Earthquake in the Conservative Camp
According to Iran Gate, only four months remain until the twelfth Islamic Consultative Assembly elections, yet conservatives have not succeeded in reaching a comprehensive consensus. The gathering of conservatives, attended by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel last week, highlighted a deep rift within the conservative camp, as many prominent figures, both moderates and hardliners, were absent from this meeting.
Many conservatives in the 2020 elections emphasized the necessity of unifying the pillars of power, claiming that this policy would solve the country’s numerous problems. Now, more than two years into Ebrahim Raisi’s administration, which is deeply aligned with the dominant forces in the legislative and judicial branches, not only has such unity not been achieved, but the inefficacy resulting from the exclusion of other political factions, particularly technocrats, has led to even greater and more complex issues for the Islamic Republic.
Now, with the approach of the twelfth Islamic Consultative Assembly elections, evidence suggests a deep rift within the conservative camp, to the extent that some factions are openly issuing statements against each other, and many of their supporters are expressing their embarrassment on the social network X.
Where Does the Root of the Dispute Lie?
The main conflict among conservatives stems from the 2019 elections, which brought ultra-revolutionary representatives to power in the parliament. This election led to an unprecedentedly homogeneous composition of the parliament in favor of lesser-known conservative figures. Among them, some figures like Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf were more recognized, but any observer looking at the list of the eleventh parliament representatives would notice the overwhelming presence of hardliners and ultra-revolutionaries.
Overall, it can be said that the main rift has developed between hardline branches like the Stability Front and the Shariyan Party, and traditional and moderate conservatives who claim leadership of the conservative movement. Over the past four years since the eleventh parliament took office, we have witnessed deep political clashes between these two factions in the parliament, which are now intensifying as we approach the elections in March 2023.
Mabna Against the Hardliners
Such a composition in parliament has not led to a comprehensive coalition among conservatives, but rather we are witnessing widespread factionalism among these figures. Last week, figures recognized as traditional conservatives held a limited meeting to present a united front to the media and public.
This group, abbreviated as Mabna, stands for the Awakening Assembly of Revolutionary Forces. Conservatives have chosen names like Shana and Jamna at different times, but due to these widespread splits, none of these groups have remained stable, and we have witnessed their collapse in recent years.
In any case, last week Mabna held a meeting attended by figures like Mohsen Rezaee, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and some members of the Islamic Coalition Party. This gathering, held at the mausoleum of the founder of the Islamic Republic, was referred to by media supporting Ghalibaf as a four-thousand-person conservative gathering. However, media activists present at this gathering estimated the attendees to be around 700 to 800 at best.
The Long List of the Excluded
As mentioned, this rift in the conservative camp stems from deep disagreements between hardline and ultra-revolutionary figures and traditional conservatives and some moderate figures. After the Mabna meeting at Ayatollah Khomeini’s mausoleum, many ultra-revolutionary figures began criticizing and even mocking Ghalibaf and his associates. Some moderate conservatives also criticized the holding of such a meeting and demanded Ghalibaf disclose the detailed expenses of this gathering.
However, media close to Mabna, particularly those affiliated with Ghalibaf, including the Sobhe No newspaper, did not remain idle and activated their artillery against hardliners and moderates within the conservative movement. This newspaper referred to Mabna as a comprehensive consensus of conservatives and labeled the absentees of this meeting as the excluded from the revolutionary front. The list of the excluded is extensive, including prominent figures like Morteza Agha-Tehrani, Hamid Rasaee, Alireza Zakani, Saeed Jalili, Mehrdad Bazrpash among the hardliners, and individuals like Mohammad Reza Bahonar, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, Mohammad Mohajeri, and Manouchehr Mottaki among the most important moderate figures who were absent from this meeting.
Both groups of Mabna absentees reacted strongly to this meeting on various social networks, including Twitter X, and criticized Ghalibaf. The moderates, emphasizing the heavy cost of holding an 800-person meeting falsely claimed to be four thousand, accused Ghalibaf of using dirty money in election campaigns. Meanwhile, the ultra-revolutionaries completely dismissed Mabna as lacking legitimacy to represent the revolutionary movement and labeled Ghalibaf as a compromised element.
In Conclusion
If we want to summarize the Mabna meeting in one sentence, we can refer to Ghalibaf’s statement during this gathering where he said, ‘We must consider seeking a share in the elections to be forbidden.’ This single sentence indicates the existence of a deep rift in the conservative camp, which they refer to as revolutionary.
From the extreme end of the conservative spectrum to the conciliatory and compromising faction in the conservative camp, they will be among the excluded in the upcoming elections. The moderates had already been marginalized in the 2019 elections and later in 2020, but the experience of the eleventh parliament reminded traditional conservatives that the hardliners’ and worrywarts’ wall is not one on which they can leave a mark, as the ultra-hardliners not only lack a clear and stable discourse but have previously shown that whenever it serves their interests, they act independently and engage in media manipulation to achieve their goals.
It should also be noted that both of these factions have accusations of moral and economic corruption in their records. Neither has a reliable social base and they are looking to the Guardian Council to see what decision it will ultimately make and whether it will, as in 2019 and 2020, eliminate reformists and moderates or not. Because if the Guardian Council changes its approach from what it adopted in recent elections, it can be said that these internal conservative disputes will not matter much and the scene will be set differently.