The Decline of the Islamic Republic in Governance
The Decline of the Islamic Republic in Governance
The wave of despair is evident among those who believed in the invincibility of the coalition led by the Islamic Republic in the Middle East, both inside and outside Iran. Since the Ba’athist regime in Syria was seen as a symbol of the power of the resistance front, its fall has not only reduced the influence of the Iranian government but also emboldened its rivals.
Followers of Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, have faced the bitter reality that their strategic calculations may have been overly optimistic, leading to a crisis of confidence in the leadership’s ability and dominance.
Moreover, the consequences could extend beyond Syria. The potential emergence of a semi-democratic or Sunni-led government could shift the balance of power in the region, further isolating the Islamic Republic, its proxy network, and its allies.
In another scenario, there are concerns about the resurgence of Sunni extremism, which could threaten stability within Iran.
Following these developments, the social base of the Velayat-e Faqih institution is grappling with despair.
Some supporters of this institution have questioned the efficacy of Iran’s foreign policy, leading to increased calls for reevaluation.
As the situation calms, it remains to be seen how Khamenei will rally his support base and respond to these growing concerns in the face of rapidly changing regional dynamics.
The emergence of despair due to the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the ousted Syrian president, may act as a catalyst for change in both strategy and ideology among Khamenei’s followers, as they confront the complex realities of the Middle East following Assad’s fall.
The consequences of these developments extend beyond foreign policy and impact the internal conflicts between the government and the majority of Iranian citizens seeking structural change in governance. After Assad’s escape, psychological factors have shifted in favor of the people in their political struggle against the Islamic Republic of Iran. This variable can play a significant role in shaping behaviors and attitudes to overcome obstacles.
Weakened Position of the Islamic Republic’s Government
The weakening of the Islamic Republic’s power and its successive regional failures lead more people to conclude that the government is in a weaker position to impose intimidation and repression, experiencing cognitive and perceptual disruption. Moreover, opponents gain more confidence to strengthen resistance and promote collective identity, encouraging individuals to act against the propaganda and misinformation disseminated by Khamenei’s establishment.
This new wave of hope among opponents, coupled with the passive tremors and separation among some followers of the Velayat-e Faqih institution, strengthens the possibility of a more powerful social movement in Iran, focusing on inspiring hope and united action among the people to free themselves from an inefficient government that has placed Iran in a precarious situation both internally and externally.
The extent of dissatisfaction and despair among the regime’s supporters is unclear, and at least part of it may be transient and fleeting. Discontent arises from two fronts: some see the pragmatism of the hard core of power as the source of the problem, while others have doubts about the correctness of the policy’s principle.
Unprecedented despair was first publicly revealed by the wireless media affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, accusing Khamenei of passive behavior in response to Israel’s attack on Iran. Although this post was quickly removed and the editorial board apologized for publishing such unexpected criticism of Khamenei within the inner circle, it showed that dissatisfaction with the decisions of the leader of the Islamic Republic is spreading among both extremist and moderate followers on one hand and independent and opposing segments of society on the other.
Another sign indicating the breaking of Khamenei’s sanctity and status was a warning note by Tasnim News Agency, another media outlet linked to the Revolutionary Guard, emphasizing the importance of aligning actions with the speed of the Islamic Republic leader’s orientation.
This note suggests not deviating from obedience to him, whether from the right or the left. Additionally, Hadi Zarei, a member of the Quds Force in Syria, spoke more explicitly about the Iranian government’s missteps in Syria in a video interview, pointing out how the head of the Guard exaggerated successes, creating problems for the country.
In recent weeks, we have seen that the main media outlets affiliated with the Velayat-e Faqih institution have made significant efforts to alleviate the grief of supporters and, based on Khamenei’s guidelines emphasizing the need to avoid self-aggrandizement after victory and despair in the face of defeat, to prevent the strengthening of opponents and critics.
However, it seems that these efforts to prevent the weakening of the social base of the Velayat-e Faqih institution are futile. The frequent occurrences of ‘lucky breaks,’ as some call them, were among the main factors of Khamenei’s unstable success in the region, which now seems to no longer persist, and perhaps a reverse trend is underway in the impact of chance.
Therefore, given that psychological resilience plays a vital role in movements based on civil and collective resistance and the passivity of supporters of the established power, it is logical to expect that the process of weakening the government and the erosion of supporters will accelerate due to rapid and surprising developments in the region, ultimately leading to the erosion of its repressive power.