Gaza One Year After the Event
One year after the Gaza war, the conflict has left deep political, security, and social wounds affecting the entire Middle East and North Africa.
The Gaza Strip, governed by Hamas since 2007 and under Israeli blockade for nearly two decades, has suffered extensive destruction and its infrastructure has been severely damaged.
A year has passed and the Gaza war remains unresolved, with the likelihood of war across the region increasing.
What is the humanitarian situation like? Will there be normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel? What is the future of the Abraham Accords? Will a regional war occur? Experts at the Atlantic Council have answered these questions.
Israel’s Relations with the United States
Israel has entered a phase referred to as a new status, with a schizophrenic rhythm in its relations with the United States.
This is because critical issues for both sides are heavily intertwined with domestic political considerations.
On one hand, both sides remain aligned in their commitment to ensuring Israel’s security. The Biden administration has uniquely supported Israel with military, intelligence, and diplomatic assistance, thereby strengthening the Israeli Defense Forces.
On the other hand, this cooperation is under intense scrutiny from public opinion in both the United States and Israel, with some believing Washington is either overly supportive or not supportive enough of its engaged ally.
These contradictory realities complicate the relationship, with current tensions revolving around how the Netanyahu government is pursuing its objectives.
U.S. efforts to promote hostages’ freedom and a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, halt conflicts across the Israel-Lebanon border, institutionalize a U.S. Central Command-led regional defense architecture, and potentially deepen Israel’s regional integration have not succeeded because of Israel’s shortcomings. Israel prioritizes continuing Israeli army maneuvers in the operational scene and resists efforts to transfer control to other foreign organizations. With the next U.S. administration taking office in January 2025, the problem facing Israel will become more acute.
The Humanitarian Situation in Gaza
Gaza’s streets are filled with rubble, and tents can be seen everywhere.
Sewage is left in the streets, and Gaza’s streets have become paths for human and donkey carts. The situation in Gaza worsens daily. Since the Rafah border crossing was closed following Israel’s invasion of the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip, humanitarian aid has drastically decreased. Even basic necessities like soap are scarce. What is available in the commercial market is extremely expensive, and relief organizations have been unable to provide hygiene packages since June. The spread of contagious diseases, from hepatitis A to meningitis and skin disease impetigo, a flesh-eating bacterium, endangers children whose bodies are too weak to fight infection and who suffer from malnutrition.
Humanitarian efforts face strange challenges during the war. In short, Gaza is effectively divided into two parts by Israeli forces. Crossing from north to south and moving to any point to receive humanitarian aid requires Israeli permission. Israel no longer needs to kill in Gaza. If humanitarian organizations continue to face deliberate obstacles and cannot provide what people need, Gazans will die in more painful ways and in greater numbers.
Israel-Iran Confrontation
Amos Hochstein, the U.S. envoy, and other diplomats have been trying for months to reach an agreement to halt conflicts in southern Lebanon. A severe Israeli attack on Hezbollah might strengthen the diplomats’ leverage, even if no political solution is found. Israel can use a temporary period without war to prepare for potential conflicts. More broadly, confronting Iran, including its nuclear program and the ongoing threat from the resistance axis, is not something Israel can handle alone.
However, ending the Gaza war with a plan for reconstruction, bringing moderate leadership to power in Palestine, and ultimately establishing a Palestinian state could help Israel garner regional and international support to address these challenges. Such a plan would pave the way for Arab governments to engage with Israel and could balance and isolate Iran and its allies. Iran pursues a long-term strategy to keep Israel under pressure and provoke actions that would elicit regional and international reactions and weaken the resolve of the Israeli people. Israel needs a long-term plan that ensures regional cooperation and maintains international standing and U.S. support.
Israel Has Lost Its Patience
One of the key considerations that has helped keep the battle below the threshold of full-scale war is that Hezbollah has not yet started using its more advanced weapon systems, namely its arsenal of precision-guided missiles. On September 25, Hezbollah launched a liquid-fueled Qadir-1 missile toward the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad’s headquarters near Tel Aviv.
As Hezbollah undoubtedly expected, the missile was intercepted by Israel’s air defense systems. The launch served as a warning to Israel that Hezbollah has only used older unguided rockets to attack Israeli targets. Hezbollah is believed to have an arsenal of 150,000 rockets and missiles with various calibers and ranges, including precision-guided systems that carry 500-kilogram warheads and can hit their targets with 50-meter accuracy.
