Europe Alone and America Withdrawn
The political developments in the United States and the increasing power of China have raised the possibility of a reduced U.S. involvement in defending Europe in the coming years. However, the timing and manner of this reduced involvement are still unclear, and it is uncertain how European countries will react to this reduced participation.
This article examines three hypothetical but plausible scenarios regarding the decrease in U.S. participation in defending Europe over the next decade and assesses the likely trend of this reduced involvement and its dynamics.
These scenarios raise an imperative that many experts have previously discussed incidentally. The reduction of U.S. participation in defending Europe can happen in better or worse ways and consequently have fewer or more consequences. Precise planning can prevent the worst outcomes.
A Look at History
European policymakers and Washington elites were concerned for much of the Trump presidency that the U.S. president might order the United States to withdraw from the NATO alliance and leave Europe to fend for itself.
Despite Donald Trump’s repeated criticisms of European countries that, in his view, do not allocate sufficient budget to strengthen their defense capabilities, a series of actions, including lobbying by prominent European leaders with Washington and significant efforts by some of Trump’s appointees, have prevented the United States from withdrawing from NATO.
Today, the prospect of reduced US involvement in defending Europe has become more imminent than ever, along with the possibility of Trump winning the presidential election and returning to the White House. This time, with advisors closer to him compared to his first term, the United States faces challenges such as limited defense budget and a focus on the threat from China, which could have a significant impact on this trend.
Current discussions on Europe’s strategic autonomy and defense costs indicate that European capitals are also aware that in the coming years, they will have to shoulder more of the burden of readiness and defense costs themselves.
Although the arguments of supporters of the current situation, who say that America’s presence and participation in defending Europe can continue, are valid, the outlook on this issue is getting darker day by day.
It has never been so explicitly stated in a new report that European countries cannot defend themselves without relying on NATO and without the assistance of the United States, and at the same time, America’s commitment to European security has never been so shaky.
It is not an exaggeration to say that Europe’s security is less dependent on events in Moscow and more on decisions made in Washington.
This fact should not be very reassuring for Europeans.
Considering the increasing likelihood of reduced US involvement in ensuring European security in the coming years, the lack of planning for such conditions by American and European policymakers would be a dereliction of duty.
The issue is that the timing and manner of America’s distancing from its commitments to maintaining European security are still unclear.
This distancing could be the result of policymakers’ decisions or imposed through a series of unpredictable developments on America and Europe.
Europe’s reaction to the US withdrawal is still uncertain. Turning Europe into a defensive power capable of defending itself requires policymakers across the continent to make tough decisions, evaluate costs and benefits, and overcome deep political and institutional divides.
The dilemmas of Europe’s collective action
Lord Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, once made a very important and, of course, unpleasant statement about the purpose of NATO’s establishment. The goal of NATO is to keep the Soviet Union out of Europe, keep the Americans in Europe, and keep the Germans down.
This statement not only became famous for its brevity but also contained the unpleasant truth. Even at the time of its establishment in 1949, NATO was not a completely simple and unchallenging institution.
The main goal of forming this alliance was to defend against the Soviet Union, but NATO also allowed the United States to maintain influence over the security of Europe, prevent Germany from becoming an independent military force, and give European countries the opportunity to focus on rebuilding after the devastations of World War II. Over time, it became clear that NATO served another purpose as well. The original plan, at least until the Eisenhower administration, was for the US to end its role in Europe’s defense after European forces were prepared to ensure Europe’s security.
Historian Mark Trachtenberg says that if Eisenhower had said this once, he should have said it a thousand times that the extensive military presence of the US in Europe was initially supposed to be temporary.
However, it soon became evident that European countries had difficulties coordinating on defense issues. Differences regarding threat identification, military capabilities, and defense coordination made it challenging for the US to end its mission in Europe.
In the economic language of Europe, there was a collective action problem in the defense sector. Although creating a common defense against the Soviet Union seemed logical and efficient for European countries, the lack of sufficient motivation for individual governments made this task difficult. The simplest solution to address this issue was to continue American leadership.
This situation persisted for decades, even though European countries came closer in areas that seemed unrealistic in the 1940s. Much of Europe now has a common monetary and customs union, and the Schengen Agreement of 1985 has provided freedom of movement across a large part of this continent. However, defense policy still remains fiercely nationalistic.
The collective action problem has also become more complicated with political decisions from Brussels and Washington. In the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO and the European Union rapidly expanded, and the number of countries whose interests needed attention increased.
On the other hand, the United States has often actively undermined the ability of European countries to converge on defense matters outside of NATO and has used NATO itself as a tool to pursue its other political priorities, such as the war on terrorism and humanitarian interventions.
