Repetition of a Baseless Claim by Europe
In an unusual and unprecedented move, the European Union supported the territorial claim of the United Arab Emirates over the completely Iranian and historical islands of Abu Musa, Lesser Tunb, and Greater Tunb. Previously, China and Russia had exhibited similar behavior.
It is evident that the United Arab Emirates lacks any capacity or capability to prove or impose its desire on Iran, and the international community also lacks the legal documentation to pursue such a request and claim.
Now the question arises, with what aim and motivation is the United Arab Emirates pursuing this plan, and on the other hand, with what aim and motivation are powers such as the European Union, Russia, and China participating in this game?
The United Arab Emirates is a state lacking historical identity, but due to its geographical position, the support of influential global powers, and interactive management with these powers, and governance style suited to its position and conditions, it has both gained substantial wealth and become a point of reliance for global powers.
The current ruler of this emirate, by creating internal cohesion and formulating a long-term development plan, has effectively achieved two out of three components needed to become a regional power: wealth and economic development.
However, the third component, which is sustainable security, will be established when the UAE can solidify its historical and territorial identity, which in practice is not an easily solvable challenge. The UAE not only has its eyes on Iranian soil but also has territorial issues and challenges with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman, and beyond that, it has long been trying to have a presence even in Saudi Arabia’s backyard, namely Yemen.
But the fact that the UAE has focused more than anything else on the Iranian islands is due to several specific and clear reasons.
1. The challenge with Iran is currently both a type of power-seeking and a mission for the UAE to maintain its dynamic economy, which is based on trade and brokerage, and requires the continuation of the tense situation between Iran and the West.
If for any reason this equation is disrupted, a significant portion of the UAE’s commercial advantage will effectively be lost.
In the tense relationship conditions between the West and Iran, the UAE is one of the two main corridors for trade and financial transactions of Iran, and this fact compels Iran to deal with the UAE cautiously.
2. The UAE’s territorial claim to the three islands is a kind of execution of a mission pursued by Europe and the United States, and its goal is completely clear: one important aspect is to obstruct the improvement of Iran’s relations with its southern neighbors, and the other is to use it as a pressure lever.
3. By pursuing this policy, the UAE effectively aligns with the regional policies of Europe and the United States in pressuring Iran, and this alignment is somewhat related to maintaining political balance in the region.
Naturally, the issue of territorial tension between Iran and the UAE should not be viewed merely as a territorial dispute between two countries; rather, this issue is a function of the set of policies, programs, and challenges that exist between Iran and the West, with the issue of Israel and Iran-U.S. relations being the main axis.
As long as there is no clear outlook on the horizon of Iran’s relations with the entirety of the West, namely the U.S. and Europe, pressure levers and threats will exist at various levels and time periods.
Remaining at an impasse in relations with the West will lead to continued pressure on Iran and the continuation of sanctions. These two components, namely sanctions and pressure, are an important part of the West’s policy, which aims to steer Iran towards a deal with minimal profit for Iran.
It is true that currently, Iran’s military capability and, most importantly, the national resolve to defend its territorial integrity have likened the UAE’s claims to drinking a cup of cold water in the midday desert heat, which satisfies no need, but the future must be considered and the grounds and context for such challenges must be eliminated.
Iran, with whatever strength it has, will not be able to continuously endure pressure and sanctions, and confrontation with the world must be transformed into interaction, and the burden of advancing this goal lies both on the final decision-makers and on the country’s diplomatic apparatus.
The current government’s approach is promising and correct, but the slowness of diplomatic exchange between Iran and the entirety of the West is somewhat to our detriment because it makes decision-making more difficult and its implementation more problematic.
The country’s diplomatic apparatus lacks a practical and clear initiative, and this fact has somewhat shrouded the policy of interaction with the world in ambiguity.