A friend of a friend or an enemy’s ally
A friend of a friend or an enemy’s ally
Let’s remember that Mohsen Rafighdoost belongs to the traditional right-wing faction.
A faction that has practically been suffocated under the feet of radicals and their young followers, and most of its prominent figures have either passed away or, if they remain, have leaned towards moderation due to the extreme radicalism of the new claimants of everything and everyone. Nateg Nouri, Ali Larijani, and recently Mohammad Reza Bahonar. Therefore, in a reverse approach, he wants to present himself as radical to say he is still in the game and cannot be eliminated.
Now, the name Mohsen Rafighdoost no longer just takes us back 46 years to the morning of February 1, 1979, when he played the role of Ayatollah Khomeini’s driver on the long journey from Mehrabad Airport to Behesht Zahra Cemetery, guiding that unforgettable Blazer through the waves of the crowd. Because in a recent interview with the Iranian Watchdog website, he made claims that, in spoken language, make one’s head spin.
Where he talked about participating in or leading or financing four political assassinations abroad, so astonishing and varied that a journalist sarcastically wrote if the conversation had continued a little longer, he might as well have claimed responsibility for the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah, saying he had given money to Mirza Reza Kermani to assassinate the Qajar king. However, those four cases were not considered first-tier political activists.
The first case is Shahriar Shafiq, the son of the Shah’s sister, who was assassinated in December 1979, a year when Rafighdoost was not yet the Minister of the IRGC but one of its founders.
The second case is the assassination of General Gholam Ali Oveisi, the military governor of Tehran during the intense days of the 1979 revolution, who was held responsible for the events of September 8 at Jaleh Square. This happened in February when Mr. Rafighdoost had become the Minister of the IRGC, but this ministry was established for logistical purposes and had no intelligence or security role.
The third case is the assassination of Shapour Bakhtiar on August 6, 1991.
Although some speculate that Mr. Rafighdoost meant the failed assassination of the last prime minister of the Pahlavi era by Anis Naqqash, or the first assassination, not the one at his later residence that led to Bakhtiar’s death. The fourth case is Fereydoun Farrokhzad, the famous pre-revolution TV showman, whom Mr. Rafighdoost described as one of ‘those flamboyant types.’ This last case also happened in August 1992, at a time when the Ministry of the IRGC no longer existed, and Rafighdoost had become the head of the Foundation of the Oppressed, although he had handed over his position at the IRGC Ministry to Ali Shamkhani before the end of the war.
The story of the four political assassinations, according to Mohsen Rafighdoost’s unique language, is as follows: We had a team there. Oveisi, the son of Ashraf, the flamboyant Farrokhzad, Bakhtiar, and all of them were usually assigned to teams there, often the Basque kids from Spain. These were the ones who carried out the hits, and that was it. We went to the Basque region of Spain. These are separatist Basque fighters. We said we want to assassinate such a person, and they said this is the price. There was an Egyptian cleric in Germany who was their friend. We left the money with him and said if the hit is carried out, give it to him.
In the past few days since Mohsen Rafighdoost’s remarks, three types of denials have been issued. One from his own office stating: Mr. Rafighdoost has undergone brain surgery with extensive complications in the past, and he might remember some memories and names incorrectly. In any case, the statements made are not legally or historically reliable.
Considering his prior illness and the lengthy interview, the statements made in the final part lack legal, historical, and international authenticity, and the media outlet publishing them should have considered these points before publication. Given the health status of Commander Rafighdoost after surgery, the lengthy interview, and the breadth of the topics discussed, it is not correct; only the official narrative about the events mentioned is confirmable. Some murders, like Fereydoun Farrokhzad’s, have no connection to Mr. Rafighdoost’s tenure.
In other words, if the interview had been shorter and not prolonged, he would have narrated it differently, and this too is perhaps a side effect of that brain surgery. However, in confirmation of the last case mentioned in the office’s statement and indeed denying what was said, a news agency close to military institutions quoted a note written in 2018 stating that Fereydoun Farrokhzad was likely killed by the Derafsh Kaviani organization led by Manouchehr Ganji.
Mr. Dehbashi believes that Farrokhzad, shocked by the collaboration between Derafsh Kaviani and the People’s Mujahedin with the Ba’athist regime of Iraq during the war with Iran, decided to return to Iran and expose the Rajavi cult despite his opposition to the leaders of the Islamic Republic.
Dehbashi also writes that Manouchehr Ganji, of course, does not accept the role of Derafsh Kaviani in Farrokhzad’s murder, but in an interview with him, he openly talks about Farrokhzad’s change in appearance and behavior towards the end of his life and even his secret relations with the Iranian embassy in Germany and his intention to return.
In another alleged matter, Ahmad Ali Masoud Ansari, a member of the Pahlavi court, in an interview in 2020, attributes General Oveisi’s murder to the Ba’athist regime of Iraq and connects the murder of Shahriar Shafiq, the son of Ashraf Pahlavi and an officer of the Imperial Iranian Navy, to Israel.
This news agency also asks if, assuming these claims are true, the responsibility for assassinating these individuals abroad was Mr. Rafighdoost’s, then undoubtedly such a matter would be considered classified and top-secret, and one must ask if these documents have been declassified or not.
