The Caucasus is Unstable
The Caucasus became unstable with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s, and the creation of the Glasnost policy in Russia, meaning openness, led to the eruption of suppressed and dormant ethnic, territorial, and border conflicts during the Soviet rule.
One of the most active centers of territorial and border crises in the Soviet Union was the Caucasus, which, alongside international economic and political factors, contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Black January or Black Saturday of 1989 in Baku, resulting from the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, laid the groundwork for a crisis that, even after three decades, has turned the South Caucasus into a center of insecurity and conflict.
The conflict was over the issue of the Armenian-populated autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh within the borders of Soviet Azerbaijan, which, for various reasons at the time of the formation of the Soviet Caucasian republics, was placed within Azerbaijan’s territory, although this region was near the borders of the Republic of Armenia, located to the west of this area.
The relationship between the Armenians of Karabakh, the indigenous residents of this region, and Armenia, which was possible during the Soviet era, at the brink of the Soviet collapse and the region’s declaration of readiness to join Armenia or gain independence from the Republic of Azerbaijan, marked the beginning of a deep crisis in the region that still remains a major obstacle to establishing peace and security in the Caucasus.
After the Soviet collapse and the independence of the fourteen republics forming the Soviet Union, and the transfer of the Soviet Union’s permanent seat in the Security Council to Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union, despite the signing of the Alma-Ata Declaration in 1991 recognizing and respecting the former borders and the independence and territorial integrity of the former Soviet republics, and the signing by the leaders, the possibility of establishing security and calm was accompanied by conflicts that eventually led to a devastating war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
Within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, with the political instability resulting from gaining independence in Azerbaijan’s political structure, the Armenians of Karabakh, who found themselves surrounded by Azerbaijani military forces, with Armenia’s help and, according to some reports, with the assistance of Red Army cadres who remained in the Caucasus, managed to declare self-proclaimed independence and engage in military conflict with the Republic of Azerbaijan, ultimately leading to the military occupation of five Azerbaijani districts surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
With the United Nations Security Council’s measures, a ceasefire was declared, and the OSCE Minsk Group was entrusted by the Security Council with the responsibility of managing Karabakh affairs and resolving the issue through diplomatic channels. Since the ceasefire declaration, Armenia and Azerbaijan have each pursued separate paths. Azerbaijan, due to significant oil and gas resources, succeeded in exporting energy outside Russia’s control, the big brother of the Soviet era, with the participation and investment of Western oil companies.
Meanwhile, Armenia focused its efforts on maintaining the occupied territories and meeting the military and welfare needs of the people in this region. As Azerbaijan benefited more economically and from Western support, strengthening its economic, military power, and political stature, Armenia, with a population about one-third of Azerbaijan’s, became weaker in terms of defense and economy and dependent on the help of Armenians living in other countries.
In November 2020, with military and advisory support from Israel and Turkey, and according to some reports, extremist forces from Syria, Azerbaijan successfully expelled Armenians from the occupied territories in a swift attack over 44 days.
The direct involvement of Russia, with Putin’s initiative and direct participation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the warring parties and Russia, initiated a crisis more complex than the original one.
Russia intended to connect Nagorno-Karabakh near the borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran to two centers of Russian military presence in Georgia, the South Ossetia region, and the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, and the declaration of independence of these two separatist units of Georgia in 2008, and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine to Russia in 2014, and create a defensive buffer line against NATO to prevent the expansion of this military alliance from the west and south of Russia’s territory. Russia itself was the biggest violator of the Alma-Ata Declaration, which it had signed.
Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 disrupted many of the Caucasus equations. Ukraine’s resistance, with Western assistance, against Russia’s advances led to Russia’s distance from the Caucasus issue and dissatisfaction from Armenia, Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Russia’s inactivity in aiding Armenia during Azerbaijan’s military operations and Armenia’s defeat, while Azerbaijan’s security threats against Armenia’s territorial integrity within the framework of non-legal interpretations of a non-legal agreement outside the competence of the Minsk Group, without the participation of the other two Minsk Group co-chairs, France and the United States, with Russia taking the initiative alone and signing the ceasefire agreement, complicated the Caucasus equation.
According to the provisions of that agreement, the Republic of Azerbaijan would provide a corridor named Lachin on its territory, which had been liberated from Armenian occupation, for the Armenians of Karabakh to travel to and from Armenia under Russian supervision. In return, Armenia was committed to allowing land communication between the main part of Azerbaijan and its exclave in the west, known as the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan. In practice, the Lachin corridor was not opened, and Azerbaijani military and paramilitary forces besieged the mountainous Karabakh region, ultimately forcing the indigenous Armenian residents of Karabakh to self-exile to Armenia.
Currently, the Armenians residing in Karabakh have filed a lawsuit against the Republic of Azerbaijan at the International Court, accusing Azerbaijan of ethnic cleansing, although the Azerbaijani government welcomes the return of Armenians to their homes in Karabakh and pledges their security. However, the Armenians, for their safety due to insecurity and the lack of security assurance from the Russian peacekeeping forces stationed in Karabakh, have withdrawn from returning to Karabakh.
The conflict between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan continues. Armenia has announced its withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the continuation of Pashinyan’s cabinet is facing widespread protests. Armenians oppose Pashinyan’s agreement to transfer four Armenian villages to the Republic of Azerbaijan.
The Caucasus remains unstable. India’s and France’s involvement in Armenia has led to protests and warnings from Aliyev in Baku.
Pashinyan is criticized by many in Armenia for his inability to manage affairs, and extensive protests against his cabinet are ongoing. The course of events in the region shows that heads of governments that have come to power without the backing of political, legal, and economic knowledge, relying solely on emotional movements, have caused political and economic instability in their countries.
