Gaza One Year After the Event
One year after the Gaza war, this conflict has left deep political, security, and social wounds that have affected the entire Middle East and North Africa.
The Gaza Strip, governed by Hamas since 2007 and under Israeli blockade for nearly two decades, has suffered extensive destruction, with its infrastructure severely damaged.
A year has passed, and the Gaza war remains unresolved, with the likelihood of war throughout the region having increased.
What is the humanitarian situation like? Will there be normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel? What is the future of the Abraham Accords? Will a regional war occur? Experts from the Atlantic Council think tank have answered these questions.
Israel’s Relations with the United States
Israel has entered what is called a new state, with a schizophrenic rhythm in its relations with the United States.
This is because important issues for both sides are deeply intertwined with domestic political considerations.
On one hand, the two sides remain aligned in their commitment to ensuring Israel’s security. The Biden administration has uniquely supported Israel with military, intelligence, and diplomatic aid, thereby strengthening the Israeli Defense Forces.
On the other hand, this cooperation has been heavily criticized by public opinion in both the United States and Israel, with some believing Washington has either over-supported or not supported its involved ally enough.
These conflicting realities complicate the relationship. Today, tensions revolve around the methods by which the Netanyahu government pursues its objectives.
U.S. efforts to promote hostage freedom and a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, halt conflicts across the Israeli-Lebanese border, institutionalize a regional defense architecture led by U.S. Central Command, and possibly deepen Israel’s integration into the region have not succeeded because Israel has underperformed. Israel prioritizes continuing its military maneuvers on the operational scene and resists efforts to transfer control to other foreign organizations. With the next U.S. administration taking office in January 2025, the problem facing Israel will likely become more acute.
The Humanitarian Situation in Gaza
The streets of Gaza are filled with debris, and tents are visible everywhere.
Sewers are left open in the streets. Gaza’s streets have become routes for human and donkey carts. The situation in Gaza worsens daily. Since the Rafah border crossing was closed following Israel’s incursion into the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip, humanitarian aid has sharply decreased. Even basic necessities like soap are scarce. What is available in the commercial market is extremely expensive, and aid organizations have been unable to provide hygiene packages since June. The spread of contagious diseases, from Hepatitis A to meningitis and the skin disease impetigo, a flesh-eating bacteria, endangers children whose bodies are too weak to fight infection and are malnourished.
Humanitarian efforts face strange challenges in the war. In short, Gaza is practically divided into two by Israeli forces. Crossing from north to south and moving to any point to receive humanitarian aid requires Israeli permission. Israel no longer needs to kill in Gaza if humanitarian organizations continue to face deliberate obstacles and cannot provide what people need. The people of Gaza will die in more painful ways and in greater numbers.
The Confrontation Between Israel and Iran
Amos Hochstein, the U.S. envoy, and other diplomats have worked for months to reach an agreement on halting conflict in southern Lebanon. Israel’s intense attack on Hezbollah might strengthen diplomats’ leverage, even if no political solution is found. Israel could use a temporary period without war to prepare for potential conflicts. More broadly, confronting Iran, including its nuclear program and the ongoing threat from the Axis of Resistance, is not something Israel can handle alone.
However, ending the Gaza war with a plan for reconstruction, the rise of moderate leadership in Palestine, and ultimately the establishment of a Palestinian state could help Israel garner regional and international support to tackle these challenges. Such a plan would pave the way for Arab governments to engage with Israel and could balance and isolate Iran and its allies. Iran pursues a long-term strategy to keep Israel under pressure and provoke actions that elicit regional and international reactions, weakening the resolve of the Israeli people. But Israel needs a long-term plan that ensures regional cooperation and maintains international stature and U.S. support.
Israel Has Lost Patience
One of the key considerations that has helped maintain the battle below the threshold of total war is that Hezbollah has not yet started using its more advanced weapon systems, namely its arsenal of precision-guided missiles. On September 25, Hezbollah fired a liquid-fueled Qadir-1 missile at the headquarters of Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad near Tel Aviv.
As Hezbollah undoubtedly expected, the missile was intercepted by Israel’s air defense systems. The launch of this missile served as a warning to Israel that Hezbollah has only used older unguided rockets to attack Israeli targets. Hezbollah is believed to have an arsenal of 150,000 rockets and missiles of various calibers and ranges, including precision-guided systems that carry 500-kilogram warheads and can strike their targets with 50-meter accuracy.
