The Sultan and Sheikh’s Banquet
The Sultan of Oman visited the UAE
The Sultan of Oman visited the UAE, and this visit is also significant for the United States and China. Oman and the United Arab Emirates have revitalized their bilateral relations, which will help enhance Oman’s position as a key infrastructural hub in the region.
Oman resumes bilateral relations with the United Arab Emirates, thereby strengthening its position as an infrastructure hub throughout the region. On April 22, 2024, Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, the Sultan of Oman, visited the United Arab Emirates to discuss bilateral, regional, and international issues with Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the President of the United Arab Emirates and the ruler of Abu Dhabi. This visit was notable for three reasons.
First and foremost, it was the Sultan’s first trip to the UAE since ascending the throne in 2020. Mohammed bin Zayed visited Oman in 2022. Secondly, Oman and the UAE have reinforced their relations after a troubled political season. Thirdly, the expansion of infrastructural cooperation between Oman and the UAE increases Muscat’s role in trade corridors amidst the strategic competition between the US and China.
Beginning of a New Political Chapter
In the 2010s, diplomatic relations between Oman and the UAE were not as friendly as throughout their history. Indeed, the UAE’s military-focused foreign policy contrasted with Oman’s traditional third-way approach to crises, which was dialogue-oriented.
The Iran issue and, above all, the Yemen file played a significant role in souring Oman-UAE relations. Abu Dhabi deployed its forces in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis, including military operations in Mahra, a province bordering Oman and traditionally under its political influence. Conversely, Muscat maintained its neutral stance during the 2015 war and facilitated diplomatic exchanges between Yemeni parties and regional powers.
Regarding Iran, the UAE withdrew its ambassador from Tehran in 2016, while Oman maintained good relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, as both are guardians of the Strait of Hormuz. Regional tensions also led to direct confrontations.
In 2018, while many Emirati citizens were purchasing border properties in Oman, Sultan Qaboos prohibited non-Omani citizens from owning agricultural land and properties in strategic border areas, including Musandam and Dhofar, except for the port city of Salalah. In 2019, the second UAE espionage cell, consisting of Emirati citizens, was uncovered, and those arrested were sentenced to prison in Oman. The first cell was discovered in 2011.
However, everything changed rapidly from 2019, helping to restore warm Oman-UAE relations. The death of Sultan Qaboos in early 2020 coincided with the UAE’s foreign policy reset towards an economic-first model due to uncontrollable political tensions in the Middle East.
Deep and Long-Standing Ties
During the visit to the UAE, a large delegation accompanied the Sultan, including the Deputy Prime Minister for Defense Affairs, Shihab bin Tariq Al Said, the Sultan’s brother, and Bilarab bin Haitham Al Said, the Sultan’s youngest son. Another son and heir, Theyazin bin Haitham Al Said, who is the Minister of Culture, Sports, and Youth, had previously visited the UAE in December 2023.
During this official visit, Sultan Haitham and the President of the United Arab Emirates witnessed the signing of several agreements worth $35 billion in renewable and sustainable energy, technology, education, and railways.
Infrastructure
Infrastructure is at the core of the new Oman-UAE political chapter, and bilateral projects can also be linked to larger corridors.
In 2022, Oman and the United Arab Emirates established the Oman-Etisalat Railway Project, a $3 billion joint investment project to develop and operate a railway network connecting the Port of Sohar in northern Oman to Abu Dhabi. Currently, a joint venture between Etisalat Rail, Mubadala Investment Company, and the Omani Asyad Group has been launched.
The company also signed a memorandum of understanding with Al Jazeera Steel Products Company, a steel products manufacturer based in Oman, aimed at developing logistics for transporting raw materials and finished goods. Since 2018, the Sultanate has been part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, while, unlike the United Arab Emirates, it has not yet participated in the US-led India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor project.
Regarding the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, foreign policy could be inconsistent. Oman is not expected to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel soon, although Muscat was the first Gulf Cooperation Council country to host an Israeli Prime Minister’s visit in 2018. The Sultan has taken firm positions against Israel, positions that Sultan Haitham’s reign has helped intensify.
Among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Oman has made the harshest statements against the Israeli government and the Gaza war, reinforcing its traditional pro-Palestinian stance. Abdullah Al Rahbi, Oman’s permanent representative to the Arab League, went further, saying the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel was resistance against occupation.
However, Oman decided to open its airspace to Israeli flights in February 2023. A few months later, Saudi Arabia did the same. Flights over Oman were later suspended due to the conflict in Gaza as a precautionary measure during wartime.
Impact of the Red Sea Crisis on Oman’s Ports
The Sultan of Oman and the President of the United Arab Emirates discussed instability in the southern Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden due to Houthi attacks on shipping. From a commercial perspective, the Sultanate of Muscat is directly affected by the crisis, as Salalah in Dhofar is the first major port for ships entering the Indian Ocean from the Gulf of Aden, with a 22% decrease in container volume in December 2023, which continued into the first quarter of 2024.
This is compounded by repeated Iranian attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, such as the seizure of a ship linked to Israel in the Strait of Hormuz on April 13, 2024, which expanded the regional maritime risk to Oman’s Sohar Port.
In an effort to counter this decline in maritime transfers in Salalah, Oman is now adapting to transport unloaded cargo overland in the Gulf Cooperation Council region, a land alternative similar to the corridor the United Arab Emirates now uses to connect Jebel Ali with Haifa in Israel via Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The Red Sea crisis occurred when Oman’s top five ports, Sultan Qaboos, Salalah, Sohar, Khasab, and Duqm, recorded a growing performance in 2023 with a 15% annual increase in cargo handling and transportation.
United States, China, and India’s Multi-Polar Oman
Closer economic cooperation between Muscat and the UAE, especially at the infrastructural level, could open new avenues for foreign investment in the country, likely motivating global powers to compete in this country. Although the economic aspect is strategic in itself, it is not the main dimension of the competition.
In late 2023, the United States was informed at the highest levels of China’s efforts to build a military base in Oman, a plan Beijing did not deny.
Since the 1980s, the United States has had a defense agreement with Oman that allows it to use military bases in the country. This agreement was expanded in 2019 to include facilities and ports in Duqm and Salalah.
China accounts for 90% of Oman’s oil exports. It has invested in the Duqm Special Economic Zone, and its navy often conducts exercises with Beijing, along with Russia and Iran. Recently, US concerns about the establishment of a Chinese military facility in the UAE near Abu Dhabi have increased.
Construction work was halted in 2021 after inspections by US officials at Khalifa Port and then resumed in mid-2023.
With increasing US-China competition in Oman and the UAE, India is gaining a prominent position in this Sultanate. In January 2024, a few weeks after Sultan Haitham’s visit to New Delhi, India secured a specific area for its navy at Duqm Port as part of increased Indian deployment against piracy in the Arabian Sea.
In 2018, Oman granted access to Duqm Port to the Indian Navy. The current move allows Muscat to assure its ally, the United States, of its geopolitical alignment while simultaneously strengthening its military relations with a historical ally like India, which has a strong voice in the BRICS Plus led by China.
Moreover, now that Oman’s public debts have improved and the Sultanate’s reliance on Chinese loans is decreasing, it can balance its traditional alliance with the United States and its growing relations with China. Although Oman continues to affirm its unique third-way approach, which is diplomacy-oriented in politics, it seems more inclined under Sultan Haitham to take firm stances on regional matters and is ready to engage in the multi-polar game that its Gulf Cooperation Council neighbors, starting with the UAE, have skillfully managed in recent years.
