A Lonely Europe Minus America
A Lonely Europe Minus America: Political developments in the United States and the rising power of China increase the likelihood of reduced U.S. involvement in Europe’s defense in the coming years. However, the timing and manner of this reduction are still unclear, and it is uncertain how European countries might react to this potential decrease in involvement.
This article examines three hypothetical but plausible scenarios regarding the reduction of U.S. involvement in Europe’s defense over the next decade, assessing the potential trajectory and dynamics of this reduction.
These scenarios highlight a necessity that many experts have implicitly discussed before: the reduction of U.S. involvement in Europe’s defense could occur in better or worse ways, with correspondingly fewer or greater consequences. Careful planning can prevent the worst outcomes.
A Look at History
During much of Trump’s presidency, European policymakers and Washington elites were concerned that the U.S. president might order the withdrawal of the United States from the NATO alliance, leaving Europe to fend for itself.
Despite Donald Trump’s repeated criticisms of European countries for not spending enough on defense, a series of actions, including lobbying by prominent European leaders in Washington and significant efforts by some of Trump’s own appointees, prevented the U.S. from leaving NATO.
Today, the prospect of reduced U.S. involvement in Europe’s defense is closer to reality than ever. In addition to the possibility of Trump winning the presidential election and returning to the White House—this time with advisors closer to him compared to his first term—the United States faces challenges such as limited defense budgets and a focus on the threat from China, which could influence this trend.
Current discussions surrounding Europe’s strategic autonomy and defense spending indicate that European capitals are aware of the reality that in the coming years, they will need to shoulder more of the burden of their own defense readiness and costs.
Although proponents of the status quo argue that U.S. presence and involvement in Europe’s defense could continue, the outlook for this issue is becoming increasingly bleak.
As a new report points out, the fact that European countries cannot defend themselves without relying on NATO and without U.S. assistance has never been clearer, and at the same time, U.S. commitment to European security has never been more uncertain.
It is not an exaggeration to say that Europe’s security depends less on events in Moscow and more on decisions made in Washington.
This reality should not be particularly reassuring for Europeans.
Given that a reduction in U.S. involvement in ensuring Europe’s security is increasingly likely in the coming years, the lack of planning for such a scenario by American and European policymakers would constitute a dereliction of duty.
The issue is that the timing and manner of the U.S. distancing itself from its commitments to maintain Europe’s security are still unclear.
This distancing could result from policymakers’ decisions or be imposed on the U.S. and Europe through a series of unpredictable developments.
Europe’s response to a U.S. withdrawal is also unclear. Transforming Europe into a defensive power capable of self-defense requires policymakers across the continent to make tough decisions, assess costs and benefits, and overcome deep political and institutional divides.
The Dilemmas of Europe’s Collective Action
Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, once famously and rather uncomfortably stated the purpose of NATO’s founding: to keep the Soviet Union out of Europe, the Americans in Europe, and the Germans down.
This phrase became famous not only for its brevity but also because it contained an uncomfortable truth. Even at its founding in 1949, NATO was not a completely straightforward and unchallenged institution.
Defense against the Soviet Union was undoubtedly the main goal of forming this alliance, but NATO also allowed the United States to influence Europe’s security, act as a barrier to Germany becoming an independent military force, and give European countries the opportunity to rebuild after the devastation of World War II. Over time, it became clear that NATO played another role: the main plan—at least until the Eisenhower administration—was for the U.S. to end its direct role and presence in defending Europe once European forces were ready to ensure Europe’s security.
Historian Marc Trachtenberg notes that if Eisenhower said it once, he must have said it a thousand times: the extensive U.S. military presence in Europe was initially meant to be temporary.
But it soon became apparent that European countries had difficulty coordinating on defense issues. Disagreements on threat recognition, military capabilities, and defense coordination made it difficult for the U.S. to end its mission in Europe.
Economically speaking, Europe faced a collective action problem in the defense sector. Although logically and efficiently, creating a joint defense against the Soviet Union seemed reasonable for European countries, the lack of sufficient incentives for individual governments made it difficult. The simplest solution to cover this problem was continued U.S. leadership.
This status quo persisted for decades, even as European countries came closer in areas that seemed unrealistic in the 1940s. Much of Europe now has a common monetary and customs union, and the 1985 Schengen Agreement allows free movement across much of the continent. However, defense policy remains stubbornly at the national level.
The collective action problem has also been complicated by political decisions in Brussels and Washington. In the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO and the European Union rapidly expanded, increasing the number of countries whose interests had to be considered.
