, and explained that this reliance on China is an illusion. But if your ear is your ear and my wailing is my wailing, then, of course, it is a cry that does not reach anywhere, and today we must witness the unveiling of such a policy.
Invitation instead of summoning
According to conventional diplomatic protocols, any statement contrary to the national interests of a country or based on interference in the governance policies is met with summoning the ambassador of the offending country and conveying a protest message. However, the strategic loneliness of the Islamic Republic in foreign policy and excessive reliance on China seems to have created a new protocol, which is invitation instead of summoning.
It seems the regime is even cautious in using words and perhaps fears displeasing China to such an extent that it is not even ready to declare a firm and clear stance in response to such anti-Iranian statements and positions from Beijing. In the statements of the Foreign Minister and Mojtaba Zolnour, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament, a kind of ambiguity and generality is clearly noticeable.
China: choice or compulsion
However, a noteworthy point is examining this model of perspective and doctrine in foreign policy: whether looking eastward is based on the necessity and a choice centered on national interests, or is it imposed on us due to strategic loneliness in foreign and regional policy? Perhaps there is a third option, which is the alignment of this option with the overall ideology governing the regime’s general policies. Whatever the reason, it does not reduce the bitterness and failure of this policy’s outcome.
According to foreign policy experts, balance in international relations is one of the main and logical principles of this field, and intelligence should replace slogans in foreign policy. And now, if the Islamic Republic, with the notion that China and Russia, due to numerous competitions and challenges with the West, like the Iranian government, categorize countries into friends and foes in foreign policy,
this seems to be a strategic mistake, and just as one should not rely on their enmity with the West, more than that, one should look at their friendship towards Iran with skepticism and believe in their national interest-centered foreign policy. Now it remains to be seen whether the regime is still determined on the previous policy or if such events lead to a change in foreign policy direction.