Ultimately, Europe’s inability to reach a consensus for collective action in the security domain persists, even though the threat from Russia has become more evident and the risk of America’s retreat from Europe has increased. The challenge today is not to convince elites that Europe should make more efforts to stand on its own feet.
As French President Emmanuel Macron declared in April, Europe must become stronger, not dependent on America.
Although only a few European leaders explicitly talk about this issue, in recent years, a wave of publications and public debates, often financially supported by European governments, have delved into how Europe can protect itself in the absence of America.
However, these discussions often highlight the inherent challenges of defense cooperation among European countries instead of providing solutions. Four main problems still remain.
The first dilemma for the concentration of Europe should be on what issues, although Washington likes to pretend that Europe acts as a unified entity, in reality, such a thing does not exist. The European Union has been able to bring its members closer in terms of trade, regulations, and finances, but it is not a unified political entity. Security decisions are still made in capitals that are thousands of kilometers apart. This means that European countries do not perceive threats in the same way.
Eastern European countries are concerned about Russia, southern European countries are worried about the Mediterranean Sea and the flow of migrants, and countries like France focus on their interests in Africa and other regions.
The second dilemma is where and for what purposes the costs should be incurred. Although Europe’s defense spending has increased by 25% since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, capabilities, not just costs, are important for defense.
On one hand, forces in recent years have been analyzed due to budget cuts, while on the other hand, there is a serious need for new armament systems and investment in defense production capacities, especially to fill the shortages traditionally supplied by the United States, such as unmanned aerial systems or short and medium-range missiles.
This situation has led to major disagreements among countries regarding prioritizing defense product production to guide costs and manage how to prevent others’ efforts from being repeated.
Some member countries are rightly concerned that delegating security authorities and decisions to other European capitals or to Brussels may put them in a difficult situation in case of a real war.
The dilemma of the economic advantage of increasing defense costs falls to which countries. A local perspective on the benefits of increasing defense costs plays an important role in the disagreements among European countries.
It is predicted that if the US distances itself from participating in the defense of Europe, it will pose a challenge for European countries as to how the budget allocated for defense matters in the European Union will be affected. Countries will seek to strengthen their domestic industries, leading to more pronounced differences among European countries.
In the past, an easy way was to purchase American weapons, but this prevented Europe from being able to strengthen its defense industries in the long run. Although defense industries in Europe have had continuous growth, it has been slow and unable to play a leading role in European industries.
The dilemma of the structure and organization of defense cooperation needs to be addressed. European mechanisms for joint command in war or decision-making in crisis situations have not been designed. On the other hand, NATO has a better position in defending Europe in crisis situations, but it is still heavily dependent on the capabilities and human resources of the United States.
Any valid path for the future of European defense must consider the division of labor among EU institutions, existing NATO structures, and the evolution of NATO subunits like the Visegrad Triangle and the Weimar Triangle involving France, Germany, and Poland.
Scenario one: Taiwan crisis
This scenario examines a crisis in the Asia-Pacific region that is likely to lead to a rapid and involuntary withdrawal of the United States from Europe.
In such a scenario, although we see efforts for bilateral negotiations and actions by some European countries to mitigate the damage caused by the US withdrawal from Europe, practical limitations in the US military systems and capabilities render that strategy ineffective.
On the other hand, the sudden and unexpected shock of this crisis leads to increased defense cooperation across Europe and, in a way, results in internal cohesion reminiscent of Jean Monnet’s theory that the European Union forms in times of crisis.
What is the political atmosphere like in Washington and Beijing? Simultaneously, in the US, Kamala Harris’ team, which aims to prove that women can be tough just like men, is at work. In Beijing, the situation is also very critical as China’s Defense Minister, Wei Fenghe, has warned that anyone daring to separate Taiwan from China will be crushed and destroyed.
Let’s see what triggered the war and what reactions occurred after a series of retaliatory economic actions between Taiwan and Beijing. Tensions escalated rapidly, and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy began moving its fleet to besiege Taiwan.
US President Kamala Harris, consulting with her advisors, decided to take a series of actions to lift the siege. Installing the American flag on Taiwanese ships and escorting commercial vessels from the encirclement of Chinese forces, which was tightening gradually. The flight of the B52 over the Taiwan Strait was among the US actions in this regard.
This last action led to a more extensive confrontation. A Chinese fighter jet trying to approach an American flight collided with the American aircraft due to a miscalculation, resulting in the deaths of both crews.