On the other hand, the United States has often actively undermined European countries’ ability to converge on defense matters outside the NATO framework, using NATO as a tool to pursue other political priorities, including the war on terrorism and humanitarian interventions.
Ultimately, Europe’s inability to reach a consensus for collective action in the security domain persists, even as the threat from Russia becomes clearer and the risk of U.S. withdrawal from Europe increases. Today’s challenge is not to convince elites that Europe must strive to stand on its own.
As French President Emmanuel Macron declared in April, Europe must become stronger, not dependent on America.
Although few European leaders speak openly about this issue, recent years have seen a wave of publications and public debates—often funded by European governments—exploring how Europe can protect itself in the absence of America.
However, these discussions often highlight the inherent challenges of defense cooperation between European countries rather than providing solutions. Four main dilemmas remain.
Dilemma 1: What should Europe’s focus be? Although Washington likes to pretend that Europe acts as a single entity, in reality, such a thing does not exist. The European Union has managed to bring its members closer commercially, regulatory-wise, and monetarily, but it is not a unified political entity. Security decisions are still made in capitals thousands of kilometers apart, meaning European countries do not perceive threats uniformly.
Eastern European countries are concerned about Russia, Southern European countries worry about the Mediterranean Sea and migration flows, and countries like France focus on their interests in Africa and elsewhere.
Dilemma 2: Where and for what purposes should spending occur? Although Europe’s defense spending has increased by 25% since the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022, capabilities—not just spending—are crucial for defense.
On one hand, existing forces have dwindled in recent years due to budget cuts, and on the other, there is a serious need for new weapons systems and investment in defense production capacities, especially to fill gaps traditionally supplied by the United States, such as unmanned aerial systems or short- and medium-range missiles.
This situation leads to major disagreements among countries over prioritizing defense product production, directing spending, and managing how to avoid duplicating others’ efforts.
Some member countries are rightly concerned that handing over security powers and decision-making to other European capitals—or to Brussels—might leave them in a difficult position in the event of a real war.
Dilemma 3: Which countries benefit economically from increased defense spending? The local view of the benefits of increased defense spending, including its economic advantages, plays a significant role in disagreements among European countries.
It is anticipated that if the U.S. distances itself from participating in Europe’s defense, how the budget allocated within the European Union for defense matters is spent will become one of the challenges among European countries. Countries will seek to strengthen their domestic industries, and in this process, disagreements will become more pronounced.
The easy solution in the past was to buy American weapons, but this prevented Europe from strengthening its defense industries in the long term. Although defense industries in Europe have grown steadily, this growth has been slow and has not taken a leading role in European industries.
Dilemma 4: How should the structure and organization of defense cooperation be? European mechanisms for joint command in war or decision-making in crisis situations are not designed. On the other hand, NATO is better positioned to defend Europe in times of crisis but remains heavily reliant on U.S. capabilities and personnel.
Any credible path for Europe’s defense future must consider the division of labor between EU institutions, existing NATO structures, and the evolution of NATO sub-units like the Weimar Triangle of France, Germany, and Poland.
Scenario One: The Taiwan Crisis
This scenario examines a crisis in the Asia-Pacific region that is likely to lead to a rapid and unintended U.S. withdrawal from Europe.
In such a scenario, although there are attempts at bilateral negotiations and actions by some European countries to mitigate the damage caused by the U.S. withdrawal from Europe, practical limitations in U.S. weapons systems and military capacity render that strategy ineffective.
In contrast, the sudden and unexpected shock of this crisis leads to increased defense cooperation across Europe, resulting in a sort of internal adaptation reminiscent of Jean Monnet’s theory that the European Union is formed in times of crisis.
What is the political atmosphere like in Washington and Beijing? At the same time, in America, Kamala Harris’s team, wanting to prove that women can be as tough as men, is in power. In Beijing, the atmosphere is very tense. Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun warned that anyone daring to separate Taiwan from China will be torn apart and destroyed.
Now let’s see how the war started and what reactions occurred. After a series of short retaliatory economic actions between Taiwan and Beijing, tensions quickly escalated, and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy began moving its fleet to blockade Taiwan.
U.S. President Kamala Harris, after consulting her advisors, decided to take a series of actions to dismantle this blockade, including flying the American flag on Taiwanese ships and escorting commercial vessels through the increasingly tight Chinese blockade, and flying B-52s over the Taiwan Strait.
This last action led to a wider conflict. A Chinese fighter jet trying to approach an American flight collided with the American plane due to a miscalculation, resulting in the deaths of the crew of both planes.