The reason Hezbollah has not yet resorted to more complex systems is Iran. Tehran does not want Hezbollah, as a key component of its deterrence architecture, the resistance axis, to engage in a massive and debilitating war with Israel over Hamas in Gaza. Hezbollah holds significant value for Iran. If Hezbollah starts launching Fateh-110 missiles at Tel Aviv and other Israeli areas, a full-scale war would undoubtedly ensue. Iran’s caution has led to frustration among Hezbollah cadres.
They prefer to use more advanced systems to inflict real damage and pain on Israel. Despite the intensity of Israeli airstrikes and targeted assassinations of Hezbollah commanders, surrendering to the onslaught and calling for a ceasefire goes against the organization’s DNA. In fact, the extent of the damage Hezbollah has suffered is currently unclear. Israeli officials claim that half of Hezbollah’s precision-guided missiles were destroyed in these airstrikes, and the organization is in disarray. So far, there is little evidence to support such claims. Hezbollah has increased its rocket attacks on Israel at an accelerating pace and has targeted Israeli military objectives deeper within Israel more than before.
Arab Reluctance to Escalate Tensions with Iran
When politicians and commentators discuss the prospect of a regional war in the Middle East, stemming from escalating border conflicts between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah, what they are really predicting or fearing is a war that Israel has launched against Iran. There is little sympathy for Iran in the Arab Gulf countries, but these countries have no interest in joining a war against Iran.
In fact, Gulf countries have normalized their relations with Iran over the past few years. Any involvement of Gulf countries in a conflict with Iran would likely be limited to some intelligence-sharing permissions and air flights. There is doubt whether countries like Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates would allow actions against Iran from U.S. bases on their soil. The main advocate for a major war with Iran would be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has long supported the removal of the Islamic Republic as the only real way to address threats against Israel.
These regime change hints are almost unwelcome in the Gulf countries, which have closely observed the results of U.S. efforts in Iraq. Meanwhile, conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon will likely continue to some extent in the coming year. Neither Hamas nor Hezbollah is likely to cease their attacks. Continued conflict, even at a low level, prevents any significant reconstruction in Gaza and makes it very difficult for people to return to their homes in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.
Tensions in Israel-Egypt Relations
A year has passed since the deadly attacks by Hamas on southern Israel on October 7, 2023. The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas has impacted Egypt-Israel relations, reversing years of progress and disrupting the relationship between the two neighbors. Egypt-Israel relations had significantly improved in the years before the war, particularly after Israel agreed to Cairo’s request for help in dealing with insurgencies by ISIS-affiliated militants in northern Sinai.
In 2013, Cairo called for amending the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to allow the deployment of additional troops and military equipment in the Sinai Peninsula. Israel agreed and allowed about 66,000 Egyptian troops to be stationed in the Sinai. Israel also strengthened its security cooperation with Egypt, providing strategic assistance, including intelligence and aerial support, which ultimately helped Cairo contain this threat.
However, the Israel-Hamas war has heightened tensions between Egypt and Israel. Over the past year, accusations and warnings have been exchanged between the two sides over several disputed issues. In the early weeks of the war, inflammatory statements by some of the far-right nationalist ministers in Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet, suggesting that Egypt accept Palestinian refugees and resettle them in Sinai, provoked an angry reaction from Cairo. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi emphasized that the Israel-Palestine conflict cannot be resolved at the expense of other parties and warned that such an action could jeopardize the peace treaty.
Egypt and Israel have also blamed each other for the closure of the Rafah border, which led to the blocking of aid trucks at Rafah. While the peace treaty is likely to remain intact, repairing the damage in relations with Egypt will require significant diplomacy from Israel. If Cairo succeeds in mediating a ceasefire and hostage exchange between Israel and Hamas, this issue might be a game-changer for restoring relations to their pre-war status.
Eradicating Hamas and the Possibility of Uprising in Gaza
With 40% of its fighters remaining on the battlefield, Hamas still has the capability to conduct a large-scale attack in the future. Thus, there is doubt that Israel will agree to end the war unless Hamas is further degraded. Israel has largely reached the end of major combat operations by clearing Gaza City, Khan Younis, and Rafah.