And if they have been declassified, where are they, and why haven’t they been made public? Which agency authorized Mr. Rafighdoost to disclose this information? On whose behalf did Mr. Rafighdoost take on this responsibility?
Another question the principled news agency could have asked, but intentionally and deliberately did not, is that if a journalist were to utter or write such content even hypothetically, wouldn’t the principled media demand action?
In the meantime, although they have mildly called for the public prosecutor to get involved and demand evidence, they have also added a sarcastic note, recalling the famous saying that if you were such a good digger, you would have dug your own garden. They stated that if an individual was so intelligent and calculating that he could carry out such complex operations and yet could not manage the Foundation of the Oppressed and was dismissed, and at the same time managed to keep all these events hidden for many years, he naturally cannot be so ignorant as to publicly disclose these matters. This, in itself, further increases the doubt about the truth of Rafighdoost’s statements.
Regarding why Mohsen Rafighdoost behaved this way, there are speculations, and this note, without wanting to elevate one over the others, considers one case more prominent and probable, the same one for clarification from Masoud Kimiaei and the story of washing Forough’s body.
The first possibility is that Mr. Rafighdoost wanted to defend the Islamic Republic, and in doing so, what was once a supportive ally has now become a burden.
The second possibility is the same as mentioned in the statement of the former head of the Foundation of the Oppressed’s office.
However, just as the testimony of a servant for a master is invalid and lacks credibility in court, it cannot be accepted here unless his doctor is involved. It is unlikely that Mohsen Rafighdoost will end up in court. The third possibility is that he actually did these things, but not to the extent he claims, and has exaggerated the situation, perhaps because as he ages, he wants to store up merit for the hereafter, as he puts it, ‘God willing, accept it,’ although killing people without trial is not acceptable.
It is enough to remember years ago, in December 2010, when he had not yet undergone brain surgery and held a position of responsibility, he recounted a memory of killing a SAVAK officer as follows: One evening, I was walking down Sahib Jam Street, it was just getting dark.
I saw this SAVAK agent coming down the street, and it was clear he was drunk. I saw him a few more times after that, and then I decided to do something about him, although he wasn’t very regular in his comings and goings.
He usually came and went home around 9:30 or 10 at night.
I had gone to Mashhad to visit Ayatollah Milani.
I told him the story in general terms, that there was a person like this. He said such people are blood-worthy, they are oppressors, they are the tools of oppression.
After some time, I explained the matter more openly to the late Motahari, and then, in another way, I presented this matter to Mr. Mahdavi Kani, who was fortunately alive at the time of the interview, and may God give him a long life.
One night, when it was raining heavily, perhaps one of those nights when it rarely rained like that in Tehran.
Finally, he got out of the car and wanted to go home.
I was hiding and hit him on the head with a stick. He fell, and I hit him seven or eight more times on the head, pushed him into the water ditch, and left.
After a while, I told the late Andarzgoo about the matter. Andarzgoo said all of them deserve to be killed, but don’t do anything that might get you caught, because if we’re going to get caught, let’s get caught for higher causes, which God willing, will accept.
The fourth possibility is that he has always wanted to appear more important and serious than he actually was, and in today’s terms, his appearance is more than his being, as he might have fabricated more elaborate stories from a meeting with Muammar Gaddafi, the former leader of Libya, than actually happened.
The fifth possibility is that he may be worried about an incident and wants to prevent it, especially as doubts increase with age. The seventh scenario, however, is similar to the hypothesis regarding Masoud Kimiaei’s claim about washing Forough Farrokhzad’s body in the mortuary.
At that time, I wrote that his mind was so engrossed in cinema and imagination that he mixed reality and imagination, and in fact, what he said was a fabrication that did not add to Kimiaei’s credibility.
At that time, I wrote that his mind was so engrossed in cinema and imagination that he mixed reality and imagination, and in fact, what he said was a fabrication that did not add to Kimiaei’s credibility.
At that time, I wrote that his mind was so engrossed in cinema and imagination that he mixed reality and imagination, and in fact, what he said was a fabrication that did not add to Kimiaei’s credibility.
The seventh possibility is similar to the hypothesis regarding Masoud Kimiaei’s claim about washing Forough Farrokhzad’s body in the mortuary.
At that time, I wrote that his mind was so engrossed in cinema and imagination that he mixed reality and imagination, and in fact, what he said was a fabrication that did not add to Kimiaei’s credibility.
At that time, I wrote that his mind was so engrossed in cinema and imagination that he mixed reality and imagination, and in fact, what he said was a fabrication that did not add to Kimiaei’s credibility.
At that time, I wrote that his mind was so engrossed in cinema and imagination that he mixed reality and imagination, and in fact, what he said was a fabrication that did not add to Kimiaei’s credibility.
At that time, I wrote that his mind was so engrossed in cinema and imagination that he mixed reality and imagination, and in fact, what he said was a fabrication that did not add to Kimiaei’s credibility.
So far, it has only provided fodder for Persian-language media outside the country, and fortunately, the entire responsibility lies with the speaker. The expectation that the media should verify the statements of someone who was the Minister of the IRGC in the 1980s and the head of the Foundation of the Oppressed in the 1990s is unrealistic.
In this situation, where relations with Europe could provide a way out for us, this channel might also be closed.