Soon it becomes too late
Soon it becomes too late. The new government has named its discourse national and social consensus. Consensus has a close and meaningful connection with hope. It is not possible to expect consensus and empathy in an atmosphere of despair. One of the fundamental issues in Iranian society is the weakness of hope and the relatively clear bleakness of the future, and the lack of horizon-opening capacities in social and political life. This issue is reflected on one hand in national surveys and on the other hand in the level of participation in elections.
Although about 62% of the Iranian society believes that the current situation should be addressed through reforms, nearly 60% of eligible voters did not participate in the last elections held in the country. On the other hand, hope for the improvement of the country’s situation in a clear future is very weak.
Nearly 80% of respondents in the fourth wave of the national survey on Iranian values and attitudes in 2023 stated that the country’s economic conditions have worsened compared to five years ago, and about 71% believed that the economic conditions of the country will worsen in the next five years. Regarding the prevalence of good traits in society, about 74% believed it has worsened compared to five years ago, and about 65% said the prevalence of these traits will worsen in the next five years.
These few statistics clearly show that today’s Iranian society evaluates itself as worse than yesterday and its tomorrow as worse than today. This evaluation of the country’s life trend indicates a lack of a positive and hopeful outlook towards the future.
One of the fundamental issues in Iranian society is the dominance of such a situation over a long period. Almost the same evaluation can be found in the results of the first to third waves of the survey on Iranian values and attitudes. In other words, based on the findings of national surveys from 2000 to 2023, which is slightly over two decades, and considering other findings, Iranians have believed that the moral, economic, political, and social conditions, and social harms in Iranian society have been on a worsening trend.
The presence of this mental atmosphere and its overlap with some existing deadlocks and official interventions in daily life has negatively impacted Iranians’ understanding of the possibility of a desirable life in the country. The widespread migration of Iranians over the past two decades has been mainly due to such understanding and recognition of the current situation and the effort to choose another environment to achieve a desirable and preferred life.
The emergence of a kind of hope in the first months of the new governments’ tenure, including the fourteenth government, is not due to structural and lasting changes but rather due to the psychological atmosphere of the elections and hope for change in the trends, policies, and programs in the new government and the creation of new conditions for improving the social living space in various moral, economic, political, and social dimensions.
This hope arising from the psychological atmosphere of the elections will not be very lasting.
The thirteenth government, despite many experts initially speaking about its inability to improve the current situation, also had this hope in society, which was not very lasting. Despite all the official propaganda to show its diverse successes, the government could not inspire hope in society for various reasons intertwined with people’s lived experiences and failed to provide a positive horizon and outlook in society. The withdrawal of the country’s elite community in various scientific, cultural, and artistic sectors during those years added to the lack of this outlook.
The new government has named its discourse national and social consensus. Consensus has a close and meaningful connection with hope. It is not possible to expect consensus and empathy in an atmosphere of despair. Moreover, consensus is not only at the level of power centers and political forces and generally in the layer of official and political structures that can push society forward and make it hopeful about the future. This consensus must also be reproduced at various social levels. Only then will society feel that the social environment for a dignified life is changing.
In this process, the government should keep an eye on the 60% who, despite the full participation of reformists, were not willing to participate in the elections. In the current atmosphere, although there are many doubts from a significant part of society about the new government’s ability to improve the chaotic internal situation and foreign relations, since we are in the honeymoon period of the government, an implicit hope arising from the elections and the establishment of the new government has emerged. It seems that this doubt has extended to this area as well, and part of that 60% is also waiting alongside the participants in the elections for actions from the government to reassess their view of the country’s conditions.
If Mr. Pezeshkian’s government can take tangible steps in the coming months to reduce pressure on society in social, cultural, and economic fields, including minimal openings on women’s and youth issues, the internet, business environment, and foreign relations, then it can be expected that more sustainable seeds of hope will be planted in Iranian society. Hope that will act as the engine of the society’s movement to face problems in cooperation and empathy with the government, that is, active consensus, and with the improvement of living conditions, will make Iranians’ outlook on the future brighter and relatively open. This will reflect in the reduction of the migration trend of Iranians, especially young elites, and the feeling of vitality and assessment of the future in the national survey on Iranian values and attitudes in 2027. Mr. Pezeshkian knows well that sometimes soon it becomes too late, so timely transformations are essential to achieving goals.
