The Beginning of a War of Attrition
The beginning of a war of attrition: Developments in the Middle East over the past two weeks have entered a new and more challenging phase. Netanyahu, three days after Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, spoke of changing the map of the Middle East and named the operation that led to the killing of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah as Operation New Order. Netanyahu’s remarks and those of Israeli extremists indicate that they initially intended to turn the October 7 operation into an opportunity to engage with resistance axis groups and confront Iran.
On this basis, Israel, which in the first three months focused on Hamas and claimed Iran and Hezbollah were uninformed about the October 7 attack, after relatively dealing with Hamas in Gaza, carried out unprecedented attacks on January 4 and April 2, martyring several high-ranking IRGC officials in Syria. Despite Iran’s limited and low-scale response to the April 2 operation against the consular section of the Iranian embassy in Damascus, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on August 1 was Israel’s next provocative action.
Iranian officials rightly sought to avoid actions that would provide an opportunity for Israel to expand the war in the region. Of course, the U.S. government also played a role in preventing a serious confrontation between Iran and Israel, as Washington knows that in such a confrontation, it might have no choice but to intervene in favor of Israel.
Ultimately, in the so-called process of changing the map of the Middle East, Hezbollah became the next target on Israel’s agenda. Striking Hezbollah is a consensus in Israeli domestic policy and offers political benefits for Netanyahu’s future, and diplomatically, almost no country, except Iran, seriously opposes it. However, Netanyahu’s problem was that Hezbollah also avoided a full-scale war, and the goal of the operation it started on October 8 was only to pressure Israel for a ceasefire in Gaza.
It is well-known that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah had said that if he had known in July 2006 that attacking an Israeli armored vehicle and killing three soldiers and capturing two Israeli soldiers would lead to a 33-day war, he would not have taken that action. Therefore, Israel only used the return of displaced northern Israeli residents to their homes and the removal of the Hezbollah threat as a pretext for war against Hezbollah. The question now is how far this change in the Middle East map and new order is supposed to continue.
Israel’s apparent goal is to use the opportunity of the October 7 operation to end the shadow war or unlimited and managed war of attrition by resistance axis groups in its surrounding areas. This strategy can be pursued with the support of Europe and the U.S., the silence of China and Russia, and the indifference of Islamic-Arab countries. In a situation where Israel has turned the threat of a full-scale war into a tactic to stop the war of attrition, the question is what Iran can do. Iran’s policy of avoiding a full-scale war has been a correct policy.
Firstly, it is expected that Hezbollah, despite the blows it has suffered, will be able to maintain its organization and military capability and defend itself. Secondly, the expectation of some factions from Iranian officials to take actions that could lead to a full-scale war is not a reasonable expectation. In the event of a serious confrontation between Iran and Israel, especially in this election period, the U.S. will not hesitate to enter the war. The military force of no medium power is prepared to face global powers. Moreover, existing problems in economic, social, domestic policy, foreign policy, intelligence, and security domains add to the reasons to avoid a widespread war.
Thirdly, due to U.S. opposition, it is unlikely that Israel initially intends to enter a war with Iran unless it can find a pretext for this purpose. This pretext could be an attack by Iran against Israel or an action in the nuclear domain. In the latter case, some have recently recommended Iran’s nuclearization as an action to avoid a full-scale war and a reaction to the weakening of surrounding deterrence arms, but such a recommendation itself could be a major threat to Iran’s security. Embarking on such a path requires fulfilling multiple conditions, such as having a robust intelligence shield, information security, nuclear safety, and protection.
Serious movement in the nuclear domain will unite many against Iran, and if China and Russia do not join, they will at most remain silent. Moreover, nuclear deterrence requires a large number of nuclear bombs and a diverse triad of delivery systems via aircraft, missiles, and submarines. One or two bombs not only do not provide deterrence, but if nuclear facilities are targeted and there is no capability to deliver a second strike SSC, a large part of the country could become uninhabitable.