This means nearly half of Hamas fighters have either blended in with the civilian population or remain hidden among the scattered buildings and tunnels in Gaza. Israel will likely have to continue re-clearing operations across the Gaza Strip for a long time. Even if a short-term deal for the remaining hostages is made, it is unlikely that Netanyahu will allow this number of Hamas fighters to remain.
Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas leader, in Tehran, but Yahya Sinwar, the group’s military commander and architect of the October 7 attack, quickly replaced him. Meanwhile, Israel is compelled to begin state-building in Gaza, as the declared goal is to replace Hamas with another group in Gaza. Hamas has governed Gaza since the last elections in 2006. Recent media reports indicate that a multinational peacekeeping force comprised of police officers will be formed to secure Gaza. If the people of Gaza reject the presence of this security force, a rebellion is likely.
Gaza After the War
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated Israel’s post-war goal for Gaza in his July 25 speech to the U.S. Congress: Gaza should have a civilian government run by Palestinians who do not seek Israel’s destruction. On May 31, Joe Biden set the U.S. goal of ending the war durably, ensuring all hostages return home, guaranteeing Israel’s security, and shaping a better post-war Gaza without Hamas. Clearly, military power alone will not achieve these goals.
History teaches us lessons that post-war planners should heed, such as the stories of Germany and Japan after World War II and Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan post-war. Who governs Gaza is crucial. Foreign experts, Israeli political leaders, and the United Arab Emirates all call for Gaza to be managed in a transitional period by a multinational authority under the supervision of an international contact group with a strong international police force to prevent Hamas’s return to power.
Some political issues need resolution, and only the United States can find a solution. All these plans acknowledge that achieving Biden’s goal requires more direct U.S. involvement than the U.S. has been willing to undertake, but there is no alternative to preventing Hamas’s return to power. Remember the phrase ‘Winter is Coming’ from the Game of Thrones series.
The Future of the Abraham Accords
The future of the Abraham Accords cannot be fully realized without a sustainable and just solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Although these accords have faced criticism for sidelining the Palestinian issue, there is still potential for them to serve as a framework to re-encourage dialogue. Additionally, the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia in these accords could be transformative.
Riyadh has shown interest, but any formal move will likely depend on meaningful progress toward resolving the Palestinian situation. Riyadh’s participation would not only bolster the accords but could also pave the way for broader acceptance of Israel in the region, further reshaping Middle East geopolitics, and potentially opening new avenues for comprehensively addressing Palestinian concerns. Looking ahead, the survival and success of the Abraham Accords depend on the continued commitment of all parties to maintain open dialogue, strengthen economic ties, and reinforce people-to-people connections beyond political tensions.
Normalization of Saudi-Israel Relations
Quiet cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia has neither stopped nor diminished one year after Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. From the outset of normalization discussions, Saudi Arabia insisted that the public formalization of relations only occur with the parallel formalization of a pathway for the formation of a Palestinian state. This path seemed more like a vague concept just before October 7. If the United States provided a defense guarantee to support Riyadh’s civilian nuclear energy program, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was ready for normalization.
However, it was Israel that did not accept. While Saudi Arabia refuses to formalize Israel’s integration with the Arab world until Tel Aviv commits to the future formation of a Palestinian state, countries like Qatar and Kuwait are compelled to defend their relations with Israel less and less each day. Even the United Arab Emirates has tied its continued relations with Israel to the two-state solution path. Despite differences in models, Saudi Arabia and Israel have similar assessments of threats to their governance models. Do not mistake their secrecy for a lack of forward movement.
Israel’s Shift to the Right
A year later, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has yet to recover from the October 7 defeat. Nevertheless, he has shown his usual shrewdness in maintaining his coalition, and the hopes of many Israelis for early elections have faded. Israel’s economy, already hit by controversial judicial reforms before October 7, has been further damaged by the war. Opening a second front with Hezbollah harms this economy even more. However, despite all the turmoil, Netanyahu continues to dig himself out of the hole and increase his popularity.
Recent polls show that although Netanyahu may not necessarily be able to form a coalition, he would still receive the most votes of any party if elections were held. The Israeli left has disappeared. Nationwide polls indicate that 66% of Jewish Israelis and 61% of Palestinians believe the other side wants to commit genocide against them. The views of Israel’s right-wing have increasingly solidified and become mainstream.