Shortly after, a US Navy ship accompanying commercial ships towards the Port of Hualien engaged with Chinese ships. This exchange of fire resulted in the deaths of four American sailors. With increasing public demands in the US for retaliation and striking against China, both sides moved towards a more extensive conflict.
The Seventh Fleet of the United States Navy was on standby in the East China Sea, but Kamala Harris ordered the Fifth and Sixth Fleet ships to be deployed through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Two strike groups, including aircraft carrier ships, were stationed in the Persian Gulf to prepare for the blockade of China’s oil resources, while the third group continued its route to the Pacific Ocean, leaving the Western Mediterranean Sea without the presence of US Navy forces for the first time in decades.
Naval forces quickly moved to the Senkaku Islands, Guam, and the Philippines, and the tenth command of the Air and Missile Force from Germany was also dispatched to the region.
To protect these forces, military planners proposed a plan to transfer all fifth-generation aircraft and most US drone units from Europe and the Middle East to this region. Patriot batteries were removed from Eastern European bases and quickly deployed around US bases at risk. Due to US reserves shortages and intensifying conflicts, US military assets were shifted towards Asia.
In just over two months, more US ground forces were transferred from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region.
Until the third month of the war in the Pacific Ocean, American nuclear weapons remained in NATO bases in Europe, but the number of American forces drastically decreased. This caused concern and uncertainty in European capitals. Europe has been dependent on American military assistance since World War II.
European policymakers quickly reacted, with some trying to persuade Washington to return to Europe with the support of America. However, most European countries were not willing to intervene in the war in Asia, and practical issues prevented the return of American forces.
The European Union quickly took action, issuing bonds for investment in European defense affairs, similar to previous crises. Despite the new financial resources, defense coordination in Europe remained a challenging issue. Over time, a combination of NATO structures and new groups such as the Eastern Partnership among Poland, Baltic countries, and Finland emerged to fill the void left by America.
The second scenario is the weakening of NATO due to America’s economic problems.
In this scenario, the debt crisis in America and severe financial constraints gradually led to a reduction in the military presence of the United States in Europe. In the 2020s, the political and economic crisis in America intensified, and by 2029, due to Congress’s failure to agree on the debt ceiling, the country’s economy plunged into a deep recession. This crisis resulted in a 20% reduction in the US defense budget.
Military forces and essential equipment necessary for defending Europe were gradually relocated to other regions, especially Asia. The gradual reduction of America’s presence in Europe raised concerns among Eastern European countries that feared Russian threats.
Although the US government continued to refer to its commitments to NATO and defending Europe, the presence of US military forces across the European continent dropped to less than 10,000 personnel.
Eastern European countries like Poland and Baltic states, which had the greatest concerns about Russian threats, gradually shifted from relying on NATO and the US to engaging in multilateral and national collaborations.
Poland focused on strengthening its defense forces and increased defense cooperation with Britain and Scandinavian countries. These countries were able to compensate for their defense deficiencies by increasing defense budgets and reviving arms production. However, the lack of coordination and extensive cooperation at the European level meant that Europe’s collective defense remained weaker than it should be.
Scenario Three: Trump’s Shock Scenario
In this scenario, Donald Trump decided in his second term as president to remove the US from its main role in NATO and transfer the responsibility of defending Europe to European countries. Despite domestic opposition, this decision led to the US no longer being the main security provider for Europe. Trump warned European countries with his policies that they should increase their defense budgets and ensure their security without relying on the US. Poland took advantage of this opportunity and by offering to build a base for 10,000 American soldiers, managed to attract Trump’s favorable opinion and maintain US support.
Other European countries also pursued bilateral negotiations with the United States but did not succeed like Poland. However, differences among European countries over defense costs and military cooperation increased.
These actions by Trump led NATO to become semi-active and Europe’s defense structure became inefficient and scattered. Many countries still adhered to their low defense budgets, and only a few countries like Poland were able to maintain support from the United States.
This situation increased the risk of conflicts and military tensions in Europe, posing new challenges for future US presidents who must decide whether to return to Europe or continue the withdrawal process.
Conclusion
These scenarios highlight significant challenges for American and European policymakers in redefining the security relationship between the two prominent sides. While the gradual withdrawal of the US from Europe is difficult and complex, it seems possible and even likely that the results of these scenarios indicate that a quick and complete US withdrawal could lead to better and more coordinated reactions from Europe, as EU member countries tend to show more cooperation during crises.
The gradual and incomplete withdrawal of the US creates weaker reactions in Europe and leads countries to refrain from decisive actions to strengthen their defense. These analyses indicate that advance planning for the US withdrawal from Europe is necessary, and lack of planning could have negative consequences.