The reason Hezbollah has not yet resorted to more complex systems is Iran. Tehran does not want Hezbollah, as a key component of its deterrence architecture, the Axis of Resistance, to become embroiled in a massive and debilitating war with Israel over Hamas in Gaza. Hezbollah holds significant value for Iran. If Hezbollah starts launching Fateh-110 missiles at Tel Aviv and other Israeli areas, a full-scale war will undoubtedly erupt. Iran’s caution has led to frustration among Hezbollah cadres.
They prefer to use more advanced systems to inflict real damage and pain on Israel. Despite the intensity of Israeli airstrikes and targeted assassinations of Hezbollah commanders, surrendering to the onslaught and calling for a ceasefire is contrary to the organization’s DNA. In fact, the extent of damage Hezbollah has sustained is currently unclear. Israeli officials have claimed that half of Hezbollah’s precision-guided missiles have been destroyed in these airstrikes, leaving the organization in disarray. So far, there is little evidence to support such claims. Hezbollah has increased the pace of its rocket attacks on Israel, targeting Israeli military objectives deeper within Israel more than ever before.
Arab Reluctance to Escalate Tensions with Iran
When politicians and commentators speak about the prospect of a regional war in the Middle East resulting from escalating border conflicts between Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah, what they are really predicting or fearing is a war that Israel has waged against Iran. There is little sympathy for Iran in the Arab Gulf states, but these countries have no interest in joining a war against Iran.
In fact, the Gulf states have normalized their relations with Iran over the past few years. Any involvement of Gulf countries in a conflict with Iran would likely be limited to some intelligence-sharing permissions and air flights. There is doubt whether countries like Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates would allow actions against Iran from U.S. bases on their soil. The main proponent of a major war with Iran would be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has long supported the removal of the Islamic Republic as the only real way to address threats against Israel.
These regime change hints are not well received in the Gulf states, which have closely observed the results of U.S. efforts in Iraq. Meanwhile, conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon are likely to continue to some extent in the coming year. Neither Hamas nor Hezbollah is likely to cease their attacks. Continued conflict, even at a low level, will prevent any significant reconstruction in Gaza and make it very difficult for people to return to their homes in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.
Tensions in Israel-Egypt Relations
A year has passed since the deadly attacks on October 7, 2023, by Hamas on southern Israel. The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas has affected Egypt-Israel relations, reversing years of progress and disrupting the ties between the two neighbors. Relations between Egypt and Israel had significantly improved in the years before the war, especially after Israel agreed to Cairo’s request for assistance in combating ISIS-affiliated militant insurgencies in northern Sinai.
In 2013, Cairo sought to amend the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to allow the deployment of additional troops and military equipment in the Sinai Peninsula. Israel agreed and allowed about 66,000 Egyptian soldiers to be stationed in Sinai. Israel also strengthened its security cooperation with Egypt, providing strategic assistance, including intelligence and air support, which ultimately helped Cairo contain this threat.
However, the Israel-Hamas war has heightened tensions between Egypt and Israel. Over the past year, accusations and warnings have been exchanged between the two sides over a number of disputed issues. In the early weeks of the war, inflammatory statements by some of Netanyahu’s ultra-nationalist cabinet ministers, suggesting that Egypt accept Palestinian refugees and resettle them in Sinai, provoked an angry reaction from Cairo. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi emphasized that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be resolved at the expense of other parties and warned that such an action could endanger the peace treaty.
Egypt and Israel have also blamed each other for the closure of the Rafah border, which led to the blocking of humanitarian aid trucks at Rafah. While the peace treaty is likely to remain intact, a lot of diplomacy from Israel will be needed to repair the damage in relations with Egypt. If Cairo succeeds in mediating a ceasefire and hostage exchange between Israel and Hamas, this issue could be a game-changer for restoring relations to their pre-war state.
Eradicating Hamas and the Possibility of Insurrection in Gaza
With 40% of its fighters remaining on the battlefield, Hamas still has the capability to launch a large-scale attack in the future. Thus, there is doubt that Israel will agree to end the war unless Hamas is further degraded. Israel has largely completed its major combat operations by clearing Gaza City, Khan Younis, and Rafah.
