Israel and Lebanon Militants: Wobbly Steps Towards Another War
Israel and Lebanon Militants: Wobbly Steps Towards Another War
According to the Irangate News Agency, while tensions on the southern borders of Lebanon continue, and recent Israeli military maneuvers have increased concerns about the possibility of a new conflict, analysts say the current signs do not necessarily mean an imminent war.
Observers believe that a combination of political, military, and international factors could currently deter Tel Aviv from launching a large-scale operation, even if the level of tension between Israel and Hezbollah has increased in recent weeks.
One of the famous quotes attributed to British journalist Claud Cockburn is, ‘Never believe anything until it has been officially denied.’
This phrase can also be interpreted differently: believe anything until everyone confirms it. This saying comes to mind when an increasing number of international observers speculate that a new conflict in Lebanon is imminent.
Their argument is that the Gaza war has ended, but in Lebanon, Hezbollah has refused to disarm according to the ceasefire agreement announced with Israel last November.
Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing domestic political challenges, and some analysts believe he may be seeking grounds to escalate tensions in Lebanon to alleviate some internal pressures.
This reasoning seems convincing to many, which is why some other analysts are no longer asking if a new Lebanon war is on the way, but when it will start. However, this hypothesis is not necessarily definitive.
Following the bloody events in Gaza, the general perception of Israel’s actions has often been pessimistic, but such a perception does not necessarily lead to a more accurate understanding of the country’s policies.
In recent weeks, some signs have indicated Israel’s potential readiness for a military scenario in Lebanon. About a week ago, the Israeli army conducted maneuvers in northern Galilee and along the Lebanon border, coinciding with increased reports of Hezbollah rearming.
Israeli drones almost daily target individuals in Lebanese territory, who, according to Israeli officials, are Hezbollah forces, although some of these attacks have also resulted in civilian casualties. For example, in the October 23 incident, some observers see these developments as signs of a gradual escalation of tensions, but these actions can also be analyzed from other perspectives.
For instance, the increase in attacks on facilities with construction machinery, including in the Masayleh area on October 11, and the destruction of a cement factory in Ansar a few days later, may indicate more economic pressure rather than military preparation.
Some analysts believe the aim of these actions is to impose economic costs on the residents of southern Lebanon to show that supporting Hezbollah will be costly.
There are other signs that Israel is trying to make life difficult in southern Lebanon, including restricting farmers’ access to olive groves, targeting houses under reconstruction, and creating conditions that disrupt tobacco production, one of the region’s main income sources.
Maurice Tidball-Binz, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, told the French news agency that unless there is convincing evidence showing that civilian targets have dual military use, these attacks are considered illegal and may constitute violations of the right to life and principles of precaution and proportionality, and even be considered war crimes under international humanitarian law.
However, analysts remind that economic pressure and preventing reconstruction do not necessarily mean preparation for war, but could be an attempt to impose political concessions on the Lebanese government and Hezbollah.
Other factors also reduce the likelihood of war. First, Israel has largely achieved its strategic objectives in southern Lebanon and has the support of the United States. In such conditions, starting a conflict with uncertain outcomes may not bring new achievements for Israel.
Israel has significant control over the land and airspace of southern Lebanon, and with the possible removal of UN peacekeeping forces UNIFIL by December 2026, it will gain more influence. The absence of international oversight could lead to the consolidation of Israel’s position in border areas, although the long-term consequences remain a matter of debate.
The second deterrent is the erosion of the Israeli army’s capabilities after the prolonged Gaza campaign. Even if this alone does not prevent war, the fundamental question is what a military operation in Lebanon could achieve.
The potential capture up to the Litani River requires entering a costly ground battle that may ultimately strengthen Hezbollah’s political position. The experience of the Gaza war has also shown that extensive attacks do not necessarily lead to the lasting weakening of armed groups.
The third factor is the political developments in the United States and the role of Donald Trump’s government. The new U.S. president has recently played a role in establishing a permanent ceasefire in Gaza and likely does not wish for a new conflict in the region.
Last week, he sent a delegation, including Vice President J.D. Vance, to Israel to stabilize the ceasefire. Although the overall Middle East policy of the Trump administration is still unclear, Washington currently seems focused on maintaining stability.
The fourth point relates to Hezbollah’s position in regional equations. This party finds meaning within the framework of an alliance with Iran-aligned forces, and without broad regional support, its military capabilities would be limited.
Given the changing conditions in Syria and internal challenges in Lebanon, it is unlikely that Hezbollah could withstand a prolonged conflict.
On the other hand, Iran’s main goal at the current juncture may be more focused on negotiations with the United States and gaining political concessions than on trying to expand the conflict.
Even if Hezbollah has retained part of its missile capabilities, using them carries high risks. The ‘unity of fronts’ strategy proposed in 2023 was more political than military in nature.
Missile attacks can cause damage, but maintaining this situation is difficult for Hezbollah, especially given logistical constraints and the potential for a widespread Israeli response, which would have significant internal political consequences in Lebanon.
Overall, it seems that Israel is not currently under immediate pressure to start a new war in Lebanon. The existing ceasefire has advantages for Tel Aviv, and Hezbollah has limited capacity to directly threaten Israeli territory. Although the possibility of conflict cannot be completely ruled out, current evidence suggests that in the short term, Israel will focus on containing Iran and related strategic developments, with Lebanon being a secondary priority.