Shortly after, a U.S. Navy frigate escorting commercial ships to the port of Hualien engaged with Chinese ships. This exchange of fire resulted in the deaths of four American sailors. As public demands in America for retaliation and striking China increased, both sides moved toward wider conflict.
The U.S. Seventh Fleet in the East China Sea was on high alert, but Kamala Harris ordered the Fifth and Sixth Fleet ships to be dispatched through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Two strike groups, including aircraft carriers, were deployed in the Persian Gulf to prepare for a blockade of China’s oil resources, while a third group continued its route to the Pacific Ocean, leaving the Western Mediterranean without American naval forces for the first time in decades.
Marine units were quickly transferred to the Senkaku Islands, Guam, and the Philippines, and the Tenth Air and Missile Command was deployed from Germany to the region.
To protect these forces, war planners suggested that all fifth-generation aircraft and most U.S. drone units be transferred from Europe and the Middle East to the region. Patriot batteries were removed from Eastern European bases and quickly deployed around U.S. bases at risk. Given the U.S.’s limited reserves and the intensity of the conflicts, U.S. military assets were moved toward Asia.
Within two months, most U.S. ground forces were transferred from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region.
By the third month of the war in the Pacific, U.S. nuclear weapons remained at NATO bases in Europe, but the number of American troops was drastically reduced, causing shock and despair in European capitals. Europe had been dependent on U.S. military assistance since World War II.
European politicians quickly reacted, with some trying to encourage Washington to return to Europe by supporting America. However, most European countries were unwilling to intervene in the war in Asia, and practical obstacles prevented the return of American forces.
The European Union, as in previous crises, quickly took action and issued bonds to invest in Europe’s defense. Despite new financial resources, defense coordination in Europe remained a challenging issue. Over time, a combination of NATO structures and new groups like the Eastern Partnership among Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland formed to fill the gap left by America.
Scenario Two: NATO’s Weakening Due to U.S. Economic Problems
In this scenario, a debt crisis in America and severe financial constraints led to a gradual reduction of U.S. military presence in Europe. In the 2020s, political and economic crises in America intensified, and by 2029, due to Congress’s failure to agree on the debt ceiling, the country’s economy fell into a deep recession, resulting in a 20% reduction in the U.S. defense budget.
Military forces and critical equipment necessary for Europe’s defense were gradually relocated to other regions, particularly Asia. This gradual reduction of U.S. presence in Europe caused concern among Eastern European countries that feared the Russian threat.
Although the U.S. government continued to reference its commitments to NATO and Europe’s defense, the presence of its military forces across Europe fell to less than 10,000 troops.
Eastern European countries like Poland and the Baltic States, which had the greatest concerns about Russian threats, gradually turned to multilateral and national cooperation instead of relying on NATO and the U.S.
Poland strengthened its defense forces and increased defense cooperation with the UK and Scandinavian countries. These countries were able to compensate for their defense shortfalls by increasing defense budgets and reviving arms production. However, the lack of broad coordination and cooperation at the European level meant that Europe’s collective defense remained weaker than it should be.
Scenario Three: The Trump Shock
In this scenario, Donald Trump, in his second term, decided to withdraw America from its primary role in NATO and shift the responsibility for Europe’s defense to European countries. Despite internal opposition, this decision resulted in America no longer being the main provider of Europe’s security. Trump warned European countries with his policies that they must increase their defense budgets and secure their own security instead of relying on America. Poland seized this opportunity and, with a proposal to build a base for 10,000 American soldiers, managed to gain Trump’s favor and maintain U.S. support.
Other European countries also sought bilateral negotiations with America but did not achieve Poland’s success. However, disagreements among European countries over defense spending and military cooperation increased.
Trump’s actions caused NATO to become semi-active, and Europe’s defense structure turned inefficient and fragmented. Many countries continued to adhere to their low defense budgets, and only a few countries like Poland managed to maintain U.S. support.
This situation increased the risk of conflicts and military tensions in Europe and created new problems for future U.S. presidents who had to decide whether to return to Europe or continue the withdrawal process.
Conclusion
These scenarios highlight the major challenges facing American and European policymakers in redefining the security relationship between the two sides. Although the gradual withdrawal of the U.S. from Europe is difficult and complex, it seems possible and even probable. The results of these scenarios show that a rapid and complete U.S. withdrawal could lead to better and more coordinated European reactions, as EU member countries tend to cooperate more in times of crisis.
Conversely, a gradual and incomplete U.S. withdrawal creates weaker reactions in Europe, causing countries to refrain from decisive actions to strengthen their defense. These analyses indicate that preemptive planning for the U.S. withdrawal from Europe is essential, and the lack of planning could lead to negative consequences.