This means that nearly half of Hamas fighters have either blended with the civilian population or remain hidden among the scattered buildings and tunnels in Gaza. Israel will likely have to continue re-clearing operations throughout the Gaza Strip for a long time. Even if a short-term deal is reached for the remaining hostages, it is unlikely that Netanyahu will allow this number of Hamas fighters to remain.
Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas leader, in Tehran, but Yahya Sinwar, the group’s military commander and architect of the October 7 attack, quickly replaced him. Meanwhile, Israel is forced to begin nation-building in Gaza, as the declared goal is to replace Hamas with another group in Gaza. Hamas has governed Gaza since the last elections in 2006. Recent media reports suggest that a multinational peacekeeping force composed of police officers will be formed to secure Gaza. If the people of Gaza reject the presence of this security force, an insurrection is likely.
Gaza After the War
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in his July 25 speech to the U.S. Congress, stated Israel’s goal for Gaza after the war. Gaza should have a civilian government run by Palestinians who do not seek the destruction of Israel. On May 31, Joe Biden set the United States’ goal to end the war sustainably, ensuring all hostages return home, securing Israel, and creating a better post-war Gaza without Hamas. Clearly, military power alone will not achieve these goals.
History teaches us lessons that post-war planners should heed, such as the stories of Germany and Japan after World War II and Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan after the war. Who governs Gaza is crucial. Foreign experts, Israeli political leaders, and the United Arab Emirates all call for Gaza to be managed in a transitional period by a multinational authority under the supervision of an international contact group with a strong international police force that can prevent Hamas from returning to power.
Some political issues need resolution, and only the United States can find a solution. All these plans acknowledge that achieving Biden’s goal requires direct U.S. involvement more than the United States has been willing to do. However, there is no alternative to preventing Hamas from returning to power. Remember the phrase ‘Winter is Coming’ from the Game of Thrones series.
The Future of the Abraham Accords
The future of the Abraham Accords cannot be fully realized without a sustainable and just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although these accords have faced criticism for sidelining the Palestinian issue, there is still potential for them to serve as a framework to re-encourage dialogues. Additionally, the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia in these accords could be transformative.
Riyadh has shown interest, but any formal action will likely depend on meaningful progress toward resolving the Palestinian situation. Riyadh’s participation would not only strengthen the accords but could also pave the way for broader acceptance of Israel in the region, further transforming Middle East geopolitics and potentially opening new avenues for comprehensively addressing Palestinian concerns. Looking ahead, the survival and success of the Abraham Accords depend on the continued commitment of all parties to maintain an open dialogue path, strengthen economic ties, and reinforce people-to-people connections that go beyond political tensions.
Normalization of Saudi-Israeli Relations
The quiet cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, one year after Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, has neither stopped nor diminished. Saudi Arabia insisted from the start of discussions on normalization that public formalization of relations would only occur with the parallel formalization of a path to forming a Palestinian state. This path seemed more like a vague concept just before October 7. If the United States provided a defense guarantee to support Riyadh’s civilian nuclear energy program, Saudi Arabia was ready for normalization.
But it was Israel that did not accept the conditions. While Saudi Arabia refuses to formalize Israel’s integration with the Arab world until Tel Aviv commits to forming a Palestinian state in the future, countries like Qatar and Kuwait are forced to defend their relations with Israel less and less each day. Even the United Arab Emirates has tied its continued relations with Israel to the two-state solution path. Despite differences in models, Saudi Arabia and Israel have similar assessments of threats to their governance models. Do not mistake their secrecy for a lack of forward movement.
Israel’s Shift to the Right
After a year, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has yet to recover from the October 7 defeat. However, he has shown cunning in maintaining his coalition, and many Israelis’ hopes for early elections have faded. Israel’s economy, which was previously hit by controversial judicial reforms before October 7, has been damaged by the war. Opening a second front with Hezbollah further harms this economy. Nevertheless, despite all the turmoil, Netanyahu continues to pull himself out of the pit and increase his popularity.
Recent polls show that although Netanyahu may not be able to form a coalition, he would still receive the most votes of any party if elections were held. The Israeli left has vanished. Nationwide polls show that 66% of Jewish Israelis and 61% of Palestinians believe the other side wants to commit genocide against them. The views of the Israeli right have increasingly solidified and become mainstream.
